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Abstract 
 
This thesis studies the trading of the Chinese American Depositories Receipts (ADRs) 
and their respective underlying H shares issued in Hong Kong. The primary intention of 
this work is to investigate the arbitrage opportunity between the Chinese ADRs and their 
underlying H shares. This intention is motivated by the market observation that hedge 
funds are often in the top 10 shareholders of these Chinese ADRs. We start our study 
from the origin place of the Chinese ADRs, China’s stock market. We pay particular 
attention to the ownership structure of the Chinese listed firms, because part of the 
Chinese ADRs also listed A shares (exclusively owned by the Chinese citizens) in 
Shanghai. We also pay attention to the market microstructures and trading costs of the 
three China-related stock exchanges. We then proceed to empirical study on the Chinese 
ADRs arbitrage possibility by comparing the return distribution of two securities; we find 
these two securities are different in their return distributions, and which is due to the 
inequality in the higher moments, such as skewness, and kurtosis. Based on the law of 
one price and the weak-form efficient markets, the prices of identical securities that are 
traded in different markets should be similar, as any deviation in their prices will be 
arbitraged away. Given the intrinsic property of the ADRs that a convenient transferable 
mechanism exists between the ADRs and their underlying shares which makes arbitrage 
easy; the different return distributions of the ADRs and the underlying shares address the 
question that if arbitrage is costly that the equilibrium price of the security achieved in 
each market is affected mainly by its local market where the Chinese ADRs/the 
underlying Hong Kong shares are traded, such as the demand for and the supply of the 
stock in each market, the different market microstructures and market mechanisms which 
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produce different trading costs in each market, and different noise trading arose from 
asymmetric information across multi-markets. And because of these trading costs, noise 
trading risk, and liquidity risk, the arbitrage opportunity between the two markets would 
not be exploited promptly. This concern then leads to the second intention of this work 
that how noise trading and trading cost comes into playing the role of determining asset 
prices, which makes us to empirically investigate the comovement effect, as well as 
liquidity risk. With regards to these issues, we progress into two strands, firstly, we test 
the relationship between the price differentials of the Chinese ADRs and the market 
return of the US and Hong Kong market. This test is to examine the comovement effect 
which is caused by asynchronous noise trading. We find the US market impact dominant 
over Hong Kong market impact, though both markets display significant impact on the 
ADRs’ price differentials. Secondly, we analyze the liquidity effect on the Chinese ADRs 
and their underlying Hong Kong shares by using two proxies to measure illiquidity cost 
and liquidity risk. We find significant positive relation between return and trading volume 
which is used to capture liquidity risk. This finding leads to a deeper study on the 
relationship between trading volume and return volatility from market microstructure 
perspective. In order to verify a proper model to describe return volatility, we carry out 
test to examine the heteroscedasticity condition, and proceed to use two asymmetric 
GARCH models to capture leverage effect. We find the Chinese ADRs and their 
underlying Hong Kong shares have different patterns in the leverage effect as modeled by 
these two asymmetric GARCH models, and this finding from another angle explains why 
these two securities are unequal in the higher moments of their return distribution. We 
then test two opposite hypotheses about volume-volatility relation. The Mixture of 
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Distributions Hypothesis suggests a positive relation between contemporaneous volume 
and volatility, while the Sequential Information Arrival Hypothesis indicates a causality 
relationship between lead-lag volume and volatility. We find supportive evidence for the 
Sequential Information Arrival Hypothesis but not for the Mixture of Distributions 
Hypothesis. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
What determines asset prices? The standard theory in financial economics, the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH), argues prices are always consistent with the ‘fundamentals’; 
and equilibrium prices are passively achieved by the market, because an efficient market 
should ‘fully reflect all available information’ (Fama, 1991). This implies that the market 
processes information rationally, in the sense that relevant information is not ignored, and 
systematic errors are not made.  
Based on the EMH, in the classic asset pricing theory, the fundamental value of 
an asset is measured by the delay or the risk of payoff, if an asset is over-priced 
(under-priced), which implies a low (high) rate of return. So, return accounts for 
compensation for the risk of holding an asset. 
   However, one question arose when scholars attempted to shed some lights on 
how securities are traded in the market, that is whether the equilibrium price consistent 
with the ‘fundamentals’ would be achieved by the market? Demsetz (1968) suggested 
that trade may involve some cost, which could be explicit or implicit. And he referred to 
the implicit cost as the costs connected with immediate execution of trading. Trading in 
stock markets can sometimes be frictional in the sense that supply and demand may fail 
to match. Under such circumstances somebody, most probably the market makers, have 
to offer liquidity for ‘immediate execution of trading’ to take place. The market makers 
who supply this liquidity must be compensated for the risk they have taken by trading an 
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asset immediately before its equilibrium price has been established. So, return, in this 
sense, also accounts for compensation for the risk of trading an asset. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) carried out an empirical study of trading cost and found a direct link 
between securities return and liquidity measured by their bid-ask spread. Since then, the 
empirical relationships between return and liquidity have been well documented.  
The purpose of this thesis is to consider a particular setting where an identical 
security (e.g. American Depository Receipt (ADR)) is traded in multiple markets, and to 
study why an ADR and its identical underlying share are not guaranteed to be traded at 
the same price in host and home markets. An American Depository Receipt (ADR) 
represents the ownership in the shares of a foreign company trading on the US financial 
markets and subjected to commission fees, an ADR is possible to be converted into its 
underlying shares or vice verse. ADR and its underlying share are in principle identical 
security, however in practice these are somehow traded at different prices across markets.  
In this thesis, we aim to answer these following questions. First of all, we 
consider the question whether or not the Law of One Price exists (the Law hereafter). The 
Law states that if two assets have the same payoffs (in every state of nature), then given 
the weak form of efficient markets, they must trade at the same price. And the Law relates 
to the impact of market arbitrage on the prices of identical assets exchanged in two or 
more markets. A deviation from this Law would give rise to an arbitrage opportunity, as 
long as the price differential exceeds all related transaction costs. However, in practice, 
the arbitrage activity across multi-markets is subject to the market segmentation. When 
two markets are segmented with each other by imposing different tax rate, having 
restrictions on foreign ownership and currency, and employing asynchronous trading 
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hours, the arbitrageurs have difficulties to promptly remove price differentials. So the 
investigation of the Law in multiple markets would address additional questions related 
with international financial markets segmentation.  
Therefore, integration vs. segmentation is the next concern for this study, because 
the linkage between the markets will affect capital flow and information transmission, 
and in turn, the arbitrage opportunity. A segmented market is defined in finance as a 
market where free labor, capital and information flows are restricted, for example, foreign 
currency controls and foreign ownership limits. In addition, in cross market trading, a 
segmented market also refers to a market with little or no overlapping trading hours with 
its counterpart. Usually, more trades are executed during the overlapping trading hours; 
as a result, a lower liquidity premium and higher volatility are observed in both markets.  
Third, we consider the question what is the market liquidity effect in multiple 
market trading. It is clear how liquidity as a cost is priced in a single market, yet how the 
liquidity effect varies across markets is still unclear. The explanations may come from 
different trading mechanisms and market microstructures which provide different 
liquidity risks and transaction costs, as well as from different price stabilization policies 
which affect volatilities. 
Finally, a better understanding on the relation between return volatility and 
trading volume in dual markets trading is helpful in exploring how information flow 
affects trading differently across markets. ‘Exchange occurs when market agents assign 
different values to an asset’ (Karpoff, 1986). Trading volume therefore is viewed as a 
variable which contains trading information, and traders in turn would revise their 
demand prices based on the observed trading volume data.  As a result, return volatility 
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is higher when trading is more active.   
The Chinese American Depository Receipts offer a unique opportunity to 
investigate all the questions mentioned above. In addition, their distinctive characteristic 
makes this study an important contribution to the literature of the ADRs. Unlike the 
ADRs from other developed and emerging countries which are usually in the framework 
of two related markets, the Chinese ADRs involve three related markets due to the fact 
that a part of these Chinese firms listed A shares (exclusively owned and traded by the 
Chinese citizens in mainland China) in Shanghai after they sequentially listed ADRs in 
the US and H shares in Hong Kong (the ADRs and H shares are exclusively owned and 
traded by foreign investors). The A shares listing makes China’s domestic stock market 
as one of important factors when we investigate the market segmentation. And two 
additional interesting concerns arose, first, A shares listings would increase shareholders 
base of these listed firms, and leads to the decrease in the returns of the ADRs and H 
shares. This suspect is based on the ‘Investors’ Recognition Hypothesis’ by Merton 
(1987), who argued that expected return of the firm’s stock decrease with the size of the 
investor’s shareholder base. Second, we suspect that for the Chinese ADRs with A shares 
listed in Shanghai, the price differentials between the Chinese ADRs and the underlying 
H shares will be affected by China’s domestic stock market as well, because of the close 
geopolitical relation between China and Hong Kong in terms of overlapping trading 
hours, common culture and business activities. 
Apart from the special characteristic we have mentioned above, we notice that 
the NYSE listed Chinese ADRs are exclusively state owned enterprises (SOEs), while 
those listed in the NASDAQ are all private firms. This obvious difference in cross-listing 
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locations suggests that the ownership structure of these Chinese firms may contribute to 
understand the price behaviour of these Chinese ADRs. Further, the SOEs listed in the 
NYSE are enterprises with monopoly power in some important industries, such as utility, 
electronic communication, and oil and gas. Then one more question arose that why the 
Chinese government want to list these important companies abroad. Since the 
conventional perspective is the Chinese government would like to entirely control the 
SOEs.  
We therefore start our research from the origin place of the Chinese ADRs: 
China’s domestic stock market. Chapter 2 provides an outline and analysis of China’s 
stock market liberalization and the market microstructures of the two domestic stock 
exchanges in China and the stock exchange in Hong Kong. There are two reasons why 
we present this survey of the domestic China’s stock market before we proceed to the 
empirical research on the Chinese ADRs’ arbitrage. First, as we have mentioned before, 
part of the Chinese ADRs have additional A shares listed in Shanghai, which takes the 
impact from China’s stock market into account. Second, the Chinese ADRs include both 
SOEs and private firms, and these two types of firms have extremely different listing 
patterns and listing locations, which inspires us to take a deeper examination on the 
ownership structure of the Chinese listed firms.  
We will focus on the special characteristics of the Chinese listed firms, investors, 
and stock exchange which are normally the three components of a stock market. China’s 
stock market makes itself unique by imposing restrictions on state-owned and 
non-state-owned shares of the listed firms; state-owned shares are non-tradable while 
non-state-owned shares are tradable. Further, the investors of the tradable shares are 
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divided into domestic citizens and foreigners. Domestic investors can only own A shares, 
while foreign investors can either own H shares (listed in Hong Kong) or B shares (listed 
in mainland China). We will discuss the different types of shares and segmented 
sub-markets in detail in chapter 2, and focus on the impact of these restrictions on the 
performance of the listed firms and the function of the markets. Some interesting issues 
are investigated, such as two-thirds non-tradable state-owned shares, and the price 
discount puzzle. However, since China joined the WTO in 2002, China’s domestic capital 
market has been gradually opened up to foreign investors, as well as relaxing controls on 
domestic citizens diversifying their portfolios by investing abroad. We will also give 
detailed introduction on these market innovations. 
Chapter 2 also examines the market microstructure and transaction costs of the 
three China-related stock exchanges: the Shanghai stock exchange, the Shenzhen stock 
exchange, and the stock exchange of Hong Kong. We provide an overview of the market 
condition of each market, such as market capitalization, the ratio of market capitalization 
to GDP, P/E ratio, annual trading value, and annual turnover trading value. In particular, 
for China’s stock market we also look at the market capitalization of the tradable shares 
which turns out to be extremely small, while the ratio of the total trading value to the 
market capitalization of the tradable shares is extremely high. A comparison of market 
mechanisms is also provided, which includes the dealer mechanism vs. the auction 
mechanism; floor based trading vs. automated trading; clearing and settlement system; 
and market maker system. We also report the market regulations to control market 
volatility, and compare the explicit and implicit transaction costs.  
Chapter 3 presents the reviews of the ADRs’ literature and the studies of liquidity. 
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We categorize the existing papers about ADRs into three issues, namely, firms’ 
motivation for cross-listing, price discovery, and the ADRs’ arbitrage. The first issue is 
from the viewpoint of firms which explains the benefit of listing shares in overseas 
markets, especially for the firms from emerging markets to cross-list in developed 
markets. The second issue, price discovery, is from the viewpoint of market. Price 
discovery is defined as the search for an equilibrium price and is a central function of a 
stock exchange. For the ADRs, the research question is in which market that price 
discovery takes place, the host or home market? And two relevant hypotheses will be 
addressed, segmented market hypothesis and the cost of capital. The third issue, the 
ADRs’ arbitrage, is from the viewpoint of traders, the trading strategies of informed 
traders and noise traders. In particular, we will review the papers with regard to two 
questions. First, does the arbitrage possibility exist? Second, why arbitrageurs do not 
exploit the price differentials of the ADRs? In this chapter, we also review the papers 
about liquidity effect on asset pricing. We focus on the different measures of liquidity, 
and emphasize to be aware of the different concept between liquidity level and liquidity 
risk.  
Chapter 4 contains empirical studies on the Chinese ADRs’ arbitrage. We follow 
the literature review in chapter 3 to develop our test hypotheses. We answer the first 
question that whether the Law exists between the Chinese ADRs and their underlying H 
shares. Since the findings about the existing of the arbitrage possibility in the ADRs are 
inconsistent, and we believe the different findings are due to different approaches that 
used in those papers. We then apply the approaches of the papers which claim no 
arbitrage possibility is found, as well as the approaches of the papers which find that the 
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arbitrage possibility may exist due to the different return distributions between the ADRs 
and their underlying shares. Our findings indicate that although we can not reject the Law 
existing in the Chinese ADRs by comparing mean and median of the two securities’ 
returns, we still find return distributions are different between the Chinese ADRs and 
their underlying H shares, especially different in the tails. In addition, we find that the 
Chinese ADRs with A shares listed in Shanghai are different with those without A shares 
in terms of distributions of return and return spread. 
We then proceed to answer the second question why the arbitrage activity is 
hampered by examining two effects, the comovement effect and liquidity effect. The 
comovement effect is caused by the information based barriers between two segmented 
markets due to asynchronous noise trading in two markets. The professional arbitrageurs 
who are usually subject to short term horizon face the risk to bet against the asynchronous 
noise traders. The comovement effect suggests that with regard to the dual-listed shares, 
the stock’s return will move with its local market return rather than with the off-shore 
market return. We find significant evidence for the contemporaneous and lagged 
comovement effect on the Chinese ADRs and their underlying H shares.  
Further, we examine the liquidity effect which is caused by trade based barriers 
between two segmented markets. The liquidity effect suggests that different illiquidity 
costs between the host and home market may increase the risk for the arbitrageurs to 
exploit arbitrage profit. Chapter 2 has discussed the market microstructure and compared 
trading costs of the Hong Kong stock exchange and two stock exchanges in mainland 
China, where applicable, we also compare the trading costs with those of the two US 
stock exchanges. The difference in the market microstructure leads to different illiquidity 
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and liquidity risk. Therefore, we employ two proxies to measure illiquidity and liquidity 
risk respectively, and provide evidence for the liquidity effect. 
Finally, we conduct a sub-period test to find out whether or not market 
liberalization in China and market collapse in the US have any impact on ADRs’ return 
spread. Two breaking points are selected, the years 2000 and 2003, the significant 
structural changes are found around 2000, and a time-varying market impact from China 
and Hong Kong market index is reported.  
Chapter 5 is to study the volume-volatility relation of the Chinese ADRs and 
their underlying shares. This chapter is an extension of the study on liquidity risk in 
chapter 4. As the literature suggests that trading volume may contain trading information, 
and return volatility increases when new information arrives at the market. The process 
that traders keep adjusting their expected prices upon new information arrival is viewed 
as an implication of volume-volatility relation. We first find a proper approach to model 
return volatility, and then compare the volume-volatility relation of the Chinese ADRs 
and that of their underlying H shares. Our findings not only justify the use of two General 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic (GARCH) models, but also provide evidence 
that the US and Hong Kong investors respond to the bad news differently, and this 
difference in the investors’ sensations may explain the different return distributions of 
two securities as we show in chapter 4. Our findings also provide evidence of the validity 
of two competing theories in the volume-volatility relation; the Mixture of Distributions 
Hypothesis (MDH) is not verified by our results, while the Sequential Information 
Arrival Hypothesis (SIAH) is supported.  
Finally, in chapter 6, we provide the conclusion of the new findings and 
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limitations of this thesis.  
This study makes important contribution to the literature in several areas. First, in 
chapter 2, we give a completed systematic investigation on the three China-related stock 
markets with respect to trading mechanisms, market microstructure, transaction costs, and 
volatility control policies, to our best knowledge, no published papers on this area have 
involved all these three markets, and all data and information we provide in this thesis are 
up-to-date, which is by the end of 2006. 
 Second, in chapter 4, we point out that the standard location tests, such as t-test 
and Wilcoxon ranked test, are not enough to convince that no arbitrage possibility exists 
in the ADRs. For the cross-listed securities, the difference in return distributions may 
provide arbitrage possibility even though these two securities are equal in the mean of 
their returns.  
We make complement to the literature of the comovement effect on the ADRs’ 
arbitrage that not only the contemporaneous but also the lagged market return has impact 
on the securities traded in there. We also provide supportive evidence to the argument by 
Kim et al (2000) that the US investors are over-reacting the US market shocks, since we 
have showed that the lagged market impact from the US is significantly negative. 
Further, we find obvious difference in the Chinese ADRs without A shares and 
those with A shares. The average returns of the ADRs without A shares are higher than 
those with A shares, this finding justify the ‘Investor’s Recognition Hypothesis’ that the 
increase in the shareholders base will decrease expected return of the stocks. In addition, 
we find the magnitude of the comovement effect of the Chinese ADRs without A shares is 
bigger than those with A shares. This may suggest that the Chinese ADRs without A 
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shares move more closely with the local market than those with A shares. 
Third, in chapter 5, we employ two GARCH models to examine leverage effect, 
which reflects investors’ sensation to good news and bad news. We not only make 
contributes to the literature of the ADRs arbitrage that different return distributions 
between the ADRs and underlying shares could be caused by heterogeneous investors’ 
sensation to bad news. We also give supportive evidence for the recently developed 
hypothesis of ‘Investors Sentiment’ in behaviour finance, which suggests stock price is a 
function of investors’ sentiment.  
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Chapter 2 
 
A Survey of China’s Stock Market 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
China’s experience with its securities markets extends back to 1891 when foreign brokers 
founded the ‘Shanghai Sharebrokers’ Association’, which was headquartered in Shanghai 
as China's first stock exchange. In 1904 the Association applied for registration in Hong 
Kong and it was renamed as the ‘Shanghai Stock Exchange’. By the 1930s, Shanghai had 
emerged as the financial centre of the Far East, where both the Chinese and foreign 
investors could trade stocks, debentures, government bonds, and futures; the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange grew to be the largest domestic securities exchange with 140 listed 
companies. The operation of Shanghai Stock Exchange paused in 1941 because of the 
World War II, and re-opened in 1946, but closed again since 1949 when the Communist 
revolution took place (Lavelle, 2004). 
The milestone in the development of China’s stock market is the establishment of 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in the early 1990s, 
before that, the Chinese government had done some experiments in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen by setting up Over-The-Counter (OTC) markets where only small-scale trading 
of treasury securities and shares were processed, and the security prices on the OTC 
markets were determined by negotiation between buyers and sellers, instead of  on the 
basis of auction. By the end of 2006, there were a total of 1434 listed firms, and the total 
market capitalization is RMB 8,940.4 billion (US$ 1146.2 billion) in both stock 
exchanges, and among them, Shanghai Stock Exchange accounts for RMB 7,161.9 billion 
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(US$ 873.0 billion). 
A large number of books, research papers and reports about China’s stock market 
have given us valuable insights into the development and working of China’s stock 
market. Green (2003) and Walter and Howie (2003) have provided a detailed coverage of 
the history of China’s equity market and state owned enterprises (SOEs) reform from mid 
1980s to early 2000s, right before the ownership structure reformation of China’s stock 
market.  
In this survey paper, we try to present a picture of the uniqueness of the Chinese 
stock market through investigating the three components of the market. Stock exchange, 
listed firms, and the shareholders are the three necessary components which make up a 
conventional stock market and this is also the case for China’s stock market. However, 
almost each of these three components has unparalleled features in China which makes 
the Chinese market unique.  
In section 2.2, we start by looking at the listed firms with focusing on their 
ownership and shareholder structure. China is a country without any history or tradition 
of private property rights since 1949, and, therefore, is experiencing a process of ongoing 
transition from a highly centrally planned economy to a market economy at present; and 
in addition, a country which is more or less still governed according to the socialist 
ideology inherited from the Maoist period. In China’s stock market, the listed companies 
issue two-thirds non-tradable shares which are controlled by the state and the investors 
have a limited choice to decide the type of shares they can buy, even though the stock 
exchanges have adopted one of the most advanced electronic trading systems in the 
world. 
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The Chinese listed firms differ from the listed firms in other developed or 
emerging stock markets not because they are state owned enterprises (SOEs) but because 
around two-thirds of non-tradable shares issued by the listed firms are ultimately 
controlled by the state, while only the one-third of shares can be traded in the stock 
market. Although the Chinese authorities arranged to make one-third of shareholdings of 
the listed SOEs available to private investors, this partial privatization without changing 
the listed firms’ control rights has been found to be the main reason behind the failure in 
improving the performance and corporate governance of the listed SOEs in the literature 
(Groves et al., (1994); Gao, (1996); Cao et al., (1999); Allen et al., (2005)).  
The two-thirds ownership of non-tradable shares by the state has not only 
hindered the performance of the Chinese listed SOEs but has also become a critical 
blockage to a healthy progress of China’s stock market. It has also brought a number of 
other problems; from the early 2000s, the Chinese authorities have made several attempts 
to deal with the problem of non-tradable shares on several occasions. However, all these 
attempts ended up in failures, until April 29, 2005, when the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) announced a new pilot program, inviting a first batch of four state 
owned companies to transform their non-tradable shares into tradable shares by 
compensating the existing shareholders in various ways like bonus shares, cash, and 
options. The main difference of this policy from the previous attempts is that the new 
reform allowed the tradable shareholders to bargain over the transfer of non-tradable 
shares. Such flexibility seemed to be working well. Among these four companies, only 
one firm failed. On June 2005, the CSRC initiated the second pilot program involving 42 
companies worth 10% of overall stock market value. On August 19 2005, this second 
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program was successfully accomplished. We leave the detailed discussion about the listed 
companies’ ownership structure and the reformation in section 2.2. 
In section 2.3, we shed lights on the segmented nature of the stock market with 
regards to shareholders, which includes three sub-markets, A share market for domestic 
shareholders, B and H share market for foreign shareholders. The problem along with the 
segmented market is price puzzle, for example, the investors in one sub-market have to 
pay higher (lower) prices than the investors in other sub-markets, and this raises the 
question: what is the true value of a listed firm? Most researches reveal that this price 
puzzle is due to the artificial barriers set up by the Chinese authority.  
However, China’s stock market has been making progress step-by-step to break 
down the barriers. On February 19, 2001; the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) announced that the Chinese residents would be allowed to own B shares, which 
are shares of mainland companies and traded in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges and denominated in US$ (Shanghai stock exchange) and HK$ (Shenzhen 
stock exchange). Further, on November 5, 2002 the CSRC and the People's Bank of 
China (PBOC) introduced the QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor) program as 
a provision for foreign capital to access China's financial markets. On 13 April 2006 the 
Chinese authorities launched QDII (Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors), a scheme 
under which selected government authorized domestic institutional investors are allowed 
to invest in overseas capital markets under the foreign exchange control system in China. 
However, till now this facility is restricted to investment in the capital market of Hong 
Kong only (Neftici et al., 2007; information can be also found in the official website: 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn).  
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These policies have partially released ‘price discount puzzle’, for example, part 
of B share discount declined after February 19, 2001, on the other hand, QFII and QDII 
are with limited application by institutional investors, a thorough integration of three 
sub-markets, as yet, remains incomplete.    
In section 2.4, we look at the stock exchanges by focusing on the market 
microstructure, and compare it with the Hong Kong stock exchange where H shares are 
traded. We provide an overview of the market condition of each market, such as market 
capitalization, the ratio of market capitalization to GDP, P/E ratio, annual trading value, 
and annual turnover trading value. Particularly, for China’s stock market we also look at 
the market capitalization of the tradable shares which turns out to be extremely small, 
while the ratio of the total trading value to the market capitalization of the tradable shares 
is extremely high. We compare the different market mechanisms, which include dealer 
mechanism vs. auction mechanism; floor based trading vs. automated trading; clearing 
and settlement system; and market maker system. We also report the market regulations 
to control market volatility, and transaction costs.  
 
2.2 The Chinese Listed Companies, Impact of Ownership Structure on China’s 
Stock Market 
 
2.2.1 A Brief History of China’s Stock market  
 
Beginning in the late 1980s, enterprise reforms took place during China’s gradual 
transition to a market economy; many SOEs and collective enterprises issued shares to 
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their employees in order to save on wage expenses. Local governments in China started 
experimenting with selling shares of collectively owned enterprises directly to private 
individuals in order to raise equity capital. Private property rights, as well as the term 
‘property rights’, was reintroduced in the sphere of share holdings by law for the first 
time since its abolition in China in 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party introduced 
socialism in China. However, still in the spirit of the socialist ideology and centrally 
planned economy, the policies were designed to improve the performance of state owned 
firms rather than outright transfer of their ownership to the private sector. Two 
over-the-counter (OTC) markets were launched; one was in Shanghai in 1984 and the 
other was in Shenzhen in 1986, there were only a handful of shares trading in these 
informal exchanges.  
Nevertheless, funding raised in this way proved to be vastly insufficient for the 
SOEs in their process of transferring from a planned to a market based institutions, so in 
the late 1990s and early 1991s, two stock exchanges, created respectively by the 
Shanghai municipal government and the Shenzhen municipal government, were 
established, with the central government’s formal approval.  
Table 2.1 Chronology of the historical events of the China’s stock market  
1891 Shanghai Stock Exchange founded to broker foreign stocks 
1905 Shanghai People’s Exchange founded in Hong Kong 
1914 Shanghai Stock Commercial Association founded: China’s first formal 
stock trading association; Northern Government issues “Stock Exchange 
Law” 
December 
1,1990 
Shenzhen begins “trial operations” without formal approval and with only 
one stock trading 
December 
19,1990 
Shanghai Stock Exchange begins operations. PBOC announces that all 
public stock issues and listings can only be done on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen exchanges: opens the primary market again 
July 3, 1991 Shenzhen Stock Exchange is formally approved and opened after seven 
months of “trial operation” 
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October 7, 
1992 
Brilliance China Automotive lists on the NYSE, raising US$80 million. 
This was China’s first ever overseas IPO 
October 25, 
1992 
CSRC established; shortly after announces nine candidates companies for 
Hong Kong listing, known as the “First Batch” 
July 29, 
1993 
Tsingdao Beer completes the first SEHK IPO by a Chinese company, 
raising US$115 million 
December 
29, 1993 
National People’s Congress passes the Company Law 
July 1, 1994 Zhu Rongji signs Company Law into effect permitting Shandong Huaneng 
(HNP later) to proceed with its NYSE listing, the first direct listing of a 
Chinese company on the NYSE 
August 10, 
1994 
First direct listing of a Chinese company on the NYSE, Shandong 
Huaneng Power Generation, raising US$333 million 
July 1, 1997 Hong Kong returns to Chinese sovereignty 
December 
29, 1997 
National People’s Congress at last passes Securities Law 
July 1, 1999 Securities Law goes into effect; CSRC begins preparing regional offices 
that would give it a national presence for first time 
October 27, 
1999 
Sale of state shares through inclusion in public offerings announced 
March 14, 
2000 
The CSRC approves listing and trading of leftover rights offering shares 
(zhuanpeigu) beginning in April. A start to getting rid of residual 
“non-tradable” shares 
March 17, 
2000 
To comply with the Securities Law, CSRC releases regulations defining 
the new review method (hezhunzhi) for listing applications, and eliminates 
old quota and administrative pricing mechanisms 
February 
19, 2001 
Domestic investors permitted to buy B shares 
November 
5, 2002 
The CSRC and the People's Bank of China (PBOC) introduced the QFII 
(Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor) program as a provision for 
foreign capital to access China's financial markets. 
April 13, 
2006  
The CSRC and the People's Bank of China (PBOC) introduced the QDII 
(Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors), which allows selected 
government authorized domestic institutional investors to invest in 
overseas capital markets under the foreign exchange control system in 
China. 
Source: Walter and Howie, 2003 
 
2.2.2 The Features of China’s Stock market  
 
China’s stock market remains a hybrid with planned and market-oriented components; 
since its initiation, it has formulated particular rules which are clearly different from those 
 32
of the conventional stock markets. Normally, a stock market consists of the stock 
exchange, listed firms and shareholders, and the foundation of this framework is an entity 
of private property with legal protection. It is difficult to imagine that in a country such as 
China with a fairly short experience of private ownership, securities and stock exchanges 
could truly exist and function as well as the established conventional stock exchanges. On 
the other hand, while the critical role that a stock market is supposed to play is to 
mobilize and allocate capital resource in a market economy; the primary motivation for 
developing China’s stock market was to mobilize private funds in order to finance SOEs 
as well as to improve SOEs performance through public participation. An efficient stock 
market should possess the ability to allocate capital into the most productive sectors as 
soon as possible; in contrast, China’s stock market apparently favours SOEs alone 
without any considerations of their performance.  
Incorporation and listing of a minority of stakes of SOEs through IPOs is not an 
activity which is unique to China. Berkman, et al. (2002) showed that the median offering 
of IPOs was only 35% of a firm’s equity capital based on a worldwide sample of 384 
SOEs’ share-issue during 1977-1997. But, China is rather unique in creating such a rigid 
set of share types, placing restrictions on the trading and ownership of each. 
In most developed or emerging stock markets, the common shares issued by 
companies give specific rights to their owners, primarily the right to vote at shareholders’ 
meetings, to receive companies’ profits in the form of dividends and to sell the shares in 
the secondary market if the owner so wishes. All owners of common shares enjoy these 
rights and are treated equally under most circumstances. 
In contrast, although China has artificially created three categories of individual, 
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legal person and state shares and awarded all of them exactly the equal rights by law, 
legal person and state shares which accounted for around two-thirds of the total 
outstanding shares of listed firms were declared non-tradable. However, as we will see 
later, following the reform, which started in 2005, this situation has changed 
considerably.  
Individual shares, in China, are the only sort of shares that can be listed and 
publicly traded on the stock exchanges, owned by retail investors or employees of a 
company who have invested their own wealth in the company. 
State shares are issued to authorized government organs acting on behalf of the 
state in return injection of assets such as buildings, equipments, and land-use rights. State 
shares are owned ultimately by the State Council and are currently managed by the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
(SASAC) and local state asset management bureaux. 
Legal Person (LP) shares are created through the injection of assets from legal 
person entities, which include enterprises, institutions or authorized social groups. The LP 
shareholders could be ‘state LP shares’ if the legal person entities are state-controlled. In 
contrast, a company may also issue LP shares to non-state investors who contribute 
non-state assets and these shares become standard LP shares. 
Furthermore, the Chinese government has segmented the market in terms of 
shareholders into five; market for domestic A share investors, market for foreign B share 
investors, market for foreign H share investors, market for legal person shares, and finally 
a market for state shares. The listed firms have different market prices in each market, 
arbitrage among five markets is nearly forbidden. For example, for the firms issuing A 
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share and H share, although H shares has been traded at discount ranging from 50% to 
90% of their respective A share (Walter and Howie, 2003:179), there is no way or 
arbitrage mechanism to short A shares and buy H shares, because due to the restrictions 
on foreign exchange currency the Chinese citizens can only purchase very limited amount 
of foreign currency. On the other hand, no conventional stock markets exist in China for 
the transfer of LP and state shares. LP shares used to be transferred through management 
buy-out (MBO), and the shares were usually priced below net asset value (NAV), and far 
lower than A share’s price (Walter and Howie, 2003:185). Chen and Chen (2007) 
discussed the undervaluation scandals along with MBO transactions, such as the 
unfairness revealed in MBO due to share mispricing, illegal sources of funding, and lack 
of transparency. As a result, MBO has been almost stopped since 2004 by the Chinese 
authorities, since then transferring LP shares has been carried out mainly through 
Mergers & Acquisition (M&A). State shares were transferred only among state entities at 
negotiable prices before non-tradable state-owned shares reform. 
A distinct feature of ownership structures of the Chinese listed firms is the 
holders of non-tradable shares have exactly the same voting and cash flow rights as the 
holders of tradable shares; where, as we have mentioned before, these non-tradable shares 
cannot be traded publicly even though the company is publicly listed. Typically these 
shares belong to the state or to domestic financial institutions which are ultimately owned 
by the central or local governments. In other words, individual tradable shareholders bear 
market risk while non-tradable shareholders do not, but they enjoy the same rights. 
Furthermore, individual owners are discriminated against in terms of pricing, because 
they pay a higher price for their shares than non-tradable shareholders who are allocated 
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their shareholdings prior to the IPO at price close to net asset value, which is far less than 
the IPO price.  
By the end of 2002, only 6% of listed companies had non-tradable shares 
accounting for less than 40% of total equity capital, while only 0.4% of listed companies 
had no non-tradable shares at all (Green, 2004). 
 
2.2.3 Non-tradable Shares Ownership Problems 
 
i. Problem of asset-stripping 
 
The direct consequence of the two-thirds non-tradable shares ownership structure leaves 
the market in a position to be manipulated by the institutional investors and local 
governments. The institutional state shareholders could easily make asset-stripping via 
cash dividend which is a regular way to pay out company profits. As reported by Green 
(2004), before April 30, 2003, 657 out of 1,236 listed companies declared either a cash or 
stock dividend. Among them, 622 listed firms paid a total cash dividends amounting to 
RMB 45.8 billion (US$ 5.5 billion), which is around 53% of these companies’ total net 
profits. ‘Retail A share investors suffer because LP shareholders pay substantially less for 
their shares than they do. It is therefore LP shareholders that predominantly benefit from 
cash dividends since all shareholders receive the same dividend. Of the RMB 45.8 billion 
(US$ 5.5 billion) worth of dividends announced by April 2003, the holders of traded 
shares received only RMB 16 billion (US$ 1.9 billion), the rest going to institutional state 
shareholders’ (Green, 2004). 
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ii. Problem of performance deterioration after listing 
 
The vast majority of researches on the question that whether the Chinese SOEs’ 
performances have improved or deteriorated after listing in the stock market have failed 
to record any evidence of improvements. Allen et al. (2005) concluded, after a detailed 
analysis of national economic statistics, that it is the private non-listed sector of the 
economy that has driven China’s economic growth. They argued that poor governance 
has constrained the performance of listed firms. Wang et al. (2001) investigated the 
impact of listing of firms with A shares; they documented that company performance 
declined significantly after listing. Chen et al. (2002) found that firm performances 
generally deteriorated both in terms of profitability and efficiency after listing. They 
showed return of equity and earnings per share generally declined during the 1990s; the 
only exceptions are the firms in the public utilities, transport and finance sectors. Huang 
and Song (2002) showed that even listing in Hong Kong stock exchange had no positive 
effects on performance improvements; which is in contradiction to general expectations 
that foreign ownership helps to improve firm performance. 
 
iii. Problem of stock market speculation 
 
The large proportion of non-tradable equity means that the share of stocks which are 
actually traded in the Chinese stock market is relatively small (see table 2.2). This is very 
small in comparison to mature markets, such as UK, US, and Hong Kong; these markets 
have market capitalization of over 110% of the free float/ GDP ratios. The extremely low 
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float/GDP ratio of the China’s stock market leads to a tremendously liquid and 
speculative market, because of the excess of demand over supply of the available stocks 
in the market (see table 2.3). Guo et al (2006) find evidence that for dually listed H (Hong 
Kong) and A (Shanghai) shares, the cost of capital is lower and liquidity measured by 
turnover ratio is far greater for A shares than those of their H shares counterparts. 
Table 2.2 Ratio of Market Capitalization to GDP in China 
 GDP 
(RMB 108) 
Market 
capitalization 
(RMB 108) 
% 
(Market 
Capitalization 
to GDP) 
Tradable 
Market 
Capitalization 
(RMB 108) 
% 
(Tradable 
Market 
Capitalization 
to GDP) 
1992 26638.1 1048.13 3.93% - - 
1993 34634.4 3531.01 10.20% - - 
1994 46759.4 3690.62 7.89% 964.82 2.06% 
1995 58478.1 3474.00 5.94% 937.94 1.60% 
1996 67884.6 9842.37 14.50% 2867.03 4.22% 
1997 74772.4 17529.23 23.44% 5204.43 6.96% 
1998 79552.8 19505.64 24.52% 5745.59 7.22% 
1999 82054 26471.17 31.82% 8213.97 9.87% 
2000 89404 48090.94 53.79% 16087.52 17.99% 
2001 95933 43522.19 45.37% 14463.16 15.08% 
2002 102398 38329.12 37.43% 12484.55 12.19% 
2003 116694 42457.72 36.38% 14178.52 11.29% 
2004 159587 37055.57 23.22% 11688.64 8.56% 
2005 183957 32430.28 17.63% 10630.51 5.78% 
2006 209407 89403.89 42.69% 25003.64 11.94% 
1. Source: NBSC, CSRC 
2. Market Capitalization includes A and B shares only 
 
Table 2.3 Turnover ratio of tradable A shares in SHSE and SZSE 
 SHSE 
% 
SZSE 
% 
1992 - 265.45 
1993 - 324.44 
1994 - 691.79 
1995 519.41 309.56 
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1996 760.05 949.68 
1997 534.99 662.32 
1998 355.30 411.14 
1999 421.55 371.61 
2000 504.07 396.47 
2001 216.67 189.97 
2002 208.74 200.65 
2003 268.58 216.97 
2004 308.31 311.78 
2005 290.70 350.64 
2006 564.50 671.34 
Source: Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
 
iv. Problem of ownership structure 
 
Apart from the small size domestic stock market, most of the domestic listed SOEs have 
small market capitalization with highly concentrated shareholders. At the end of 2002, 
64% of the domestic listed SOEs had fewer than 50,000 shareholders and fewer than 5% 
had more than 150,000 shareholders (Walter and Howie, 2003:132). In terms of 
concentration of share holding, China is at a level similar to those in most West European 
countries (Faccio and Lang, 2002). What differentiates China’s ownership structure from 
the rest is the identity of the controlling shareholders; as the majority of the shares are 
owned, directly or indirectly, by the state. 
Further, China's stock market was developed under a weak legal framework that 
offered minority shareholders little protection. La Porta et al. (1998) developed LLSV 
indicator1 to measure shareholder rights protection, China scored 3, which was lower 
than the average score of 3.61 for all other transitional economies (Pistor and Xu 2005). 
However, some papers reported that the actual protection for shareholders in China is 
                                                        
1 LLSV is the initial capital letter of four authors: La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 
Vishny, R. 
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probably lower than what the index suggests (Tenev and Zhang 2002; Allen, Qian, and 
Qian 2005; Pistor and Xu 2005 
In terms of the relationship between ownership structure and the performance of 
the Chinese listed firms, there are several papers in the literature. Qi, et al. (2000) studied 
all firms listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) from 1991 to 1996, and found 
that the ownership structure composition and relative dominance by various classes of 
shareholders can affect the performance of the listed firms. Their empirical study 
suggested that firm performance increases with the degree of relative dominance of LP 
shares over state shares. Similarly, Hovey et al. (2003) indicated that though the 
ownership concentration has little explanatory power, the structure does matter. Legal 
person's shareholdings are positively related to firm valuation. Wei et al. (2005) 
investigated the relationship between ownership structure and firm value across a sample 
of 5,284 of China's partially privatized former state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 
1991-2001. They found that a significant convex relation exists between state and LP 
shares and Tobin’s Q which measures firm’s value. They also found that foreign 
ownership is significantly positively related to Tobin's Q. Ding et al (2007) analyzed 273 
private-owned and state-owned Chinese companies listed in 2002; they revealed that an 
inverted U-shaped relationship exists between ownership concentration and earnings 
management practices. It is clear that private-owned listed companies tend to exaggerate 
their accounting earnings. However, the entrenchment effect of ownership concentration 
on earnings management is weaker in private-owned listed firms than in state-owned 
listed firms.  
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2.2.4 Hardening of the Budget Constraints and Non-tradable Shares Reform  
 
Hard budget constraints are becoming an increasingly common feature for the Chinese 
listed firms. On the one hand; the state-owned commercial banks are decreasingly 
favouring SOEs and are putting greater emphasis on evaluating loan applications on their 
profit-making potential since bank officers are now personally responsible for their 
lending decisions. On the other hand, under pressure from the CSRC, the listed firms are 
less likely to make asset-stripping through dividends payments in cash. The benefit of 
liquidating state-owned shares on the secondary market is not only to ‘clear the tangles in 
corporate governance, but the proceeds from the selling of state-owned shares can be 
used to offset the huge nonperforming loans and keep the capital adequacy ratio 
sufficiently high by the banking sector.’ (Neftci and Menager-Xu, 2007: 232). 
Under such situations, as well as the five-year slump of China’s stock market, in 
April 2005, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) launched a new 
approach for state share reform to make all non-tradable state shares become tradable on 
the market. This is an important landmark in China’s stock market, to virtually privatize 
and change the control rights of the Chinese listed SOEs. The state share reform, as 
announced by the CSRC as a top priority in China, is the biggest reform in China’s stock 
market history, and is critical for the privatizing process. Meanwhile, the timing for 
carrying out this reform seems to be perfect, after the market slumped during the past 4 or 
5 years; the Shanghai Composite Index fell from over 3000 to less 1000, the market 
capitalization dropped by two-thirds.  
The state share reform is a market-based negotiation between the private 
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shareholders holding tradable shares and the state shareholders holding non-tradable 
shares. It is a market-based negotiation because the share merger gives ‘consideration’ to 
the private shareholders and uses ‘consideration’ to transfer trading rights. The 
consideration includes more bonus shares, warrants, and cash as compensation to holders 
of tradable shares. For example, in order for non-tradable shares to be tradable, each 
public shareholder will receive a certain number of shares, or a number of warrants, or 
certain cash as consideration. The public shareholders will decide at the shareholder 
meetings whether they considered it a fair consideration, whether they should accept it.  
Further, foreign ownership inevitably became involved in this state share reform. 
In the last few years, the general legal and regulatory reforms have been upgraded to 
facilitate increased foreign ownership in listed companies. In the A share market, the 
tradable share market side, the QFII system was introduced in 2002 to open up foreign 
ownership in the public tradable share market. Then on the non-tradable share side, a 
series of mergers and acquisitions (M & A) rules were put into effect from 2002 to 2004. 
This new M & A framework has opened up foreign ownership in listed companies 
through acquiring non-tradable shares via private negotiations. For example, on October 
25, 2005, Carlyle Group, an American private equity fund, announced a leveraged buyout 
of 85% of the claims Xu Gong Mechanism, the deal was worth by US$ 375 million. 
(Neftci and Menager-Xu, 2007:234) 
So far, the literature about the Chinese state share reform is not very large, since 
this reform process is still ongoing and is yet to be completed. However, several papers 
such as Green (2003b) who gave an introduction about the background of the state share 
reform, and how it works and Beltratti and Bortolotti (2006) who reported that this 
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reform process has generated a statistically significant 8 percent positive abnormal return 
over the event window.  
Table 2.4 Chronology of state-owned shares reform  
November 
1999 
Regulators approve the sale of a portion of state-owned shares by 10 
firms 
December 
1999 
Landmark sales of state shares in Guizhou Tyre and China Jialing 
Industry Motorcycle perform badly. As share prices are too high 
investors fail to take up much of the stock on offer. Beijing suspends 
planned sales for the eight other firms. 
Jun 13, 
2001 
The State Council (the cabinet) requires all state-owned firms 
planning IPOs as well as listed firms issuing more shares to raise the 
equivalent of 10% of the offering by selling state shares. The money 
must be given to the National Social Security Fund to help finance the 
Public welfare system. This is the first full-scale attempt to solve the 
problem of state-owned shares. The aim is to allow all shares 
eventually to be traded on the market. 
October 23, 
2001 
Regulators suspend the reform as a result of 30% slide in the 
benchmark index in just three months. Expectations that Beijing will 
eventually sell state shares haunt the market thereafter, pushing down 
share values whenever rumours about the program emerge. 
April 29, 
2005 
Beijing issues rules to revive the state-owned share reform. The 
approach is made more attractive to investors by requiring companies 
to win approval of two-thirds of public shareholders before floating 
state-owned shares. Also, a phased, three-year limit on the number of 
shares that can be sold to the market is established. 
May 9, 
2005 
Sany Heavy Industries Co. and Tsinghua Tongfang Co. start the 
reform on a trial basis. 
May 10, 
2005 
Four companies announce plans to give compensation, in cash and 
bonus shares, to public shareholders; the aim is to encourage a 
favourable vote by shareholders. 
May 
25,2005 
China quietly suspends IPOs, to ease investor worries about the 
supply of new shares coming to the market. 
June 1, 
2005 
China’s shares end at their lowest level since early 1997 on renewed 
worries concerning state-owned share sales. 
June 20, 
2005 
Regulators pick the steel mill Baoshan iron and Steel and Three 
George Dam operator Yangtz Electric Power to be among 43 firms 
subject to the reform. 
August 24, 
2005 
Regulators open the reform to all 1,400 listed firms. 
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September 
12, 2005 
Forty firms, including Minsheng Banking Corp., announce they will 
voluntarily adopt the state-share reforms. The group of companies 
joining the reform scheme begins expanding quickly. 
Source: Neftci and Menager-Xu, 2007 
 
2.3 The segmented market with price puzzle 
 
The shareholder structure of a Chinese listed firm is around two-thirds non-tradable 
shares plus one-third tradable shares, and the tradable shares could be owned by domestic 
investors as A share holders or foreign investors as B or H share holders. Although these 
different shareholders have the same voting rights and cash flow rights, they have to pay 
different prices for each type of shares. For example, the domestic investors have to pay 
much higher price for A shares while an investor from Hong Kong or the US pay 
considerably low prices for shares which provide them with the identical rights and 
benefits to those of an A share holder. The price differentials persist all along since the 
beginning of the China’s stock market, and there is no way for the domestic Chinese 
citizens to arbitrage between A share market and B/H share market due to the restrictions 
on exchange currency; likewise there is no way for foreign investors to earn arbitrage 
profit just simply because they do not hold Chinese citizenship.  
 
2.3.1 A shares 
 
On the domestic stock exchanges, a firm may issue tradable A shares and B shares. The A 
shares can only be traded by mainland Chinese investors, from December 2002; certain 
qualified foreign institutional investor (QFII) may also trade in the A-share market. 
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2.3.2 B shares 
 
Like many other stock markets in emerging countries, China’s stock market has placed 
explicit restrictions on foreign ownership from its beginning. In 1992, the CSRC allowed 
companies to issue the so-called ‘Special Shares’ (later, designated as B shares) which 
were the only shares in China’s stock market foreign investors have access to. In 
Shenzhen stock exchange, the B shares are denominated in Hong Kong dollars, and in 
Shanghai stock exchange; they are transacted in US dollars. The shareholders of both A 
and B shares are recognized to have equal status by the Securities Law of China. By 
December 2006, there were a total of 109 firms with B share listing. 86 of these 
companies also listed their shares as A shares while 23 of them did not. B share market 
constitutes a very small proportion of the whole market; it accounted for less than 5% of 
the overall market capitalization and trading volume during the past decade (CSRC 
website). 
A shares and B shares have different accounting standards and information 
disclosure requirements. International Accounting Standards (IAS) are used to prepare 
accounting reports for the B share firms, while China’s accounting regulations, PRC 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (PRC GAAP) are used to prepare accounting 
reports for the A share firms. The IAS is more conservative than the PRC GAAP, so the 
level of disclosure for the B shares is higher than that for the A shares. Therefore, the 
profit values, asset values, and book values etc. are different between the IAS and PRC 
GAAP statements. The B share companies need to prepare two sets of financial 
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statements: one is based on IAS for the B share holders, and the other is based on PRC 
GAAP for the A share holders2.  The PRC GAAP and IAS numbers are released to the 
shareholders on the same day, and the differences between the two sets of numbers are 
disclosed in the PRC GAAP statements as well as the IAS statements, so there are no 
information barriers or advantages to either the A share holders or the B share holders.  
Although segmented markets are not unique to the Chinese stock market, the 
Chinese market is distinctive because of its complete segmentation. The segmentation in 
most other markets is only partial, foreign investors are allowed to own the foreign 
category of shares only, while domestic investors can own both local and foreign shares. 
A price discount puzzle arises in China since in this market, though A and B shares have 
identical voting rights and cash flow rights, A shares continue to be traded at a higher 
price premiums relative to the corresponding B shares. However, this contradicts most 
other findings on the impact of foreign ownership restrictions on asset returns. For 
example, Hietala (1989) for Finland stock market; Lam and Pak (1993) for Singapore; 
Bailey and Jagtiani (1994) for Thailan; Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995) for Switzerland; 
Domowitz et al. (1997) for Mexico; and Bailey et al (1999) for stock markets in 11 
countries -- all these studies gave supportive evidence that shares available to foreigners 
are usually priced at a premium relative to that of the domestic shares, which are 
otherwise identical but only for the domestic investors. China is the only exception, 
where foreign B shares are priced at huge discounts compared to the price of the domestic 
A shares. 
A number of papers have studied the B shares’ price discount puzzle, and tried to 
explain it from several aspects associated with China’s capital markets. The most 
                                                        
2 Major differences between PRC GAAP and IAS are summarized by Bao and Chow (1999) 
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important papers include Bailey (1994), Ma (1996), Chakravarty, Sarkar and Wu (1998), 
Chui and Kwok (1998), Poon, Firth and Fung (1998), Fernald and Rogers (2002), Sun 
and Tong (2000), Chen, Lee and Rui (2001), Eun, Janakiramanan and Lee (2001). 
Bailey (1994) was the first to uncover the discount puzzle; he attributed it to the 
lower opportunity cost of capital for the A shares, because there was nearly no alternative 
investment vehicle available for the domestic citizens other than low-yielding bank 
accounts. As a result huge amount of Chinese domestic savings were driven into stock 
investments. The limitation of the above research is the small sample size that only 
covered the preliminary data of 8 listed companies for one year time period. In addition 
to the low cost of capital as suggested by Bailey (1994), Ma (1996) also proposed some 
other explanations, such as different attitudes towards risk between A share and B share 
investors, differences in liquidity between A share and B share markets, portfolio 
diversification intention of foreign investors, and different reactions of domestic and 
foreign investors to regulation changes. Chen, Lee and Rui (2001) found evidence that 
high B share price discount is primarily due to the illiquid B share market, so B share 
have a higher expected return and lower price to compensate investors. Adopting a 
similar approach as Bailey (1994), Fernald and Rogers (2002) also showed evidence that 
domestic investors have lower expected return than foreign investors, and which is due to 
lower risk that Chinese citizens were exposed to.  
Apart from the explanation related to liquidity and cost of capital, Poon, Firth and 
Fung (1998) proposed that the theory of ‘investor recognition’ may constitute an 
important explanation for pricing behaviour in a segmented market. The theory of 
‘Investor recognition’ was suggested by Merton (1987) according to which ‘an increase 
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in the size of the firm’s investor base will lower investors’ expected returns and increase 
the market value of the firm’s shares’. Poon et al. (1998) studied the impact of issuing B 
shares on the price of existing A shares, and found a significant negative abnormal returns 
on the A share firms which also issued B shares; which implies that the demand curve for 
equity shares is downward sloping. 
Another line of study on the B share discount is ‘substitute effect’ proposed by 
Sun and Tong (2000), which used the model by Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995). Basically, 
they suggested Chinese H shares and Red Chips listed in Hong Kong, as well as the 
Chinese ADRs listed in the US offer good substitutes for the B-shares listed in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen, so foreign investors have more elastic demand for China B-shares. The 
availability of these stocks in the US and Hong Kong means that foreign investors can get 
them from the US or Hong Kong markets instead of from the B share markets in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen. Yang and Lau (2005) extended the substitute effect of Sun and 
Tong (2000); they found that the number of shares and trading volume of the Chinese 
firms traded in the US are also significantly negatively related to the B share premium. 
The substitute effect from these stocks is stronger than that from the Chinese stocks listed 
in Hong Kong. 
Finally, some papers suggest the information asymmetry pattern related to the 
Chinese segmented stock market can clarify this discount puzzle. Chakravarty, Sarkar and 
Wu (1998) developed a model by involving a proxy measuring asymmetric information 
between A and B share investors, they argued that it is because foreign investors have less 
information about the local firms, relative to domestic investors that leads to the B share 
discount. On the other hand, Chui and Kwok (1998) argued because of the information 
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barriers in China, foreign investors are better informed, due to strict disclosure 
requirements in the overseas stock exchanges, than the Chinese domestic investors with 
respect to the value of the Chinese stocks, and they found robust results of the 
asymmetric cross-autocorrelation between A share and B share in terms of lagged returns 
and trading volumes. Bergstrom and Tang (2001) adopted asymmetric information 
measurements of Chakravarty, Sarkar and Wu (1998), as well as considered other factors, 
such as liquidity effect measured by bid-ask spread and relative trading volume; 
diversification effect measured by the correlation of B share return and portfolio return; 
client bias effect; company size; risk-free return differentials between foreign and 
domestic investors; and foreign exchange risks, and reported all these factors are 
significantly related to B share discount. 
    At the end of 2000, there were 29.433 million A share accounts and 0.145 
million B share accounts on the SHSE. On the SZSE, the figures were 28.303 million and 
0.129 million for the A and B share accounts respectively. The dramatically small and 
inactive B share market has troubled the Chinese authorities for a long time. As early as 
in April and June of 2000, Tu Guangshao, the president of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, 
and Dai Xianglong, the governor of the People’s Bank of China, acknowledged that 
difficulties existed in the B share market but expected them to be resolved with greater 
internationalization of the markets through, for example, the liberalization of the capital 
account. Almost one year later, on February 19, 2001, the CSRC announced that 
domestic investors would be allowed to open trading accounts for B shares.  
In one research carried out after the introduction of the new market regulation in 
China, Karolyi and Li (2003) observed wide-ranging differences in the discount changes 
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across their sample of stocks. B-share discounts ranged from 56 percent to 90 percent 
before February 19, 2001, however, after that date, the discounts ranged from premiums 
of 381 percent to discounts of 56 percent. And only for small market capitalization and 
with substantial past-return momentum, the B share discount has declined from the period 
when this regulatory change was announced. However, this decline is found to be 
unrelated to the firm’s risk and liquidity attributes.  
 
2.3.3 H shares 
 
For its special geographical and political reason, Hong Kong is the favourite overseas 
market place of the Chinese government to list firms, especially SOEs. Tsingtao Beer 
became the first Chinese SOE to list directly on the SEHK in July 1993, and raised 
capital of approximately US$115 million. ‘As of February 2006, a total of 125 Chinese 
companies had listed H shares on the Hong Kong and overseas stock exchanges, raising 
US$ 55.907 billion,…,31 of these H share companies had also issued and listed A shares 
domestically (Neftci and Menager-Xu, 2007:6)’. 
The Chinese H share firms act more like the Hong Kong listed firms rather than 
the Chinese listed firms which only issue A shares and the performances of the H share 
firms are better than those of firms issuing only A shares. The main reasons may come 
from several aspects of the markets, such as the legal system of Hong Kong which helps 
to bring better corporate governance practice, high accounting standards in SEHK which 
offer sufficient information release, and artificially packaging of the SOEs before their 
listing in Hong Kong (Huang and Song, 2005). 
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In contrast to mainland China’s civil law system, Hong Kong maintains the 
common law tradition established by the British colonial rule. Although Hong Kong has 
been a special administrative region of China (HKSAR) since 1 July 1997, the Basic Law 
of Hong Kong allows Hong Kong’s courts to refer to decisions under the jurisdiction of 
common law. As reported by La Porta et al. (1997) that the common law provides 
sounder legal protections for minority investors, as in the US and UK.  
Second, in order to satisfy the needs for listing in Hong Kong and promote 
competition with their international peers, the listed SOEs have been restructured before 
they issue international offering. The typical restructuring methods is to separate 
productive heart of the SOEs and establish them as companies, and leave the other 
non-profit making part such as social and ancillary service operations to the parent 
company. It is very likely that there are some “dressing-ups” for the listed firms during 
the packaging process. Nevertheless, it is expected that company performance should 
improve because of the restructuring. 
Finally, the H firms are obliged to provide annual financial reports in accordance 
with Hong Kong or international accounting standards. And all these firms are required to 
recruit Hong Kong certified public accountants for their audits. It is reasonable to expect 
the information from these companies to be more reliable than those from the other 
companies in China that are not listed overseas. 
Some papers compared H firms with A firms or B firms with regard to companies 
performance, which include Aharony et al. (2000) who examined the earnings pattern of 
83 newly listed B and H firms in China from 1992 to 1995, and found that SOE managers 
have different incentive and opportunities for earnings management, they attributed the 
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reasons to the firm’s relation with the government and the location where its shares are 
listed; they reported a statistically significant post-issue earnings decline for unprotected 
industry firms, they also found that the H firms exhibit smaller post-IPO return on assets 
decline than B firms. Wang and Jiang (2004) examined the Chinese companies’ 
cross-listed in mainland China (A shares) and Hong Kong (H shares). They documented a 
large time-varying H share price discount relative to that of A shares, and they attributed 
this discount to domestic and foreign market factors and relative market illiquidity. They 
also reported that H shares exhibit significant exposure to Hong Kong market factors and 
behave more like Hong Kong stocks than the mainland Chinese stocks. Guo and Tang 
(2006) compared the price differences between H and A shares. They found that the 
Chinese mainland investors require lower rate of returns than foreign investors, and 
liquidity is greater in the A share market, which is contrary to the conventional wisdom 
that firms cross-list to achieve lower cost of capital and greater liquidity. Their results 
also indicate that differences in cost of capital and liquidity between the two markets 
contribute to the price difference between the Chinese A shares and their matching H 
shares. Eun and Huang (2007) studied asset pricing mechanism of China’s stock market, 
and revealed domestic A share investors would value A shares more if there are B and H 
shares counterparts, which suggested that a Chinese firm with a foreign shareholder base 
has a lower cost of capital.   
 
2.4 Stock Exchanges, Transaction Costs, and Trading Mechanisms 
 
We have analysed the unique characteristics of the Chinese listed firms and the 
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segmented sub-markets for A, B and H share holders. O’Hara (2001) emphasized the 
importance of that ‘the price discovery and liquidity are affected by market environment 
and the characteristics of the firms themselves’. We then proceed to discuss the market 
microstructure and trading costs of the three China-related stock exchanges. Xu (2000) 
studies the microstructure of the China’s stock market with regard to the trading 
mechanisms design, as well as empirically investigates trading volume and volatility 
relation of the market index (Shanghai Composite Index). Our study will focus on the 
impact of the trading mechanisms on the trading costs and liquidity, because trading costs 
and liquidity is critical in determining stocks’ price discovery and firms’ listing decision, 
it would be helpful for understanding why the Chinese SOEs’ listing patterns are different 
from that of the private firms.  
 
2.4.1 Transaction Costs and Liquidity  
 
Although the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock exchange have adopted 
advanced electronic trading systems, it is no guarantee that the two stock exchanges will 
work as efficiently as the stock exchanges in Hong Kong, New York and similar others. 
As mentioned by Harris (2003:420) that ‘Exchanges conduct transaction cost 
measurement studies to document the quality of their markets.’ When we value the 
efficiency of a stock exchange, one important point that must be considered is transaction 
costs; because low trading costs helps traders trade efficiently, for example traders can 
minimize transaction costs of a given size, or maximize size for a given cost.  
‘Transaction costs include all costs associated with trading. These costs include 
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explicit cost, implicit cost, and missed trade opportunity costs’ (Harry, 2003:421). 
Explicit costs are those costs which include brokerage fees, exchange charges and the 
taxes applicable on the transactions when these are executed. Implicit costs such as 
market impact costs cannot be easily identified and measured. Market impact costs 
usually arise because traders have an impact on prices, especially when a large order is 
executed in a very short period of time. And it is easy to understand that the price changes 
are usually adverse in terms of the initial trading; for example, selling drives prices down, 
and vice verse. So the initiator has to spend part of his funds under management to 
purchase liquidity. Missed trade opportunity costs arise when traders fail to fill their 
orders or fail to fill their orders in a timely manner. 
Competition among brokers to attract large number of investors tends to decrease 
the explicit costs, as it seems to happen nowadays. However, the implicit cost is more or 
less out of the investors’ control, because it depends mainly on the market conditions. 
Reduction of the implicit cost is a key factor for enhancing the returns on an investment. 
The factors determining market impact costs include the volume of the transaction, 
the market liquidity, and market depth. Large volumes of transactions tend to incur large 
market impact costs for a given liquidity condition, and vice verse. But the liquidity 
condition of the market rather than the size of the transaction have a greater influence on 
market impact costs. In a highly liquid market, the bid ask spread can be narrowed down, 
so even a large volume of transaction can be easily executed with lower cost. Market 
depth is the size of an order needed to move the market by a given volume of trade. 
Partial execution arises when the depth of a stock market is not sufficient to complete the 
transaction. This will result in an adverse price movement, because the remaining part of 
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the transaction has to generate additional depth on the opposite side, which may result in 
a higher (lower) price in buy (sell). 
 
2.4.2 Trading mechanisms  
 
Madhavan (1992) examined how different trading mechanisms affect the process of price 
formation, and argued ‘the crucial function of a trading mechanism is to transform the 
latent demands of investors into realized transactions.’ And ‘no two trading mechanisms 
are alike in the performance of price discovery; they differ in the types of orders 
permitted, the times at which trading can occur, the quantity and quality of market 
information made available to investors at the time of order submission, and the reliance 
upon market makers to provide liquidity’. 
Trading mechanisms can be classified into continuous and periodic mechanisms 
based on the time at which trading occurs. In a continuous market an investor’s order is 
executed immediately upon submission, where full transparency is provided of the limit 
order book. The periodic system (commonly referred to as a call auction or batch market) 
is characterized by a set of multilateral transactions at a given price, where the orders are 
matched periodically at the mid price of the quotes. The latter system doesn’t provide any 
independent price discovery mechanism. No single system is ideal for a market. The 
decision to adopt continuous or periodic call auction matching depends on the market 
dynamics. A market system which prefers greater transparency and favors retail investors 
would more likely want to adopt a continuous matching system enabling the investors to 
view the full limit order book and decide on the price of the instrument traded. This limit 
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order book disclosure may not be favorable for a large institutional investor who 
generally places orders for a large quantity. Disclosure of full order book will result in 
more impact cost for the institutional investor. An institutional investor would rather 
prefer to hide its order from the market and execute at an average price. Normally 
markets, which operate on continuous matching system, tend to adopt call auction 
mechanism and single price execution whenever trading is resumed from market halt. 
The reason behind this is that this type of trading ensures that the information 
accumulated during the halt period should be factored in the price of the asset once the 
trading is resumed from halt. So a brief pre-opening session is held (before the 
continuous trading is resumed) to accumulate the orders and orders are executed based on 
call auction mechanism. 
On the other hand, based on the reliance upon market makers to provide liquidity, 
market microstructures may be classified into quote-driven (such as NASDAQ) and 
order-driven trading mechanisms (such as NYSE), In a quote-driven system, investors 
can obtain firm price quotations from market makers prior to order submission. This 
mechanism is also known as a continuous dealer market because an investor need not 
wait for order execution, but instead trades immediately with a market maker, the market 
maker supply all the liquidity. In pure quote-driven markets, dealers participate in every 
trade. Anyone who wants to trade must trade with a dealer, traders either negotiate with 
the dealers themselves, or their brokers, acting as their agents. The dealers frequently 
trade among themselves, but public traders cannot trade with each other. 
By contrast, in an order-driven system, also known as auction system, investors 
submit their orders for execution through an auction process, order-driven mechanisms 
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can operate either as continuous systems or as periodic systems, in the first type, known 
as continuous auction, investors submit existing limit orders submitted by public 
investors or dealers. The system is continuous, since orders are executed upon arrival, but 
operates as an auction because the price is determined multilaterally. The second type of 
order-driven system is known as periodic auction, where the orders of investors are stored 
for execution at a single market clearing price. In order-driven markets, buyers and sellers 
regularly trade with each other without the intermediation of dealers; these markets have 
trading rules that specify how they arrange their trades. In order-driven markets, traders 
can offer or take liquidity; traders who offer liquidity indicate the terms at which they 
will trade. Traders who take liquidity accept those terms. 
Compared to auction market (order-driven market), dealer market (quote-driven 
market) has more impact on liquidity, because of narrower spreads in the dealer market, 
informed traders are less likely to take utmost advantage of the special information that 
they have. The spread also depends on the market makers inventory as market makers 
trade based on their inventory position. A balanced inventory position of a market maker 
will result in narrower spreads due to the pressure on the market maker to maintain his 
inventory being less. But too many long or short position will result in high pressure on 
market maker’s inventory that results in wide spreads in the market maker quote. 
In the following sections, we will contrast transaction costs (explicit and implicit 
costs) among three China-related stock exchanges, we also compare this three stock 
exchanges by examining the market condition including market size, trading value, 
trading hours and trading days, and describe the market mechanisms of each market, 
including trading mechanisms, clearing and settlement systems, and market maker system, 
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etc, and the policy tools used by the regulatory authorities to control market volatility, 
such as short-selling restriction, daily price limits, and tick size. 
 
2.4.3 Transaction costs of three China-related stock exchanges 
 
As discussed above, transaction costs include explicit costs and implicit costs. It is easy 
to quantify explicit costs which mainly take account of brokerage fees, exchange charge 
and the taxes applicable on the transaction when it is executed. However, it is difficult to 
accurately measure implicit costs, i.e. market impact costs and opportunity costs. Market 
impact costs can be explained by trade size, trade direction (i.e. buys or sells), stock size, 
investment style, and the type of institution executing the trade package, and is directly 
related to the size of the trade executed by an institutional investor. Normally larger 
volume transactions are expected to incur higher market impact costs, the reason is 
because that larger trades will account for a higher proportion of total trading volume, 
and hence the size of an order can cause an adverse shock in the price of stock. Other 
implicit costs in trading are opportunity costs incurred by patient traders seeking to avoid 
market impact costs (i.e. the value lost due to information decay). Hence, there exists a 
trade-off between market impact and opportunity costs.  
 
2.4.3.1 Explicit costs of the SHSE (SZSE) and HKSE  
We summarize explicit costs of Shanghai stock exchange (Shenzhen stock exchange), and 
Hong Kong stock exchange in table 2.5. The two mainland China’s stock exchanges 
charge the fees in the different way that Hong Kong stock exchange does, especially for 
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the transfer fee, two China’s stock exchange charge 0.1% per side of the transaction value 
while Hong Kong stock exchange charges HK$2.50 per share, when stocks’ prices are 
relatively high, the way charging in terms of ‘per share’ will lead to low transaction costs. 
So, it is hard to conclude which market demand high explicit costs. 
Table 2.5 Explicit costs of the SHSE, SZSE and HKSE (2006) 
Stock Exchange SHSE (SZSE) HKSE 
Brokerage 0.3%, (minimum RMB 5.00) 0.2% - 0.5%,  
Stamp Duty 0.3% per side of the  
transaction value 
0.1% per side of the 
transaction value 
Trading Fee N/A 0.005% per side of the 
transaction value 
Transaction Levy N/A 0.004% per side of the 
transaction value 
Transfer fee 0.1% per side of the 
transaction value 
HK$2.50 per share 
Source: Fact books (2006) of Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Stock Exchange 
of Hong Kong 
 
2.4.3.2 Market impact costs of the SHSE (SZSE) and HKSE 
 
Traders estimate market impact costs by using specified price benchmark methods and 
econometric methods of estimation of transaction cost. The price benchmark methods are 
the most commonly used, because they are easier to implement than the econometric 
methods. So, the estimated cost would be relative to trade size and the difference between 
trade price and benchmark price (Harris 2003:422). 
Estimated Cost = Trade Size * Trade Sign * (Trade Price – Benchmark Price) 
Trade Sign = 1 for a purchase / -1 for a sale 
The 2006 annual report by the SHSE research institution about market quality 
provides a comparison of transaction costs on the SHSE chronologically as well as 
comparison of transaction costs among different stock markets. They reported the market 
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impact costs on the SHSE based on a transaction value of RMB 100,000 from 1995 to 
2006. According to the report, the basis point of market impact costs is on a decreasing 
trend on both buy and sells sides (see Table 2.6). This annual report also compared the 
market impact costs on the SHSE for the same time period when transaction values are 
respectively RMB 100,000, RMB 250,000, and RMB 900,000, and found all market 
impact costs based on different levels of transaction value dropped year by year, but large 
value of trades has much higher impact on the transaction cost (see Table 2.7). Further, 
they compared the market impact costs on the SHSE, HKSE, NYSE, and NASDAQ, and 
found that the SHSE has the highest market impact cost, while NYSE has the lowest 
costs (see Table 2.8). 
 
Table 2.6 Market impact costs on the SHSE for one transaction value (based on a 
transaction value of RMB 100,000)  
                                         Unit: basis point 
 1995 2000 2005 2006 
Buy  259 85 73 49 
Sell  140 81 62 46 
 
Table 2.7 Market impact costs on the SHSE for three transaction values (transaction 
values are respectively RMB 100,000, RMB 250,000, and RMB 900,000) 
                                               Unit: basis point 
 1995 2000 2005 2006
RMB 100,000 399 166 135 95 
RMB 250,000 853 229 223 157 
RMB 900,000 4231 343 359 293 
 
Table 2.8 Market impact costs on the SHSE, HKSE, NYSE, and NASDAQ 
                                               Unit: basis point 
SHSE SEHK NASDAQ NYSE 
95 13.5 14.67 8.67 
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2.4.4 SHSE, SZSE, and SEHK 
 
2.4.4.1 The market condition 
The SHSE and SZSE have adopted a market trading system based on modern 
computerized and telecommunications technology and fully practiced electronically 
automated trading. The system automatically matches the closest offer and bid and works 
remarkably well in practice. Based on the principle of price priority and time priority, the 
system offers concentrated bidding and matches offer and bid deal by deal, with a daily 
capacity of 10 million commissions. Most of the firms listed in the SZSE are small, joint 
venture firms, and since 1994, the SZSE has been over taken by the SHSE in terms of 
market capitalization, trading volume, and number of listed shares (Xu, 2000). 
Recently, the government has decided to merge the SHSE and SZSE into an 
integrated main board market. The listed companies on the main board of the SZSE will 
move to the SHSE in two to three years time, while the SZSE will be dedicated to 
Growth Enterprise Market. The Chinese authorities have realized that ‘stock exchanges 
around the world are rushing to establish alliances and partnerships with one another that 
could lead to outright mergers and acquisitions.’ An article in Asia Times (June 30, 2007) 
pointed out that ‘This cooperation between two Asian bourses has given a renewed 
impetus to the idea of creating a link between the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) 
and the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges as many mainland companies are listed on 
both bourses.’ 
The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) ranks fifth in the world in terms of 
market capitalization of listed companies (2006), and is classified by the International 
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Finance Corporation (IFC) and World Bank as a developed market. Hong Kong is a free 
market economy with well established regulations for finance and commerce. 
Non-residents can efficiently trade in Hong Kong stock exchange. Hong Kong dollar is 
internationally exchangeable at a stable fixed rate against the US dollar (1USD= 7.8 
HKD). The history of the securities exchange of Hong Kong began in the late 19th 
century. The exchange has predominantly been the main exchange for Hong Kong despite 
co-existing with other exchanges at different points in time. After a series of complex 
mergers and acquisitions, HKSE remains to be the core. In 1993 the exchange launched 
an ‘Automatic Order Matching and Execution System’ (AMS) that was replaced by the 
third generation system (AMS/3) in October 2000. These systems were added to meet the 
increased popularity of online stock trading3.  
 
2.4.4.2 Trading hours and trading days 
 
The SZSE and SHSE open from 9:30 am to 15:00 pm with a lunch break from 11:30 am 
to 13:00 pm. There is a pre-trading session from 9:15 am to 9:25 am each day; the 
morning opening prices are generated during that session. Thus we see a hybrid of 
periodic auction and continuous auction trading mechanism in the two markets under 
discussion; the periodic auction is used once a day to generate the opening price. During 
the rest of the trading time, continuous auction is used to match transactions. They open 5 
days a week except for holidays; the SZSE has more holidays than the SHSE during the 
Chinese New Year period, and both exchanges have fewer trading days than the SEHK. 
                                                        
3 More information can be found in HKEx website, http://www.hkex.com.hk 
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The SEHK opens 5 days per week, and the trading hours is from 10:00 am to 
12:30 pm and from 14:30 pm to 16:00 pm. Like stock markets in most countries and 
economies in Asia, the SEHK has adopted a continuous auction market microstructure. 
Table2.9 Market condition, Trading hours and Trading days (SHSE, SZSE, and 
HKSE, 2006) 
 
Stock exchange SHSE SZSE HKSE 
Number of listed firms  
(including domestic 
and foreign firms) 
842 579 975 
Market capitalization 
(US $ billions) 
898.50 222.39 1,687.00 
Market capitalization 
of tradable shares  
(US $ billions) 
206.13 107.19 - 
%  
(Market 
capitalization/GDP) 
34.19% 8.50% 115% 
%  
(Tradable Market 
capitalization/GDP) 
7.85% 4.10% - 
Trading value 
(US $ billions) 
725.40 408.15 1,069.00 
%  
(Trading value/Total 
market capitalization) 
80.74% 183.52% 62.89% 
%  
(trading value/tradable 
market capitalization) 
351.9% 380.76% - 
P/E ratio 33.38 33.61 17.37 
Dividends yield - - 2.19 
Trading hours 9:30 -11:30 
13:00-15:00 
9:30 -11:30 
13:00-15:00 
10:00-12:30 
14:30-16:00 
Trading days 241 241 247 
1. Source: Fact book of each stock exchange, 2006 
2. Market capitalization and Trading value include A and B shares only 
3. In 2005, China adopted floating exchange rate, according to http://www.pbc.gov.cn/, the average 
exchange rate of USD to RMB in 2006 is 1USD=7.97RMB, and we convert RMB to USD at a yearly 
average exchange rate. Hong Kong has been pegged its exchange rate to USD at 1USD=7.8 HKD 
since 1983. 
4. China and Hong Kong are in the same time zone 
 
2.4.4.3 Trading mechanisms 
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First, like many other mature markets employing multiple trading mechanisms (for 
example the NYSE and NASDAQ are both hybrids of dealer market and auction market), 
the two young Chinese mainland exchanges are hybrids of periodic auction (9:15am- 
9:25am of every trading day) and continuous auction (9:30am-15:00am of every trading 
day). During the periodic auction, all orders are matched on the basis of price priority, 
while during the period of continuous auction; all orders are matched according to the 
principle of price as well as time priority. The periodic auction applies once per day to 
determine the morning opening prices. All bidding orders are set from high to low, and all 
asking orders are set from low to high, the final execution prices get determined between 
the highest bidding price and the lowest asking prices and as many as pre-trading orders 
as possible are executed. The continuous auction is used during the rest of the trading 
hours in terms of time and price priority, so that each transaction price is the equilibrium 
price determined by the demand for and supply of securities at each spot of time. 
Compared to periodic auction, market volatility tends to be higher in continuous auction. 
In Hong Kong, the continuous auction method is used throughout the trading day 
and also determines opening and closing prices. 
 
2.4.4.4 Clearing and settlement systems 
 
The registration and clearing of securities is centralized through the China Securities 
Depository and Clearing Corporation Ltd. (CSDCC). Before trading in a stock exchange, 
an investor must place all the securities (fully dematerialized) into an account opened 
with the CSDCC.  Currently, the settlement for A shares is T+1 and the settlement for B 
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shares is T+3. (Neftci and Menager-Xu, 2007:15) 
The China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation (CSDCC) is the only 
securities depository and clearing corporation registered with the State Administration of 
Industry and Commerce in compliance with the Securities Law of the People's Republic 
of China and the Company Law of the People's Republic of China. CSDCC is based in 
Beijing with subsidiaries in Shanghai and Shenzhen. It operates under the supervision of 
the China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC). CSDCC was founded on March 20, 
2001, with the approval of the State Council and CSRC. (http://www.chinaclear.com.cn)  
The Hong Kong Securities Clearing Co Ltd (HKSCC) is the clearing company 
for transactions relating to stocks and a variety of other SEHK-traded securities, 
traded-options on the SEHK. The HKSCC started to operate on May 28, 1992, and the 
settlement period is T+2. 
 
2.4.4.5 Floor based trading vs. Automated trading system 
 
Unlike the NYSE, the two exchanges in China have almost no floor traders or floor 
brokers; buy and sell orders are matched through a telecommunications network but not 
on the actual trading floor. Electronic trading system is now widely used around the 
world which differs from the traditional trading methods such as floor trading in several 
ways. The most marked advantage of electronic trading system is that it helps to improve 
market liquidity by reducing bid-ask spreads; however, when trading volume increases at 
times of market stress, it underperforms a floor-based trading system by widening the 
bid-ask spread. As Stoll (1992) pointed out, there are disadvantages of an automated 
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system which affect several aspects of market structure such as risk bearing, free trading 
options, informational trading, reputation building, and anonymity. Venkataraman (2001) 
also mentioned that institutional investors prefer to use the floor broker to “work” large 
and difficult orders. This is because the floor brokers can reduce market impact and 
execution costs by reacting quickly to the changes in the market conditions and execute 
sophisticated trading strategies. 
Hong Kong abandoned floor trading system since 1993 when Automatic Order 
Matching and Execution System (AMS) replaced the traditional trading system. 
(McGuinness, 2000:85). 
 
2.4.4.6 Market marker system 
 
There is no official market marker system in SZSE and SHSE. Market makers, also 
known as specialists in the NYSE, ‘provide liquidity on demand in small quantities. They 
often trade in and out of their positions many times a day.’ (Harris, 2003:195) Market 
maker system is helpful in promoting market liquidity and the depth of market. Another 
important role of the market makers is to stabilize stock prices. Market makers have their 
own inventory position; they must adjust purchasing and selling out of their own 
inventory to balance the market when there's a demand-supply imbalance of a particular 
security. ‘The lack of official market maker system in the SZSE and SHSE could be a 
main reason for the two exchanges to have low liquidity (measured by the bid ask spread) 
and high transaction cost.’ (Shanghai Stock Exchange Trading Quality Report, 2006, in 
Chinese language) 
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On the SEHK, the number of market maker is 21 by the end of 2006 (SEHK Fact 
book, 2006), since SEHK employs electronic matching system, market makers are only 
required to quote two way prices at specified times to enhance liquidity of the markets. 
      Comparing with the NYSE and NASDAQ, we can find out one of the distinctive 
characteristics of the three China-related stock exchanges is that, the block trading in 
those three exchanges are very limited because block trading are normally executed by 
market makers, however, block trading in the US stock market account for about 50% of 
daily trading, therefore, we can clearly see the big difference in the trading costs and 
liquidity among these markets. 
 
2.4.4.7 Over-The-Counter (OTC) Market  
 
Unlike the US where a multilevel financial trading system has been built up, China has 
only two national stock exchanges and no stock exchange at the provincial level. The 
Chinese authority had launched two OTC markets in the late of 1980s with only very 
limited informal exchanges and trading, however, due to lack of effective supervision and 
regulation, these two markets were closed in 1999, and the decision to re-open these is 
still under discussion. 
 
2.4.4.8 Short selling practice 
 
Short-selling practice is quite popular in the developed stock markets, especially in the 
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US markets, which is an investment strategy used by speculative investors who try to 
profit from the falling price of a stock. Short-sellers usually borrow a security (or 
commodity futures contract) from a broker before selling it, with the understanding that it 
must later be bought back (hopefully at a lower price) and returned to the broker. The two 
Chinese exchanges have strict restriction on short-selling, while Hong Kong has relaxed 
the restrictions on short-sells gradually since 1994, when 17 designated securities could 
be sold short in a pilot scheme. The number of these designated securities has increased 
over time and at present; there are 527 securities eligible for short-selling according to the 
official website (www.hkex.com.hk).   
 
2.4.4.9 Tick size 
 
Most stock exchanges have regulations on tick size which is minimum allowable price 
movement. Tick size is one of the factors attributing to affect market liquidity, if the size 
is too large; traders are reluctant to improve prices because of the expense involved. The 
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) has different levels on tick size according to 
different scales of stock price, for example, when stock price is between HK$ 0.01 to 
HK$ 0.25, the tick size is HK$ 0.001, when stock price is between HK$ 0.25 to HK$ 0.50, 
the tick size is HK$ 0.005.4 On the SZSE and SHSE, the tick size for quotes on A shares 
is RMB 0.01yuan. Huang and Stoll (2001) reported in their empirical study on the stocks 
traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and their respective ADRs traded on the 
NYSE, that the lower restrictions on tick size will cause the higher spreads, higher quote 
                                                        
4 http://www.hkex.com.hk/rule/exrule/sch-2_eng.pdf 
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clustering and higher market depth5.  
 
2.4.4.10 Daily price limits 
 
Both SHSE and SZSE applies a 10% price cap for both rise and fall margins within the 
day for shares and funds trading to maintain market stability and keep away from 
dramatic fluctuations in share prices. However there is no limit imposed on the HKSE. 
 
2.5. Conclusions 
 
We have studied the features of the three components of the domestic market, the listed 
firms, the investors, and the stock exchanges. With regard to the listed firms, we analyzed 
the root of the ownership structure problems. After an introductory survey of the 
historical motivations of the Chinese government to create the stock market and enlist the 
SOEs, we concluded that the state owned non-tradable shares of the listed firms have 
been an obstacle for the development of China’s stock market and the performance of the 
listed firms. We then focused on the important non-tradable shares reformation which 
started from 2002; the reform policies and the impact on the market were reviewed.  
      With respect to the investors, we have shown how the investors were artificially 
grouped into three segmented sub-markets, the A shares, B shares, and H shares 
sub-markets. We have also reviewed the literature studying the price discount puzzle that 
                                                        
5 On the NYSE, the tick size was US$ 0.125 before June 24, 1997, and has been US$ 0.0625 since then until 2000, 
when the size was decreased to US$ 0.01. However, there is no limits on tick size on the LSE 
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addressed that the A shares prices have been much higher than the prices of B shares and 
H shares. By reviewing the important published papers about this issue, we have made 
the following conclusions; first of all, the B shares listing do not make any contributions 
to the listed firms to improve their operation, even though B shares were initially issued 
only to the foreign investors. Unlike the firms issuing A and B shares, the firms with H 
shares listed in Hong Kong behave more like the Hong Kong firms rather than like the 
mainland Chinese firms, in terms of information disclosure, corporate governance, and 
firms’ performance. We also examined the impacts of important policy changes which 
aimed to gradually release the segmentation restrictions among these three sub-markets.   
      For the stock exchanges, we have studied the trading mechanisms and market 
microstructure of the three China-related exchanges. We compared explicit trading costs 
and implicit trading costs, wherever applicable, and contrasted them with the costs of the 
NYSE and NASDAQ. We reported that the explicit costs of China’s domestic stock 
exchanges are not demonstrably higher than that of the Hong Kong stock exchange, yet, 
the implicit trading costs of two domestic stock exchanges are extremely higher than 
those of the Hong Kong stock exchange and both the NYSE, and NASDAQ. Further, we 
compared the market capitalization, the value of trading volume and turnover ratio of the 
three China-related stock exchanges; we found the domestic stock market has extremely 
small market size and particularly high turnover ratio, especially when we have to take 
account of the tradable shares. These findings may give the answers to the questions we 
asked in the beginning that whether the reason for the Chinese government to list the 
important SOEs abroad is to gain the benefit of capital raising and more liquid trading. As 
well as whether the Chinese private firms are more sensitive about the listing costs than 
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the Chinese SOEs so that the private firms choose to register in some tax-free islands 
before they list in the NASDAQ.    
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Chapter 3 
 Literature Review on ADRs and Related Topics 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a comprehensive literature review about the main issues about 
ADRs. In chapter 1, we have explained the reason to select the Chinese ADRs as our 
research object is because of the special characteristics of the Chinese ADRs that they 
connect three markets. An explicit connection between the US and Hong Kong market is 
obvious due to the transmission mechanism between the Chinese ADRs and the 
underlying H shares. In addition, due to the fact that part of these Chinese ADRs list A 
shares (only owned by the Chinese citizens) in Shanghai after they list H shares and 
ADRs (only owned by foreign investors), there is also an implicit connection existing 
between the China’s market and the US and Hong Kong market, such kind of market 
linkage supplies a closer examination on the available theories and hypotheses put 
forward in the ADRs literature.  
       We organize this chapter as: section 3.2 is an introduction about the background 
of the ADRs; section 3.3 contains an outline of the motivations for cross-listing based on 
the point of view of the firms; section 3.4 is a literature of the issues related with price 
discovery hypothesis, the related theories include the segmented market hypothesis and 
the cost of capital of the cross-listing; section 3.5 is a literature about the ADRs’ arbitrage 
and the limits of the ADRs’ arbitrage; section 3.6 reviews the literature of liquidity effect 
and the liquidity effect on the cross-listed securities; finally, section 3.7 is conclusion. 
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3.2 American Depository Receipts (ADRs) 
 
An ADR is a negotiable instrument issued by a US depositary bank evidencing ownership 
of shares in a non-US corporation. Each DR denotes Depositary Shares (DSs) 
representing a specific number of underlying shares on deposit with a custodian in the 
issuer’s home market. The term ‘DR’ is commonly used to mean both the physical 
certificate and the security itself. There are mainly three levels of ADRs based on 
different accounting standards and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
disclosure requirements. The Level I Depositary Receipts are traded in the US 
Over-The-Counter (OTC) market with prices published in the ‘Pink Sheets’ and on some 
exchanges outside the United States. The Level II and Level III Depositary Receipts are 
exchange-listed securities and traded on NASDAQ, AMEX or NYSE and have more 
stringent accounting and disclosure requirements.6 
   Prior to 1990, most ADRs were of companies from developed courtiers, such as 
the UK, Australia, and Japan. However since 1990, more and more firms from emerging 
countries such as Chile, Mexico, Brazil, India and China have started issuing ADRs and 
accounted for one third of the total ADRs in circulation at the end of 1990s. Developed 
country firms have historically used ADRs for overseas listing, but most emerging 
country firms issue ADRs to raise sufficient capital from the US market (Gande, 1997). 
One particular aspect of the ADRs is that the ADR owners can convert the shares 
into the foreign currency-denominated underlying shares subject to cancellation and 
conversion fees. By the same token, holders of the underlying shares can convert their 
shares into ADRs if they are traded in the US markets (Kim et al. 2000). Therefore, an 
                                                        
6 A detailed introduction on ADRs can refer to the survey paper by Karolyi (1998) 
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investor who compares the ADR price with the dollar price of the underlying share can 
get a risk less profit if the price differential is sufficient to cover the transactions costs. 
 
3.3 Firms’ motivations for cross listing 
 
The firms’ motivations for cross-listing in the literature are straightforward because of the 
obvious evidence. In conclusion, the motivations of the non-US firms to cross list in the 
US market are governed by a) increased trading liquidity (Mittoo, 1992; Pagano et al., 
2002; Rabinovitch et al, 2003); b) promoting firms’ visibility, exposure, and prestige 
(Fanto and Karmel, 1997); c) reduction in market segmentation and the attendant cost of 
capital, increase investor recognition, enhance liquidity and bond themselves to protect 
the minority shareholders (Errunza and Miller, 2003). The above perceptions about 
overseas listings show that overseas listings should have positive impact on domestic 
firms’ achieving a fair valuation by improving the trading efficiency of their shares listed 
on the domestic stock exchanges. 
 
3.4 Price discovery process of the ADRs 
 
The literature about the price discovery on the ADRs contains several related theories or 
hypotheses, which include the segmented markets hypothesis, price discovery theory, and 
the cost of capital. A prevailing wisdom about the US-listed non-US shares is that 
cross-listing would decrease the systematic risk of capital caused by segmentation. The 
segmented markets hypothesis maintains that due to some direct international investment 
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restrictions, such as ownership restrictions and investment barriers are erased by 
cross-listing in a less-restricted market, the compensation for the local investors’ inability 
to diversify their investments globally would disappear. So cross-listing would decrease 
the cost of capital, and ask for a higher equilibrium market price, a lower systematic risk, 
and thus a lower securities return.  
One of the related research questions is in which market price discovery takes 
place, the home or the off-shore market? Price discovery is defined as the search for an 
equilibrium price and is a central function of a stock exchange. Researchers find that the 
shares cross-listed in the integrated markets have different price discovery process with 
those cross-listed in the segmented markets.  
In this section, we review the papers related with the three issues discussed above, 
the segmented markets hypothesis, the cost of capital, and the price discovery theory. 
Although some earlier papers we will review in this section are not exclusively about the 
ADRs, these papers offered empirical study approaches which have been applied later on 
in the ADRs studies. 
 
3.4.1 The segmented market hypothesis 
 
The study about the international capital markets segmentation and integration starts from 
Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977), Errunza and Losq (1985), and Alexander, Eun, and 
Janakiramanan (1987). These papers considered a number of investment barriers in the 
international capital market.  
Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977) considered two types of segmentations; one 
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is caused by restrictions on certain individuals investing in certain securities and is 
exemplified by segmentation in international capital markets; and the second one is 
induced by the simultaneous existence of differential personal tax rates and a fixed 
element of transactions costs. They built up a Walrasian equilibrium model on the 
framework of single period capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Their models confirmed 
the pronounced effect of three financial policies as the firm’s intention to remove 
investment barriers. The three financial policies include Foreign portfolio/direct 
investment by firms, mergers with foreign firms, and dual listing of the securities of the 
firm on foreign capital markets. They also confirmed a strong negative tax effect of 
dividend policy that affect investors’ portfolio selection. An investor can gain the 
advantages of the tax characteristics of the stocks by going long in those that suit his tax 
bracket and short in those that do not.   
Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan (1987) considered a situation that one of the 
domestic securities is dually listed on a foreign capital market, while none of the foreign 
securities is dually listed on the domestic capital market. The domestic market is assumed 
to be with relatively limited capital or a relatively underdeveloped capital market and 
with restriction on its citizens to invest in foreign securities. The scenario of their model 
was that dual-listing would remove a variety of investment barriers such as transaction 
costs, information costs, and legal restrictions on domestic investors to invest overseas. 
Their model clearly indicated that the expected return on the dually listed security was 
different from its expected return when it is not dually listed. The revaluation of the 
change in the return after dual-listing depends on the risk premium measured as the 
relative covariance of the dually listed security with the domestic and foreign market 
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portfolios. Their model predicted that dual-listing would lead to a higher market price and 
a lower required return due to the decrease in the risk.  
Errunza and Losq (1985) proposed ‘Mild Segmentation Hypothesis’ and 
conducted empirical investigation of the pricing (and portfolio) implications of 
investment barriers in the context of international capital market. The scenario of their 
model is partial segmentation that in a two-country capital market where country 1 
investors are restricted, country 2 investors are unrestricted. Unrestricted investors can 
trade in all the securities available; while the restricted investors, can trade only in a 
subset of the securities, those which are termed eligible. Their hypothesis was the 
ineligible securities command a ‘super’ risk premium which is proportional to the 
conditional market risk, and they found supportive though not strong evidence in the less 
developed countries. 
Apart from the segmentation which comprises the direct international barriers 
caused by regulatory frictions, there are some specific patterns of segmentation which 
may not be observed directly. For example, Forester and Karolyi (1993) defined ‘industry 
segmentation’ as industry related segmentation even when two markets share high degree 
of connection in business, culture and geography such as Canada and the US.  
Particularly, with respect to ADRs trading, different trading hours is another 
important factor of segmentation. The ADRs are in principle fully convertible into their 
underlying stocks, however in practice these are impossible when the two markets have 
few overlapping trading hours even when these two markets are integrated according to 
the prevailing definition. Karolyi (1998) mentioned non-synchronous business and 
trading hours will increase the costs of information monitoring, which he described as an 
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indirect international barriers. Similarly, Kato et al (1991) and Kim et al. (2000) 
mentioned the importance to take into account the non-synchronous trading hours in the 
study of the arbitrage of the ADRs, as which may make arbitrage between ADRs and 
their underlying shares costly. 
 
3.4.2 The cost of capital 
 
The segmented markets hypothesis is the theoretical background of the issues of the cost 
of capital and price discovery. As we have discussed in the beginning of this section, 
there is growing evidence that the cost of capital change around cross-listing date due to 
the international investment barriers erased, and we will review papers which are 
specifically within the context of the ADRs. The important papers include Sundaram and 
Logue (1996), Foerster and Karolyi (1999), and Bekaert and Harvey (2000). Typically, 
these papers measure the change in systematic market risk (with factor models, such as 
CAPM and APT), as well as the change in total risk (ex post standard deviations of 
returns, or ex ante implied volatilities from options) in a specific time period around 
overseas listing date. 
Sundaram and Logue (1996) examined the change of the cost of capital for 76 
ADRs from 1982 to 1992, they evaluated three costs: the price-to-book value, 
price-to-cash-earnings, and price-to-earnings, by adjusting the home and world country 
industry indices. They found the price ratios increased associated with the cross-border 
listing, and they attribute the reason as the reducing of the overall effect of segmentation 
among different markets.  
Foerster and Karolyi (1999) studied 153 ADRs from 1976 to 1992, and identified 
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the important changes in the stock return that non-US firms earn cumulative abnormal 
returns of 19 percent during the year before listing the ADRs, and earn additional 1.20 
percent during the listing week, but lose 14 percent during the year following listing. 
They found supportive evidence for three hypotheses: segmented markets hypothesis, 
investor recognition hypothesis, and liquidity hypothesis. 
Errunza and Miller (2000) presented evidence on liberalization's impact on cost of 
capital and its relation to the firm's diversification potential, as well as the revaluation 
effect. Their sample contained the ADRs from 126 stocks from 32 countries over the 
period 1985-1994. They documented a significant decline of 42% in the cost of capital, as 
well as positive returns up to and including the announcement of the liberalization (six to 
one month prior to liberalization and the month of announcement) that are consistent with 
equity valuations increasing as the cost of capital falls.  
 
3.4.3 The price discovery 
 
Finally, the investigation on price discovery starts from the seminal papers by Hasbrouck 
(1995), as well as Harris et al. (1995, 2002).  
Hasbrouck (1995) addressed the question that for the homogeneous or 
closely-related stocks traded in multiple markets, in which market the price discovery 
occurs. He employed an econometric approach that has been largely used in the 
multi-market trading studies afterwards. The basic idea of this paper is the prices of the 
same asset in different markets should tend to converge in the long run, while in the short 
run, these prices may deviate from each other due to trading frictions. He used variance 
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decomposition analysis, and named the components of the variance as ‘information 
share’, namely IS model. He found supportive evidence that the preponderance of price 
discovery take place on the NYSE.  
On the other hand, Harris et al. (1995, 2002) used the common factor error 
correction model to measure how much prices in different markets adjust due to 
cross-market information flow. They developed their model based on the paper of Engle 
and Granger (1987), which introduced the concept of error correction that described the 
cointegrated series move together through time, i.e., given movement away from long-run 
cointegration equilibrium in one period, a proportion of the disequilibrium is corrected in 
the next period. So, Harris et al (1995, 2002) conducted the model by employing a vector 
of n component time series to represent a common but exogenous factor of the 
cointegrated series. The cointegrating vectors define the long-run equilibrium, while the 
error correction dynamics characterize the price discovery process. They also conducted 
empirical investigation on the stock IBM based on intraday data, and found consistent 
findings that the NYSE stands for the predominant market in the function of price 
discovery during most of the time period. 
However, recent empirical studies, reviewed bellow, on the price discovery of 
non-US firms listed on the NYSE give inconsistent evidence, and the difference may be 
caused by the links of the domestic and the US markets in terms of trading hours. The 
markets with non-synchronous trading hours, the markets with several overlapping 
trading hours, and the markets with entirely overlapping hours have different patterns in 
the price discovery process.  
For instance, Kim et al. (2000) examined the impact of the underlying shares, the 
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exchange rate, and the US market index on the ADRs prices, their sample was composed 
of 21 Japanese, 21 British, 5 Dutch, 5 Swedish, and 4 Australian firms from the period 
January 1988 to December 1991. By estimating VAR models and analyzing impulse 
response functions, they found that the underlying shares appear to be most important, 
but there is a significant independent role for the exchange rate and the US market index 
in pricing ADRs. While their paper did not specifically address the question of price 
discovery, their findings of a role for the US factors suggest a more detailed analysis in 
terms of the issue of price discovery of the ADRs. 
Eun and Sabherwal (2003) studied 62 Canadian firms cross-listed in the US, by 
applying the error correction model as Harris et al. (1995) and investigating the intraday 
price for a six-month period, they also performed cross-section regression analysis to 
study the factors which might attribute to price discovery, such as trading volume in the 
US, trading costs of the US, and proportion of the shares traded in the US, they reported 
that for a majority of stocks, price discovery took place in the US, and the greater the 
proportion of shares traded in the US, the greater the U.S. contribution to price discovery  
On the other hand, the studies of the US-listed European stocks tell a different 
story, since there are only couple of overlapping trading hours between the NYSE and the 
European stock exchanges. Gramming et al. (2000) examined the intraday data for three 
US-listed German firms (with three overlapping hours between the NYSE and the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange) for three months; they found the Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
dominated over the NYSE in price discovery only during the three overlapping trading 
hours. Pascual et al. (2001) examined five Spanish stocks listed in the US by using 
similar approaches as Gramming et al. (2000), and reported the contribution of the NYSE 
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is less than 3.5%.  
Furthermore, for the cross-listed Asian stocks, Kadapakkam et al. (2003) 
examined 23 Indian Global Depository Receipts (GDRs) which are same in other terms 
as the ADRs except that the GDRs are listed in London (with three overlapping trading 
hours between the London and Mumbai stock exchanges), by using the approach as 
Hasbrouck (1995), they found that both markets contribute equally to the price discovery, 
and the contributing of the off-shore market to price discovery increase with the foreign 
ownership and the issue size of the Global Depository Receipts.  
In particular, Xu and Fung (2002) studied 10 Chinese ADRs7 during the time 
period from January 1994 to May 2000. This paper examined the transmission of pricing 
information for dual-listed stocks in domestic (Hong Kong) and offshore (the US) 
markets, and reported Hong Kong had more important role of price discovery than the 
US. 
 
3.5 Arbitrage opportunity and the limits of arbitrage 
 
The most extensive and attractive research on the ADRs is in the area of determining the 
existence and extent of the ADRs premium, and the reasons why arbitrageurs are 
impeded to eliminate the price deviation between the ADRs and their counterparts. An 
ADR represents the underlying shares (traded in home market) in the foreign (host) 
market and hence both securities have the same state contingent payoffs. Thus assuming 
both host and home markets are efficient and integrated, by virtue of the law of one price, 
                                                        
7 These 10 Chinese ADRs have been included in our sample, except the ADRs have been terminated 
listing. 
 82
the ADRs and their underlying securities should have identical prices after adjusting for 
the exchange rates. Hence deviations from the law of one price indicate arbitrage 
opportunities. Arbitrage is a concept central to the theory of capital markets, which is 
defined as “the act of buying an asset at once price and simultaneously selling it or its 
equivalent at a higher price” (Bodie, Kane and Marcus, 1996:133). Theoretically, it is a 
“zero-risk and needs zero-net investment strategy that still generates profits” (Bodie, 
Kane and Marcus, 1996:965). But, in reality, there usually exist some impediments to 
increase the uncertainty for the arbitrageurs with limited horizons. As we have discussed 
in the previous section, the literature of the ‘segmented market hypothesis’ has introduced 
the main factors of international barriers, for instance, the explicit market frictions such 
as transactions costs, taxes, restriction on regulation etc, as well as the barriers due to the 
imperfect information which are often implicit and more difficult to observe. In this 
section, we will review two topics, arbitrage of the ADRs, and the limits of arbitrage of 
the ADRs which explains why mispricing persists in an extended period. 
 
3.5.1 Arbitrage possibility 
 
The research upon the arbitrage possibility of the ADRs started from Rosenthal (1983), 
who examined weekly data of 54 stocks from 1974-1978, by testing serial correlation 
between the ADRs and their underlying shares, Rosenthal found that ADR prices are 
fairly consistent with weak-form efficiency, as abnormal returns cannot be earned from 
any price dependence.  
Kato et al. (1990) examined daily price difference of the ADRs and their 
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underlying shares from Australia, England, and Japan from 1986 to 1988, and reported 
that there are no significant differences between the prices of ADRs and that of their 
respective underlying shares and hence there are no obvious profitable arbitrage 
opportunities between any of these three markets and the US market. They also run serial 
correlation test on the return of the ADRs parity, and reported significant but not high 
correlation.. However these research have some limitations that the statistical tests 
employed in their papers, such as t test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test, are well known as 
only being sensitive in the location of distribution. Further, the correlation tests employed 
in these studies cannot uncover a dynamic relationship between two securities, however, 
it has been recently documented that the correlation between dual-listed stocks changes 
over time (Karolyi and Stulz, 1996).  
Similar findings also include Officer and Hoffmeister (1987), who examined 
monthly data of 20 NYESE listed ADRs and 25 NASDAQ listed ADRs from 1973 to 1983, 
and constructed portfolios of ADRs with the domestic stocks, and reported that the ADRs 
were the substitutes for the underlying shares in terms of diversification effect. 
 Miller and Morey (1996) chose one UK ADR as objective to study if the markets 
are efficient in terms of arbitrage opportunities by employing intraday data during the 
period of March 27 1995 to May 31 1995. The authors calculated the price difference 
between ADR and the UK share after adjusting for the exchange rate, and reported the 
mean of the price difference were well within the transaction costs of arbitrage. 
 However, one exception among those early studies is Wahab et al. (1992), who 
examined daily return of 31 pairs of the ADRs from eight countries (the UK, Japan, 
Germany, France, Sweden, Norway, Australia and South Africa) in a time period of 1988 
to 1990. They constructed portfolios by two ways, equally weighted and mean-variance 
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weighted, and found limited arbitrage profit ranging between 1.23% and 4.44% by 
constructing portfolios with mean variance efficient weight, but no profits were found 
with equally weighted portfolios.  
Another important finding is by Rabinovitch et al (2003; they compared distribution 
of the returns of the ADRs and their underlying shares, among them, six ADRs are from 
Argentina while fourteen ADRs are from Chile, and their sample time period was from 
1993 through 2001. They found that the returns distributions of the Chilean ADRs are 
significantly different from those of the underlying Chilean shares while the distributions 
of the returns on the Argentinean ADRs and those of their respective underlying shares 
are similar. They attributed the difference between Chile and Argentina ADRs to the 
restrictions on foreign investment as well as a flexible exchange rate in Chile and not 
Argentina. They hypothesized that transactions costs and market microstructure 
considerations may explain the differences between returns of ADRs and their underlying 
securities in some cases, where they exist.  
Another interesting recent paper is by Hong and Susmel (2003) who presented 
significant arbitrage profit by employing pairs-trading in 64 Asian ADRs; they developed 
ADRs portfolios by taking long-short trading strategy, which is basically to take long 
position in underlying shares and short in ADRs when the price difference (ADRs price – 
underlying shares price) is greater than a positive value (depends on the arbitrage cost). 
The annual arbitrage profit reported in their paper was up to 33%.  
 
3.5.2 The limits of arbitrage 
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The study on the limits of arbitrage started from the study on the dually-listed company 
(DLC, also referred to as a Siamese twin8), for example, Froot and Dabora (1999), and 
De Jong et al. (2004).  
Froot and Dabora (1999) examined the Anglo-American DLC Smithkline 
Beecham; they found that significant mispricing in these DLCs has existed over a long 
period of time. By investigating some fundamental factors, such as the issues related to 
currency risk, governance structures, legal contracts, as well as the country-specific 
sentiment, such as the local market behavior, they discovered that fundamental factors 
cannot explain the price deviations, however the comovement with local stock market 
indices could explain part of the time-series pattern in the relative returns of the twin stocks.  
De Jong et al. (2004) used similar empirical approach as Froot and Dabora (1999) 
to study 12 DLCs. They also found large deviations from theoretical price parity for all 12 
DLCs. And in line with Froot and Dabora (1999), they demonstrated that mispricing can be 
fairly explained by comovement of the prices of twin stocks with domestic stock market 
indices. For all DLCs, the relative price of a twin rises (falls) when their domestic market 
rises (falls). This finding is consistent with the view that noise traders affect the relative 
pricing of DLCs.  
Later on, Gagnon and Karolyi (2004) applied the same methodology to the empirical 
study on the arbitrage of the ADRs. They also found strong evidence of the price deviations 
for many of the almost 600 pairs of cross-listed shares from the 39 countries. Their findings 
supported the results of the previous works in DLCs that mispricing exists due to the 
comovement with the domestic market indices, however, they in addition found that returns 
                                                        
8 The two eldest twins are the Anglo-Dutch combinations Royal Dutch/Shell and Unilever NV/PLC. 
Extensive descriptions of these twins can be found in Rosenthal and Young (1990) and Froot and 
Dabora (1999) 
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on cross-listed stocks have significantly higher systematic comovement with the US market 
index and significantly lower systematic comovement with home market index than their 
equivalent home-market shares.  
  The comovement effect indicated in those papers (Froot and Dabora (1999), De 
Jong et al. (2004), and Gagnon and Karolyi (2004)) can be interpreted as evidence of 
country-specific sentiment, namely noise trader risk. As Gagnon and Karolyi (2004) have 
explained in their paper that arbitrageurs are specialized professional portfolio managers, 
who are risk-averse and concerned about the short-term performance of the fund, while noise 
traders are idiosyncratic, who act on their erroneous stochastic beliefs. The unpredictability of 
noise traders’ beliefs increase the uncertainty and risk of the expected price of the stocks, so 
the professional arbitrageurs usually with short horizons would rather wait other than bet 
against noise traders to put on an arbitrage trade, therefore, which leads the prices to deviate 
from their fundamental value for an extended period of time.  
  Apart from the comovement effect, Gagnon and Karolyi (2004) also suggested the 
trade-based barriers, namely, illiquidity effect is one of other reasons to put off arbitrageurs. 
Recently, some scholars have applied the theory of liquidity effect developed by Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986), and O’Hara (2003), to study the liquidity and premium between the 
cross-listed shares, for instance, Chan et al. (2007), and Guo and Tang (2006).  
      An explicit evidence of the relation between the ADRs’ price premium and 
liquidity is from one recent paper by Chan et al. (2008). They investigated the 
cross-sectional relationship between the ADRs premium and the liquidity of the ADRs 
and that of their underlying shares, their sample consisted of 401 ADRs from 23 countries 
over the period between January 1981 and December 2003. They employed three 
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liquidity proxies, namely, Amihud Illiquidity9 (Amihud, 2002), turnover ratio, and 
trading infrequency. However, they also emphasized their awareness of the difference 
between liquidity level and liquidity risk, as stated in their paper that “The level of 
liquidity is the predictable part of the tradability of the security without suffering the 
adverse consequences of market impact. Liquidity risk, on the other hand, arises from the 
unpredictable changes in liquidity over time”. They only focused on the effect of liquidity 
level, and reported that the liquidity effects remain strong after controlling for firm size 
and a number of country characteristics. 
Although it is not specifically about the ADRs, another recent paper by Guo and 
Tang (2006) also gave indirect evidence about liquidity and the return difference. They 
studied the relation between liquidity and return of the Chinese firms which issued H 
shares in Hong Kong as well as A shares in Shanghai. Their sample included 29 firms in 
the period of July 1993 to December 2003. They reported that the liquidity measured by 
turnover ratio could explain the return difference between two cross-listed shares. 
  In short, the inconsistent findings in the literature of the ADRs’ arbitrage 
possibility might be due to the different methods and econometric techniques used in 
those papers. However, it is better to be aware of an obvious trend that the increasing 
popularity of ADRs are from emerging markets, and we note that the recent studies upon 
emerging countries are well different from the previous works which were exclusively 
upon developed markets. Which in addition suggests the arbitrage possibility of the 
ADRs may tend to exist in the ADRs from emerging markets. 
 
                                                        
9 Amihud (2002) constructed an illiquidity measure which is the average daily return over trading 
volume 
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3.6 Literature review on liquidity  
 
Following the literature on the limits of the ADRs’ arbitrage that illiquidity effect as the 
trade-based barriers is one of the possible reasons to hamper arbitrage activity on the 
ADRs. In this section, we will focus on liquidity with regard to the conceptual terms and 
dimensions of the liquidity measurements.  
 
3.6.1 What is liquidity 
 
Liquidity is the ability to trade large size quickly, at low cost, when the trader wants to 
trade. It is the most important characteristic of well-functioning markets. As explained in 
Harris (2003:394), the liquidity “is the object of a bilateral search in which buyers look 
for sellers and sellers look for buyers” and the efficiency of the bilateral search relates to 
the designs of the market. As stated by Pastor and Stambough (2003) ‘liquidity is a broad 
and elusive concept that generally denotes the ability to trade large quantities quickly, at 
low cost, and without moving the price.  
Amihud et al. (2005) explained that the sources of illiquidity come from a) 
exogenous transaction costs such as brokerage fees, order-processing costs, or transaction 
taxes; b) demand pressure and inventory risk. When the quantity of demand for a stock 
does not equal to the quantity of supply at certain time, then an agent or market maker 
may be exposed to the risk of immediately trading or holding the asset in inventory; c) 
private information, which may be the private information about firm’s corporate 
governance, or about order flow; d) the difficulty of locating a counterparty that is willing 
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to trade a particular security, or a large quantity of a given security.  
 
3.6.2 How to measure liquidity 
 
Although, the term liquidity is not difficult to be understood, it is quite difficult to 
measure liquidity, as Amihud and Mendelson (1991) posited that liquidity is not directly 
observable and has a number of aspects all of which cannot be captured in a single 
measure.  
In practice, several liquidity proxies are used and their impact on stock returns has 
been well documented in the existing academic literature. The earlier empirical studies 
relate asset returns to different firm specific liquidity measures such as bid-ask spread, 
illiquidity, turnover, and trading volume. And these papers view liquidity as an effective 
trading cost to predict the expected stock return. For example, bid-ask spread by Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986) and Chalmers and Kadlec (1998); ILLIQ as a measure of 
illiquidity by Amihud (2002); illiquidity based on the price response to signed order flow 
(i.e. using opposite signs for buy and sell orders) by Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996); 
turnover ratio as the ratio between trading volume and the outstanding shares by Datar et 
al (1998) and Dey (2005); trading volume by Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam 
(1998).  
The extant liquidity proxies can be classified as four dimensions of liquidity: 
trading cost, trading quantity or volume, price impact, and trading speed (Liu, 2006). 
Bid-ask spread (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) is related to trading costs. If a security is 
less liquid and hence is more costly to trade, then that security should provide a higher 
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gross return as compensation. Turnover ratio related with trading quantity or volume 
supports the predictions of Amihud and Mendelson model (Datar, et al., 1998), but its 
presence of non-stationary problem and with random component are also found (Dey, 
2005). ILLIQ, an Illiquidity measure (Amihud, 2002) is calculated as the average of daily 
ratio of absolute returns to volume, which is exactly the concept of illiquidity, since it 
quantifies the returns impact based on a given size of trade.  
 
3.6.3 Liquidity risk and liquidity level 
 
There is an increasing attention of the different characteristic between liquidity risk and 
liquidity level. As concluded by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), the liquidity measures 
such as bid-ask spread, illiquidity measurements, and turnover ratio are all related with 
the marketwide liquidity level, these studies generally find that less liquid stocks have 
higher average returns. This risk-factor concern started from Amihud et al. (1990), who 
put forth that liquidity change over time. Amihud et al. (1990) studied the stock market 
crash of October 19, 1987; they suggested that the crash had down-warded investors’ 
belief about liquidity which had caused a decline in stock price. Their study suggested a 
dynamic relation between the expected return and liquidity. Amihud (2002) documented 
the presence of a time-series relation between their measures of market liquidity and 
expected market returns.  
Later on, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) emphasized the effects of the change of 
liquidity in terms of time series and cross-section. They found that the covariance 
between an asset’s return and the common liquidity factor (‘liquidity betas’ as named in 
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their paper) is priced, and the asset prices should reflect a premium for the sensitivity of 
stock returns to market-wide liquidity: Stocks with greater exposure to market liquidity 
shocks – i.e., with greater systematic liquidity risk – should earn higher returns.  
Similarly, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) expanded the model of Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) by involving four factors capturing both liquidity level and liquidity 
risk. They used Amihud ILLIQ (Amihud, 2002) to measure the market wide liquidity 
level, and employed the ‘liquidity betas’ (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003) to measure 
liquidity risk. They also found that higher (absolute) liquidity related betas lead to higher 
expected returns.  
 
3.6.4 Trading volume and liquidity risk 
 
Among these different liquidity measurements, trading volume is special and has not 
been frequently documented in the literature of liquidity level. Karpoff (1987) concluded 
that in the literature theoretical treatment of trading volume arises in three settings: its 
relation to the bid-ask spread, its relation to price changes, and its relation to information. 
The intuition about the trading activity is that it should be easier to trade in more active 
markets, which then imply a negative relation between trading volume and bid-ask spread. 
Nevertheless, some recent researches investigated the relation between trading volume 
and the conventional liquidity level proxies at market-wide level, and reported there is 
little evidence of the association between these measures. For example, Jones (2002) 
found no significant effect of changes in turnover on changes in bid-ask spreads by 
applying vector autoregression model to examine the annual data of the Dow Jones 30 
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industrial stocks in a period of 1900-2000. Similarly, Evans and Lyons (2002) found no 
association between trading volume and liquidity which is termed as the price impact of 
trades: trades have more price impact when markets are less liquid, other things equal 
(this is same as bid-ask spread by nature).  
Interestingly, Johnson (2007) found a strong positive contemporaneous relation 
between trading volume and liquidity risk (measured as the variance of liquidity, same as 
the definition in Amihud et al. (1990), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)). He considered a 
continuous-time economy populated by Nt agents with constant absolute risk aversion 
(CARA) preferences, where high volume occurs not when there are large changes to the 
overall state of the economy, but when the mean change in individuals—relative to the 
average—is high. In his model, volume captures something closer to the physical concept 
of flux: the total (gross) flow into and out of the population. This, in turn, captures the 
degree to which the individuals within the population have been rearranged. He 
concluded that the scale of liquidity innovations—liquidity risk—should be positively 
related to volume, because intuitively, large changes in liquidity cannot occur without a 
lot of population flux, and a small amount of flux must imply a small change in liquidity.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
We review three main issues in the literature of the ADRs. First, the motivations to cross 
list shares is from the point of the firms, since firms’ intention to cross-listing is obvious, 
the research about this issue are relatively few than about the other two issues. Second, 
the price discovery process is from the point of view of market. Most of the cross-listed 
stocks are from emerging markets which tend to be segmented. Among a number of 
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segmentation factors, the papers reviewed point to asynchronous trading hours is the most 
important factor. Price discovery process tends to take place in the US market when the 
underlying market is with larger over-lapping trading hours with the US. Third, the 
ADRs’ arbitrage is from the point of view of investors. The persistent mispricing arises 
from gambling activities between the informed traders (arbitrageurs) and the noise traders. 
Finally, we also review the papers about liquidity effect. In particular, we focus on the 
difference of several conventional liquidity measurements, and pay attention to the 
difference of liquidity level and liquidity risk. 
      From the literature, we also note that the price discovery of the Chinese ADRs has 
been studied by Xu and Fung (2002). So our objective will be mainly on the issue of the 
Chinese ADRs’ arbitrage. 
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Chapter 4  
 
Returns Spread and Liquidity of the Chinese ADRs 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
We are going to perform the main empirical examinations on the Chinese ADRs’ 
arbitrage in chapter 4.  From the literature of the ADRs’ arbitrage surveyed in chapter 3, 
we concluded that the investigation on the Chinese ADRs’ arbitrage could be processed in 
two steps. The first examination is to find out whether the Law of One Price (the Law 
hereafter) exists between the Chinese ADRs and their underlying H shares. The second is 
to examine the factors which impede arbitrageurs to close price differentials between two 
securities.  
With regard to the first step, according to the Law, if markets are efficient, the 
ADRs and their underlying shares are supposed to be traded at the same price and very 
little arbitrage profit would exist between them. However, if the Chinese ADRs are truly 
traded at same price as their underlying H shares adjusted for the exchange rate, then it 
would be difficult to explain some remarkable market phenomena that we have quite 
often observed; that hedge funds are among the top 10 shareholders of these Chinese 
ADRs. Given the nature of the hedge funds, this practical evidence clearly suggests the 
existence of deviation between the prices of these two identical securities and implied a 
possible arbitrage profit.  
On closer examination of the papers on the ADRs’ arbitrage possibility, we 
noticed the findings of these papers are inconsistent, which we believe is due to different 
methodologies applied. Some earlier papers employ basic statistical tests such as t-test 
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and Wilcoxon signed-rank test which are only sensitive to location, as well as correlation 
tests to compare the returns of the ADRs and the underlying shares. These papers report 
no significant differences exist between home and host securities’ prices, and thus 
conclude that very few profitable arbitrage opportunities persist between any of the home 
markets and the US market (see Kato et al (1991), Miller and Morey (1996), and Karolyi 
and Stulz (1996)). On the other hand, Wahab et al (1992) used portfolio approach and 
found small but significant differences between prices of some ADRs and their 
underlying securities. Furthermore, Rabinovitch et al (2003) employed non-parametric 
methods to compare return distribution of the ADRs and their underlying shares; they 
found that even when the means and medians are not different there may still be 
differences in higher moments for securities return distributions.  
In this chapter, we will use both standard location tests as Kato et al (1991), 
Miller and Morey (1996), and Karolyi and Stulz (1996), as well as non-parametric tests to 
compare return distribution as Rabinovitch et al (2003). 
In the literature on financial markets, the distributions of returns of the cross-listed 
securities have long been the subject of researches for the Law. In particular, the 
distributions of the returns of ADRs and their underlying shares are compared to test the 
implications of the Law in recent published papers. Due to the fact that ‘there is ample 
empirical evidence that the distribution of short-term security returns, e.g., daily, weekly 
or monthly, is non-normal’ (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997), return distribution 
studies pay attention to the higher moments especially on skewness and kurtosis, instead 
of on the lower moment such as mean. Skewness is a measure of symmetry, or more 
precisely, the lack of symmetry. A normal distribution is symmetric of the centre point. 
 96
Kurtosis is a measure of whether the data are peaked or flat relative to a normal 
distribution. Data set with high kurtosis tend to have a distinct peak near the mean, 
decline rather rapidly, and have heavy tails. Data set with low kurtosis tend to have a flat 
top near the mean rather than a sharp peak. The deviation from normal distribution in the 
higher moments leads to newly developed financial analysis methods and portfolio 
studies, for example, the Copula weighted portfolio which is based on the tail dependence 
between markets and risk factors. This approach applies widely in the researches of hedge 
funds strategy and the comovement between market indices. Although the portfolio 
approach motivates us to carry out the return distributions study, it will not be discussed 
in this thesis because of the limitation of time and we leave it for further extension in 
future.  
With respect to the second step, we will follow the approach of Gagnon and 
Karolyi (2004). This paper not only reported evidence of existence of significant 
mispricing in the ADRs, but also specified the various cross-sectional attributes at the 
country-, industry- and firm-level. They further grouped these attributes into three major 
categories of barriers or frictions: market-based, information-based, and trading-based. 
Market-based barriers can include direct and indirect investment barriers faced by the 
foreigners, which address the question about the segmented market hypothesis. 
Information-based barriers are the asymmetric information about noise trader risk across 
the host and home market as well as the asymmetric information between corporate 
insiders and other shareholders, which hamper professional arbitrageurs to bet against 
noise trader, so the mispricing would be persistent for an extended period. Trading-based 
barriers are the illiquidity in the home market for the underlying shares or in the US 
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market for the ADRs, since the ADRs are usually not frequently traded, arbitrage activity 
may be impeded for the fear of illiquidity.  
In particular, we test the information-based and the trade-based barriers on the 
limit of the ADRs’ arbitrage. These two barriers are examined as ‘comovement effect’ and 
‘illiquidity effect’ in the paper of Gagnon and Karolyi (2004). According to Froot and 
Dabora (1999), De Jong et al. (2004), and Gagnon and Karolyi (2004), the comovement 
effect arises due to the noise trader risks. Noise traders tend to move with the local 
market, so the noise trader risks would have different extent and are usually 
asynchronous in the host and home markets. The professional arbitrageurs who are 
usually with limited horizons would not be able to remove the mispricing for fear of the 
noise trader risk. As a result, the mispricing can be persistent over long period.  
Apart from the comovement effect, we further test the illiquidity effect. Gagnon 
and Karolyi (2004) provided evidence that the greater the illiquidity in one or the other or 
both markets, the greater the net market risk exposures revealed for the return differences 
between the ADRs and the underlying shares. In addition, as analyzed in chapter 2, we 
introduce the market microstructure and trading mechanisms of the three China-related 
exchanges, and compare the trading mechanisms and the trading costs of these three 
exchanges with that of the NYSE and NASDAQ. We find that the size of the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchange is extremely small compare to that of the Hong Kong stock 
exchange as well as to that of the NYSE and NASDAQ. A large stock exchange tends to 
provide bigger width and depth, and therefore greater liquidity. Second, we show that due 
to the employment of different trading mechanisms, a notable difference among these 
stock exchanges is whether the market makers exist. The NYSE and NASDAQ are dealer 
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market and all transaction must be processed by the market makers, the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges are auction markets where no market makers exist; all 
transaction are cleared through electronic trading system, and the Hong Kong stock 
exchange though has a small number of market makers, it is designed as an auction 
market and all transactions are carried out through electronic trading system, the market 
makers in the Hong Kong stock exchange will supply liquidity only on very particular 
situations, but not be involved in the daily frequent exchanges. Market makers not only 
play a critical role in providing liquidity, some of the market makers or dealers also take 
part in block trades. Block trades account for about 50% of the daily trading value in the 
US equity markets, however, there are nearly no block trade in Hong Kong or Shanghai 
stock exchanges. In conclusion, we suspect that liquidity is also one of the important 
attributes of the ADRs’ mispricing.  
Finally, we have introduced the market liberalization of China’s stock market in 
chapter 2, and we have explained that the distinctive characteristic of the Chinese ADRs 
is due to the fact that they connect three markets, the US, Hong Kong, and China’s stock 
markets. We view the important reforms of the China’s stock market as the innovation, 
and try to find if the market innovations would have any impact on the Chinese ADRs’ 
price. So we process to test for the effects of structural change on the comovement effect.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: section 4.2 contains an introduction the Chinese 
ADRs; section 4.3 explains the hypothesis and methodology; section 4.4 provides a 
description of the data; section 4.5 is the empirical results of tests; section 4.6 concludes. 
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4.2 Overview of the Chinese American Depository Receipts (ADRs) 
 
By the end of 2006, 59 Chinese firms have accessed the US markets by issuing ADRs. 
Among those, 16 are listed on the NYSE, 17 on the NASDAQ, and 26 on the OTC 
market. China’s first overseas IPO, Brilliance China Automotive (CBA) was listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) on October 1992 and raised US$ 80 million.  
 The 59 Chinese ADRs have some interesting features; the 16 firms listed on the 
NYSE are all SOEs with monopoly power in the domestic market; they operate in some 
critical industries, such as electric power, petroleum, airline, and telecom. These 
companies first issue H shares and then make the H shares serve as backing for their 
ADR programs, where the receipts are potentially convertible into the underlying H 
shares, (except for Huaneng Power Intel (HNP) and Brilliance China Automotive (CBA), 
which issue IPO on the NYSE before issue H shares in Hong Kong, and then combine 
ADRs with their H shares instead of existing shares in the US). The 17 firms listed on the 
NASDAQ are all young privately owned IT companies, these firms do not issue H shares 
in Hong Kong, and they first issue IPOs on the NASDAQ, then convert part of the IPOs 
to ADRs. The 26 firms on the OTC market have different characteristic, they are also 
SOEs but do not enjoy a monopoly position. Finally, in the OTC market, 11 firms have H 
shares as underlying shares, 6 firms have B-shares as underlying shares, and 9 firms have 
underlying shares issued in the US. 
One interesting thing deserving our attention is to look at how the Chinese 
NASDAQ-listed firms enlist abroad. First, the timing of Chinese IT firms to list on the 
NASDAQ is related with the ‘NASDAQ surge’, the first ‘surge’ is around 1999, however 
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the Chinese IT industry just started since then, computer owners and internet users were 
still very few in 1999, the second ‘surge’ started from 2003 in NASDAQ, and provided 
good opportunities for the well-developed Chinese IT firms. Second, the manner of these 
Chinese IT firms listing abroad is entirely different from those listed on the NYSE. a) All 
of these firms in NASDAQ are private, so they don’t have support from the government. 
b) These firms have smaller shareholder base and market capitalization, which make most 
of them ineligible to list in Hong Kong. c) Most of these firms merge with a shell 
company in the US, and register in the free-tax heavens such as Bermuda, Cayman 
Islands before their listing on NASDAQ. This way of listing continued until 2005 when 
China’s government issued regulations to ban Chinese private firms to list abroad in this 
way and as a result of which, all the Chinese NASDAQ listed firms have close listing 
dates between 2003 and 2005. 
 
4.3 Research Methodology and Hypothesis Development 
 
4.3.1 To test the law of one price 
 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the arbitrage possibility between the 15 
NYSE-listed Chinese ADRs and their underlying H shares, and if there are any price 
deviations, we will additionally measure these price differentials taking into consideration 
the impact of the market factors and the liquidity risk.  
      As the literature survey on the ADRs arbitrage in chapter 3 has indicated that the 
location tests such as t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test tend to uncover an equality 
relation between the price parity and suggest that the law of one price exists between two 
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securities, while the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which is well-known for its sensitive to 
both the location and shape of a distribution, tend to reveal the difference in the 
distribution, for instance, the difference in skewness and kurtosis. And we have discussed 
the importance to be aware of the distribution difference in the introduction of this 
chapter. Therefore, we will use both the approaches of Rabinovitch et al. (2003) and that 
of Kato et al. (1990) to test the law of one price. We will apply t-test, Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, and the parametric joint test of simultaneous 
means and variance equality10. Our null hypothesis is; there is no difference in the return 
distribution of two securities, and the alternative hypothesis is of the opposite.  
 
4.3.2 To test the comovement effect on mispricing 
 
Secondly, as reviewed in chapter 3, the literature of segmented markets suggests several 
possible international barriers that may influence how securities are priced in their 
respective market, for example, restrictions on foreign ownership, tax, illiquidity, 
non-synchronicity, etc. With regard to the Chinese ADRs, the underlying market is Hong 
Kong which is a free market as the US market without restrictions on foreign investors; 
so we expect investors in the two markets could freely buy or sell shares in both the 
domestic and cross-border markets. On the other hand, Hong Kong has pegged its 
exchange rate with the US dollar since 1983, so the international traders would expose to 
zero risk in exchange rate. The critical factor in the Chinese ADRs’ trading is the 
non-synchronous trading hours between the US and Hong Kong market. The 12-hour’s 
                                                        
10 The original test method can be found in Bradly and Blackwood (1989). “A simultaneous test for 
means and variances”. Am. Statistician 43,234-235 
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difference between the two markets induces non-overlapping trading in two markets. In 
chapter 3, the comovement effect suggests securities tend to systematically move with the 
local market index, and Gagnon and Karolyi (2004) showed the ADRs have a higher 
systematic comovement with the US market index than the comovement with the home 
market. 
Therefore, we develop our testing in two steps: first, we follow Kato et al. (1991) 
who applied correlation test on the returns of the ADRs and their underlying shares, and 
reported significant correlation between two securities with regard to both 
contemporaneous and lead-lag relation; and they concluded that the US and the home 
market are weak-form efficient and integrated fully, there exists no arbitrage possibility. 
We will employ Spearman correlation test and Pearson correlation test to examine the 
returns of the Chinese ADRs and the underlying H shares.  
Second, we follow De Jong et al. (2003) and Gagnon and Karolyi (2004) to 
examine the comovement effect of two securities. The implication of the comovement 
effect is that the ADRs (the underlying H shares) tend to move more closely with the US 
(Hong Kong) market index than Hong Kong (the US) market index. Because if the ADRs 
(the H shares) move with local and off-shore market equally, then the noise trader in the 
US (Hong Kong) market would not create different risk of the price of the securities to 
deter the arbitrageurs. Further, by reason of the asynchronous trading hours, it is difficult 
to tell whether mispricing exists if we exclusively focus on contemporaneous relation. 
Likewise, arbitrage may not remove mispricing within one day because of the time 
needed to complete the necessary trades. Especially, the US market opens 12 hours later 
than Hong Kong, so the Hong Kong market index at day t may be reflected by the US 
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market index at day t+1, so we consider the comovement effect in the longer horizon; we 
take the first stage time series regression model as De Jong et al. (2003) and Gagnon and 
Karolyi (2004) and give our model as bellow:   
ADR
tr -
HK
tr  = 
USα + ∑
−=
+
0
2i
US
it
US
i Rβ  + ∑
−=
+
0
2i
HK
it
HK
i Rβ + tε  …… (1) 
Where itr refers to the returns for security i (H share or ADR) on day t, (
ADR
tr -
HK
tr ) 
is the return spread between two securities at day t. We calculate the 
continuously-compounded return as (ln (Pt/Pt-1)). UStR is the return on the US (host) 
market on day t, HKtR is the return on Hong Kong (underlying) market on day t.  
Further, some of those Chinese ADRs are also subsequently listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE). The shares listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong (SEHK) are H shares, which allow foreign ownership and are traded in Hong Kong 
currency while the shares listed on SHSE are A shares available only to the Chinese 
citizens and traded in Chinese currency.  And in chapter 2, we have discussed that there 
is strict restriction on the ownership of A shares as well as the limitation for the Chinese 
citizens to own foreign currency, given that H shares must be traded at Hong Kong 
currency, that stops any arbitrage possibility between H shares and A shares, even as we 
have introduced in chapter 2 that a huge price discount exists between A shares and H 
shares.  
For the ADRs have A shares in Shanghai stock exchange, we also include 
Shanghai market returns as an explanatory variable in spite of the evidence that the 
Chinese market and the global market in general and the US market in particular are not 
correlated. Yet, Shanghai market may have an indirect impact on the Chinese ADR 
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returns through Hong Kong market. This is because some of our empirical evidence 
suggests an inverse correlation (negatively related) between the market returns of Hong 
Kong and Shanghai. While the correlation is expected, the inverse correlation is 
surprising given that the markets in Hong Kong and Mainland China are integrated due to 
their common culture, interdependence, and cooperation in business.  They also have 7 
overlapping opening hours of stock exchanges during which political and economic news 
in China are likely to impact H shares’ performance in Hong Kong, which may then 
transmit from the H shares to the ADRs in US due to the integration between US and 
Hong Kong markets.  A possible explanation for the inverse correlation is that Hong 
Kong and Shanghai markets compete for funds and thus one market can gain only at the 
cost of the other. 
Our null hypothesis is that if two markets are weak form efficient and fully 
integrated, then the differential of the returns of two securities is zero. So the coefficient 
of the US and Hong Kong market indices should be zero. Therefore, the alternative 
hypothesis is that if the two markets are segmented, then market shocks can explain 
movements in the return differential, the return differential is positively affected by a 
positive shock in the US market index and negatively affected by a positive shock in the 
Hong Kong market index. 
 
4.3.3 To test the liquidity effect on mispricing  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, along with Karolyi (1998), De Jong et al. (2003), Gagnon and 
Karolyi (2004), etc., several theoretical and empirical studies have examined the 
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mispricing of the paired traded stocks, and have carried out investigations on the issues 
related with market imperfections, limits to arbitrage, noise trader risk, or a combination 
of these arguments. Although quite a few papers have argued that the illiquidity across 
markets could be one of the attributes to the mispricing, it is not until recently did 
researchers begin a rigorous study of whether a difference in liquidity (DIL) between 
markets explains part of this phenomenon. The strong evidence of the liquidity effect on 
the ADRs mispricing are given by Chan et al. (2008), who argued when similar securities 
are traded at different prices at different markets, the liquidity or illiquidity in these 
markets also differ in the direction, for example, a rise of the liquidity (illiquidity) in the 
US market will lead to a decrease (increase) on the ADRs price differentials, likewise, a 
rise of the liquidity (illiquidity) in the underlying market will lead to a increase (decrease) 
on the ADRs price differentials. Their results clearly support the illiquidity effect as 
concluded in Gagnon and Karolyi (2004). 
       As we have pointed out in chapter 3 that it is crucial to select proper liquidity 
measures from a full range of liquidity proxy candidates. The simplest and the most 
traditional illiquidity measure is the bid-ask spread calculated by Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986), this proxy has been widely used in empirical researches. Unfortunately, it is 
difficult to apply the bid-ask spread in our thesis due to constraints on data availability. 
Bid-ask spread need to use intra-day data, although intra-day data on transactions and 
quotes are available for the ADR market in the US, it is not available for the H shares. As 
a result, we have to use alternative liquidity measures that use only daily return and 
volume data as inputs. 
      Same as Chan et al. (2008), we decide to use ILLIQ (Amihud, 2002) as the 
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illiquidity measure. ILLIQ is defined as the average of daily ratio of volume to absolute 
return, the merit of this measure is that ‘it measures the daily price impact of the order 
flow, which is exactly the concept of illiquidity, since it quantifies the price/return 
response to a given size of trade’ (Chan et al., 2008). Therefore, we calculate daily ILLIQ 
as: 
tILLIQ  = 
t
t
vol
r
 
Where tILLIQ  is the daily illiquidity proxy, tr  is the absolute value of return at 
day t, tvol is the trading volume at day t. 
Chan et al. (2008) also employed turnover ratio as alternative liquidity measure. 
Turnover ratio is calculated by the traded volume divided by the total outstanding shares, 
it measures how actively the stock is traded. However, given the specific characteristic 
about the Chinese ADRs that the Chinese ADRs are backed by the H shares, these ADRs 
firms issued H shares in Hong Kong and then sold small part of H shares as the ADRs in 
the US market, then the turnover ratio, the relative ratio between traded shares and 
outstanding shares, will not be able to tell if the ADRs is traded more actively than the H 
shares, because most part of the floating shares will remain in the Hong Kong market. As 
a result, we decide to choose trading volume as one of our liquidity measures; we view 
trading volume as a proxy capturing liquidity risk.   
As we have discussed in chapter 3, in the literature of liquidity, it is important to 
be aware of the difference of two liquidity dimensions: the liquidity level and the 
liquidity risk. The level of liquidity is the predictable part of the tradability of the security 
without suffering the adverse consequences of market impact. Liquidity risk, on the other 
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hand, arises from the unpredictable changes in liquidity over time. Johnson (2007) 
demonstrated that the scale of liquidity innovations (liquidity risk) is positively related to 
volume, because intuitively, large changes in liquidity cannot occur without high trading 
volume, and a small amount of trading volume must imply a small change in liquidity. 
Therefore, we use trading volume as alternative measure of liquidity risk, and we give 
our model as below: 
εββα +++=− HKtHKADRtADRHKtADRt ILLIQILLIQrr 21    (2) 
εββα +++=− HKtHKADRtADRHKtADRt liqliqrr 43          (3) 
Where ADRtr  and 
HK
tr  are the return at day t, tILLIQ  is the proxy measuring 
illiquidity for ADRs and H shares at day t, tliq is calculated by the logarithms of trading 
volume at day t for ADRs and H shares.  
Equations (2) and (3) aim to capture whether the exposure to the illiquidity and 
liquidity risk would impact on the return differentials. Our null hypothesis is mispricing 
between the ADR and H share is zero, therefore, the beta of each the liquidity proxies 
equal to zero. The alternative hypothesis is ADR1β  is positive while HK2β  is negative, 
because the positive illiquidity-return relation. And ADR3β  is positive and ADR4β  is 
negative, because high liquidity risk should lead to high return.  
 
4.4 Data and descriptive statistics 
 
4.4.1 Data 
Our sample of the Chinese ADRs is drawn from the Bank of New York’s Complete DR 
Directory, which is available on the web (www.adrbny.com). This directory provides the 
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issuer name, symbol, CUSIP number, listing market (Rule 144A, AMEX, NASDAQ, or 
NYSE), ADR bundling ratio, home country, industry, region, and the name of the 
sponsoring bank if the issue is sponsored. The information about the listing history of the 
H shares is drawn from the website of Hong Kong stock exchange. Our sample includes 
15 pairs of NYSE-listed ADRs and H shares, the sample period varies depends on 
individual stocks, the longest is of SHI (SINOPEC Shanghai Petrochemical Company 
LTD) which begins on October 1993, the shortest period is of CEO (CNOOC China 
National Offshore Oil Co.) which begins on April 2004, the sample period for all ADRs 
and H shares end on October 2006. We obtain daily close price after adjusted with 
dividends, trading volume and market indices from DataStream Advance 4.0.  
As of October 2006, there are 33 Chinese ADRs (ADR level III) listed on the US 
stock exchanges; another 26 (ADR level I) are traded on the OTC. Among the exchange 
listed ADRs, 16 are listed on the NYSE and 17 on the NASDAQ. For the purpose of this 
study, we are specifically focusing on the NYSE-listed ADRs since we aim to test the 
arbitrage possibility. We further exclude one NYSE-listed ADR, namely STP, due to this 
ADR was listed on Dec of 2005 and its time period is less than one year up to our sample 
ending date. We exclude the ADRs listed in NASDAQ, because these ADRs do not have 
underlying shares in the stock exchange other than NASDAQ, we also exclude the ADRs 
listed in OTC, because these ADRs cannot provide the examination on the comovement 
effect due to the inability of a proper market index. We then group 15 ADRs into two 
portfolios: Portfolio I consists of 9 stocks listed on the NYSE with underlying shares in 
Hong Kong stock exchange; Portfolio II consists of 6 stocks listed on the NYSE with H 
shares in Hong Kong stock exchange, and A shares in Shanghai stock exchange.  
Table 4.1 overview of the Chinese ADRs listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ as of October 2006 
 
NYSE listed Chinese ADRs 
Company name 
 
ADR 
Symbol
Listing 
Date 
HK 
Underlying 
Shares 
HK 
Listing 
Date 
SH 
Home 
Shares 
SH 
Listing 
Date 
Industry Conversion 
Ratio 
 
Average 
price ($) 
Average 
trading 
volume ($) 
CHINA EASTERN AIRLINES 
CORPORATION LIMITED 
CEA 01/97 0670 01/97 600115 11/97 Travel & 
Leisure 
100 14.673 18815.97 
CHINA PETROLEUM & 
CHEMICAL CORPORATION 
SNP 10/00 0386 10/00 600028 08/01 Oil& Gas 
Producers 
100 31.624 172664.7 
CHINA SOUTHERN AIRLINES 
CO., LTD. 
ZNH 04/98 1055 04/98 600029 07/03 Travel & 
Leisure 
50 13.772 19490.58 
HUANENG POWER 
INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
HNP 10/94 0902 01/98 600011 12/01 Electricity 40 27.247 182012.3 
SINOPEC SHANGHAI 
PETROCHEMICAL COMPANY 
LIMITED 
SHI 07/93 0338 07/93 600688 11/93 Chemicals 100 23.795 34844.11 
YANZHOU COAL MINING 
COMPANY LIMITED 
YZC 04/98 1171 07/98 600188 07/98 Mining 50 28.488 19703.85 
ALUMINUM CORPORATION 
OF CHINA LIMITED 
ACH 12/01 2600 12/01 N/A N/A Industrial 
Metals 
25 11.396 328227.8 
BRILLIANCE CHINA 
AUTOMOTIVE HOLDINGS 
LIMITED 
CBA 10/92 1114 10/99 N/A N/A Cars & Parts 100 22.263 32509.74 
CHINA LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY LIMITED 
LFC 12/03 2628 12/03 N/A N/A Life 
Insurance 
40 36.137 431115.6 
CHINA MOBILE (HONG 
KONG) LIMITED 
CHL 10/97 0941 10/97 N/A N/A Mobile 
Telecom 
5 17.744 441852.4 
CHINA TELECOM 
CORPORATION LIMITED 
CHA 12/02 0728 11/02 N/A N/A Fixed Line 
Telecom 
100 32.181 123691.6 
CHINA UNICOM LIMITED CHU 06/00 0762 06/00 N/A N/A Mobile 
Telecom. 
10 10.117 444997.7 
CNOOC - CHINA NATIONAL 
OFFSHORE OIL CORP 
CEO 02/01 0883 04/04 N/A N/A Oil& Gas 
Producers 
100 63.293 116834.8 
GUANGEN RAILWAY 
COMPANY LIMITED 
GSH 05/96 0525 05/96 N/A N/A Travel & 
Leisure 
50 10.690 32218.42 
PETROCHINA COMPANY 
LIMITED 
PTR 03/00 0857 04/00 N/A N/A Oil& Gas 
Producers 
100 41.025 318396.9 
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NASDAQ listed Chinese ADRs 
51JOB, INC. JOBS 10/04 N/A N/A N/A N/A IT 2 19.345 261758.3 
BAIDU.COM, INC. BIDU 08/05 N/A N/A N/A N/A IT 1 79.606 2250077 
CHINA FINANCE ONLINE CO., 
LTD. 
JRJC 10/04 N/A N/A N/A N/A IT 5 6.510 139716.3 
CHINA MEDICAL 
TECHNOLOGIES 
CMED 08/05 N/A N/A N/A N/A IT 10 25.874 654057.1 
CHINA TECHFAITH WIRELESS 
COMMUNICATION LIMITED 
CNTF 05/05 N/A N/A N/A N/A IT 15 12.607 345958.1 
CTRIP.COM INTERNATIONAL, 
LTD. 
CTRP 12/03 N/A N/A N/A N/A IT 2 30.091 418166.5 
ELONG, INC. LONG 11/04 N/A N/A N/A N/A IT 10 13.096 150726.6 
FOCUS MEDIA HOLDING 
LIMITED 
FMCN 07/05 N/A N/A N/A N/A IT 10 49.560 583140 
HURRAY! HOLDING 
COMPANY LTD. 
HRAY 02/05 N/A N/A N/A N/A IT 100 8.067 129041.6 
LINKTONE LTD. LTON 03/04 N/A N/A N/A N/A IT 10 7.976 329068.5 
NETEASE.COM, INC. NTES 06/00 N/A N/A N/A N/A IT 100 8.702 3648606 
NINETOWNS DIGITAL 
WORLD TRADE HOLDINGS 
LIMITED 
NINE 12/04 N/A N/A N/A N/A IT 1 6.142 226728 
SHANDA INTERACTIVE 
ENTERTAINMENT LIMITED 
SNDA 05/04 N/A N/A N/A N/A IT 2 23.274 1000400 
THE9 LIMITED NCTY 12/04 N/A N/A N/A N/A IT 1 22.577 259323.7 
1. STP, ACTS, VIMC are excluded from our empirical study, because their effective date is after Oct 2005, the time period is not enough for one year. 
2. The conversion ratio indicates the number of underlying shares in Hong Kong that corresponds to one ADR share in New York, and this number is of October 2006. 
3. In order to compare returns from different markets, the sample period for each firm starts on the listing date of ADR or H shares of the company, whichever is later. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 contains an overview of the Chinese ADRs listed on NYSE and 
NASDAQ, the corresponding underlying securities, if available on Hong Kong (SEHK) 
and additional listing on Shanghai (SHSE) stock exchanges along with the respective 
listing month and year in each exchange. We observe that the listing, month and year and 
particularly the years in which the ADRs were issued reveal some strategic decisions on 
the part of the issuing Hong Kong firms to enlist their ADRs.   
 
4.4.2 The Chinese ADRs listing history and listing pattern 
 
We summarize the NYSE-listed Chinese ADRs listing history in the following Graph 4.1. 
Graph 4.1: Yearly ADR listing by Hong Kong firms during the sample period. 
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First, as Graph 4.1 indicates, the Chinese ADRs listing during our sample period 
do not show any trend or any other discernible regularity; strikingly though, more than 
50% (8/15) ADRs were listed between 2000 and 2003. A reasonable hypothesis for this 
structural shift in 2000 may be the market collapse in US, particularly the IPO market, 
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which led some Hong Kong firms11 to offer their securities to the US investors as 
alternative investment options.  
Second, as we have mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, we aim to 
investigate the impacts from a set of reforms happened in China’s domestic stock market 
around 2003. Since part of these NYSE-listed ADRs additionally listed A shares in 
Shanghai stock exchange after they sequentially listed in the Hong Kong stock exchange 
and the NYSE. Given the close relation between Hong Kong and China, we expect that 
China’s stock market would have some indirect impacts on these ADRs through her 
connection with Hong Kong. Therefore, we will later use 2000 and 2003 as our two 
structural shift points for regression analysis.  
We also notice that some interesting listing behavior exist in these ADRs. First, 
almost all listings on the Hong Kong market and on the NYSE were done almost 
simultaneously (within a month) for all the ADRs, and predate listing on the Shanghai 
market for the ADRs with A shares listed in Shanghai12. The question about these firms’ 
motivation to list A shares in Shanghai is worth our concern. While the motivation behind 
the Hong Kong firms to cross list in the US to attract more capital is obvious, the 
implications for these firms to cross-list in Shanghai stock market is not clear. According 
to our research on the trading costs and market conditions in chapter 2, we know the 
Shanghai stock exchange has far less liquidity, depth, and width than that of Hong Kong. 
Then it seems to contradict the conventional wisdom that firms’ cross-listing is to achieve 
                                                        
11 For the purpose of this study, we name these Chinese firms as Hong Kong firms to differ them 
from the Chinese firms without issuing H shares, because they issue IPO on the SEHK, and behave 
more like Hong Kong firms rather than Chinese mainland firms, the details are discussed in chapter 2. 
12 HNP is an exception that issued H shares in 1998, A shares in 2001, and ADR in 2003.  This order 
of listing for all securities except HNP i.e., listing as ADRs prior to or simultaneously on Hong Kong 
exchange prevents us from investigating the announcement effect around cross listing.  
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lower cost of capital and greater liquidity. Further it raises questions about those Chinese 
ADRs which do not list A shares in Shanghai, and those NASDAQ-listed ADRs which 
do not list in any of their home country exchanges. The answer may lie in the ownership 
structure of firms since the firms with additional cross listing in Shanghai are SOEs with 
strong political ties with the Chinese government.  
In table 4.1 above, we also list the corresponding industries which these firms 
belong to.  We find that all NYSE-listed ADRs belong to four industries - utilities, 
communication, travel and leisure, and heavy engineering and industrial products.  The 
industry distribution for the NASDAQ ADRs is different; they are all young IT firms. 
Compared to the large industrial base of China, the ADRs from China seem to be from a 
very selective industry core. Table 4.2 gives the overall distribution of all Chinese listed 
firms in domestic stock market as of 2006. 
 
Table 4.2 Overview of the Chinese listed firms’ industry distribution (2006) 
Industry  No. Industry  No.
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 38 Mining 25 
Food, Beverage 61 Textile, Appeal, Leather 68 
Wood Product 4 Paper, printing 30 
Petroleum, Chemical Product, Plastics, Rubber 153 Electrical Equipment 51 
Metal, Non-metallic Mineral product 130 Machinery, Equipment, Meter 227
Medicine, Biologic product 91 Other manufacturing 20 
Electricity, Gas, Water supply 62 Construction 31 
Transport, Storage 63 Information, Technology 90 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 92 Finance, Insurance 12 
Real Estate 55 Social Services 42 
Transmission, Culture 10 Conglomerate  78 
Total listed firms: 1433 
Source: 2006 Yearbook from http://www.csrc.gov.cn 
 
4.4.3 Descriptive statistics on ADRs and H shares returns 
We compute continuously compounded returns on the ADR listings in US exchanges and 
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their corresponding underlying stocks listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (and 
Shanghai Stock Exchange as applicable) as 1ln( / )
i i i
t t tr P P−= where itP denotes adjusted 
closing price of security i on day t.  The sample period for each pair of ADR and the 
underlying security begins from the latest listing dates of the ADR or HK security13 and 
ends in October 2006 and the actual number of observations for each security used in our 
analysis is reported in Table 4.3.   
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics on daily returns ADRtr and 
HK
tr  
 
Symbol  Obs. Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max  Skewness  Kurtosis 
Portfolio I 
ACH 
[2600.hk] 
1187 
1226 
0.116%  
(0.107%) 
2.99% 
(3.14%) 
-0.104 
(-0.149) 
0.162 
(0.144) 
0.331  
(0.098) 
4.550  
(4.358) 
CBA 
[1114.hk] 
1274 
1301 
0.009%  
(0.010%) 
3.08% 
(3.63%) 
-0.248 
(-0.219) 
0.175 
(0.221) 
0.229 
(0.285) 
6.619  
(7.743) 
LFC 
[2628.hk] 
715 
736 
0.185%  
(0.178%) 
2.26% 
(2.09%) 
-0.104 
(-0.081) 
0.115 
(0.099) 
0.203 
(0.199) 
6.586  
(5.722) 
CHL 
[0941.hk] 
2827 
2774 
0.073%  
(0.078%) 
2.93% 
(2.76%) 
-0.157 
(-0.165) 
0.186 
(0.156) 
0.297  
(0.253) 
6.672  
(7.076) 
CHA 
[0728.hk] 
970 
1005 
0.083%  
(0.074%) 
1.93% 
(1.89%) 
-0.087 
(-0.083) 
0.082 
(0.075) 
0.153 
(-0.017) 
4.698  
(4.273) 
CEO 
[0883.hk] 
645 
667 
0.118%  
(0.113%) 
1.89% 
(1.94%) 
(-0.075) 
(-0.077) 
0.087 
(0.090) 
0.199  
(0.059) 
4.222  
(4.351) 
GSH 
[0525.hk] 
2620 
2595 
0.035% 
(0.010%) 
2.88% 
(3.09%) 
-0.207 
(-0.203) 
0.268 
(0.185) 
0.556 
(0.002) 
10.641 
(7.680) 
PTR 
[0857.hk] 
1588 
1542 
0.130%  
(0.136%) 
2.03% 
(2.03%) 
-0.092 
(-0.107) 
0.112 
(0.099) 
0.1274   
(0.155) 
5.848  
(5.340) 
CHU 
[0762.hk] 
1587 
1650 
-0.053%  
(-0.042%) 
2.82% 
(2.67%) 
-0.128 
(-0.131) 
0.159 
(0.143) 
0.227  
(0.078) 
6.255  
(5.338) 
 
Portfolio II 
CEA 
[0670.hk] 
2432 
2405 
-0.002%  
(-0.006%) 
3.32% 
(3.94%) 
-0.194 
(-0.375) 
0.236 
(0.267) 
0.706  
(0.225) 
8.812  
(10.196) 
SNP 
[0386.hk] 
1504 
1560 
0.072%  
(0.095%) 
2.45% 
(2.37%) 
-0.169 
(-0.090) 
0.182 
(0.104) 
0.080 
(-0.063) 
8.334  
(4.248) 
ZNH 
[1055.hk] 
2132 
2117 
0.004% 
(0.007%) 
3.67% 
(3.85%) 
-0.328 
(-0.327) 
0.241 
(0.296) 
0.301  
(0.259) 
9.672  
(9.947) 
HNP 
[0902.hk] 
2202 
2148 
0.051%  
(0.054%) 
3.29% 
(3.14%) 
-0.166 
(-0.167) 
0.168 
(0.207) 
0.225  
(0.383) 
6.023   
(6.775) 
SHI 
[0338.hk] 
3282 
3330 
0.021%  
(0.016%) 
3.38% 
(3.80%) 
-0.194 
(-0.239) 
0.271 
(0.304) 
0.512  
(0.328) 
9.324  
(8.144) 
YZC 
[1171.hk] 
2105 
2128 
0.037%  
(0.049%) 
3.76% 
(3.81%) 
-0.454 
(-0.487) 
0.238 
(0.268) 
-0.454 
(-0.848) 
17.478 
(18.087) 
 
Table 4.3 provides descriptive statistics on returns on ADR and the underlying 
                                                        
13 Since most Chinese ADRs have different listing date with H shares, for our particular research 
purpose, we choose sample period starting from the date when ADR or H shares listed later.  
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securities listed at SEHK.  In portfolio I, the number of observations vary from 645 
(CEO) to 2827 (CHL), while in Portfolio II, the minimum and maximum observations are 
1504 (SNP) and 3282 (SHI) respectively. The annualized returns on the ADRs (Hong 
Kong shares) range from -67.75% (-37.56%) to 37.30% (30.42%) with a mean of 5.33% 
(5.91%), however, after splitting the ADRs and the underlying H shares into Portfolios I 
and II the means of ADR (H shares) break down as follows: 7.21% (7.28%) for Portfolio 
I and 2.53% (3.85%) for Portfolio II. Thus the average returns for portfolio I for the 
underlying H shares and ADRs are higher than those of Portfolio II. Further the H shares 
in Portfolio II seem to be outperforming their ADR counterparts.   
The statistics show that three stocks, CHA, SNP, and YZC, either of the ADRs or 
of the H shares, are negatively skewed, although the skewness statistics are not large. The 
negative skewness implies that the return distributions of the shares have a heavier tail of 
large values and hence a higher probability of earning negative returns. The kurtosis 
values are very much larger than three, this result shows clearly that for most series, the 
distribution of return have fat tails compared with the normal distribution. It implies that 
much of the non-normality is due to leptokurtosis. 
Next, we compute return spread as the difference between the returns of each 
ADR and that of its corresponding underlying H shares respectively. We select the return 
data by matching two data set at same date, since the US and Hong Kong market have 
different holidays, so we exclude the return data which cannot be matched. Our measure 
of return spread is same as Gagnon and Karolyi (2004) and Rabinovitch et al (2003). It 
denotes arbitrage profit and is equivalent to ADR premium, the percentage difference in 
prices between ADR and its underlying security.  
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Table 4.4: Statistical distribution of return spread ( ADRtr -
HK
tr ) 
 
Symbol  Obs. Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max  Skewness  Kurtosis 
Portfolio I 
ACH 1183 0.002% 0.9% -0.040 0.036 -0.180 4.667 
CBA 1251 -0.002% 0.826% -0.050 0.038 -0.153 6.789 
LFC 715 0.003% 1.56% -0.104 0.066 -0.450 7.50 
CHL 2161 0.000% 2.37% -0.243 0.310 0.904 26.284 
CHA 970 0.001% 1.45% -0.061 0.064 0.168 4.605 
CEO 645 0.000% 1.59% -0.048 0.049 -0.058 8.194 
GSH 2515 0.025% 3.09% -0.218 0.300 0.099 12.856 
PTR 1489 -0.007% 1.61% -0.060 0.073 0.032 4.035 
CHU 1587 -0.005% 2.28% -0.145 0.136 0.105 7.51 
Portfolio II 
CEA 2336 0.000% 1.56% -0.120 0.129 -0.176 13.328 
SNP 1501 -0.002% 0.81% -0.090 0.061 -0.610 17.338 
ZNH 2132 0.000% 3.09% -0.352 0.244 -0.566 19.200 
HNP 2090 -0.015% 0.024 -0.205 0.149 -0.600 11.877 
SHI 3190 0.009% 1.54% -0.105 0.122 -0.262 10.972 
YZC 1929 0.032% 3.25% -0.180 0.486 -0.718 30.417 
 
Table 4.4 contains descriptive statistics on return spreads ( ADRtr -
HK
tr ) for 15 pairs of 
the Chinese ADRs separated into Portfolios I and II. The mean return spread is small, 
ranges from -1.5 basis point to 2.5 basis point14, from the mean value of return spread, we 
can not predict that mispricing exists and the arbitrage profit will by some chance catch 
the attention of arbitrageurs. However, we notice the skewness is negative for four out of 
nine ADRs in portfolio I and negative for all ADRs in portfolio II. And once again, we 
find a large kurtosis in all ADRs, especially very much higher for the ADRs in portfolio II 
than those in portfolio I. A negative skew indicates the distribution is left-tailed, the left 
tail is longer than the right tail, and the larger is the kurtosis, the fatter is the distribution. 
The non-normality of the return and return spread series justify the examination on the 
return distribution. This finding suggests that compare to the Chinese ADRs in portfolio I, 
the Chinese ADRs in portfolio II are more likely to have lower return than their 
underlying H shares.  
                                                        
14 100 basis point accounts for 1% 
 117
4.5 Empirical tests and results 
 
4.5.1 Tests on the law of one price 
 
We next conduct several tests to determine whether the returns for ADR and their 
underlying HK securities are identical. We first apply t-test to compare mean and 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test to compare median for each pair of the ADRs. Kato et al. 
(1991) reported no arbitrage possibility exists by using these two location sensitive tests. 
Next, we follow Rabinovitch et al (2003) to use Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the means 
and variances equality test to examine the return distribution for 15 pairs of the ADRs, 
and we report our results in table 4.5 and 4.6 
 
Table 4.5: Equality tests on returns of the ADRs and H shares.  
(p value in parentheses). 
 
Symbol  Two sample t-test Wilcoxon signed-rank test Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
Portfolio I 
ACH  -0.0331(0.9736) -0.207 (0.8362) 1.1959 (0.115) 
CBA  0.1227(0.9736) 0.183 (0.8544) 1.6527 (0.010)*** 
LFC -0.1289(0.8975) -0.242 (0.8091) 1.0062 (0.001)*** 
CHL  -0.0577(0.9540) 0.042 (0.9663) 0.9193 (0.369) 
CHA -0.0058(0.9954) -0.011 (0.9912) 2.4433 (0.000)*** 
CEO -0.0161(0.9872) 0.148 (0.8820) 1.4069 (0.038)** 
GSH 0.2861(0.7748) -0.123 (0.9018) 1.8961 (0.001)*** 
PTR -0.0779(0.9379) 0.143 (0.8866) 2.5826 (0.000)*** 
CHU -0.1173(0.9066) 0.038 (0.9693) 1.3721 (0.046)** 
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Portfolio II 
CEA 0.0324(0.9741) 0.550 (0.5824) 2.0422 (0.000)*** 
SNP -0.2595(0.7953) -0.610 (0.5416) 2.6330 (0.000)*** 
ZNH  -0.0254(0.9797) -0.304 (0.7614) 1.5380 (0.032)** 
HNP  -0.7638(0.4451) -0.470 (0.6383) 2.0749 (0.000)*** 
SHI 0.1454(0.8844) 0.592 (0.5540) 1.9546 (0.001)*** 
YZC  -0.0959(0.9236) -0.630 (0.5285) 1.5287 (0.041)** 
Note:*** indicates a less than 1% significant level, ** indicates a less than 5% significant level, * indicates a less than 
10% significant level 
 
Table 4.5 reports the test results.  First we conduct a paired t-test for differences 
in means.  Column 2 contains the t-statistics for the difference in means test.  Based on 
the t-statistics, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in means 
between the ADR and the corresponding underlying security returns at 10% or lower 
significance level for any of the 15 ADR-HK security pairs. 
Second, in column 3, we report results from a non-parametric Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test. On the basis of the signed rank test results also we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis on the equality of medians between ADR and HK security returns for any of 
the 15 ADR-HK security pairs. 
Third, in column 4, we report Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for testing the null 
hypothesis that the distributions ADRs and HK returns are identical. In statistics, the 
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (the K-S test) is a goodness of fit test used to determine 
whether two underlying one-dimensional probability distributions differ, or whether an 
underlying probability distribution differs from a hypothesized distribution, in either case 
based on finite samples. The two-sample K-S test is one of the most useful and general 
nonparametric methods for comparing two samples, unlike t-test and the Wilcoxon 
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signed-rank test which are only sensitive to differences in location, the K-S test is 
sensitive to differences in both location and shape of the empirical cumulative 
distribution functions of the two samples. 
As the reported test statistics, KSa shows we reject the null hypothesis that ADR 
and underlying security returns distributions are identical at less than 10% significance 
level for 7 out of 9 pairs of securities (each ADR and its underlying HK security) from 
Portfolio I and reject the equality of the returns distributions for all ADRs and their 
underlying securities in Portfolio II.  In addition to the differences in means and 
standard deviations in portfolio returns as stated earlier, here we find evidence of a 
structural difference between Portfolios I and II; however, the number of securities in 
each portfolio is too small to conduct a conclusive statistical test on the difference 
between the two portfolios.  
Note that results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov test implying the inequality of two 
securities returns is due to dispersion of returns distribution, since two location tests t-test 
and Wilcoxon signed-rank test cannot reject the null hypothesis. And this is consistent 
with the small mean of return spread that we report in table 4.4. We then do a joint means 
and variance test as in Rabinovitch et al (2003) based on Bradley and Blackwood (1989) 
who assumed a joint parametric distribution of the means and variances equality. 
Let HKtr and 
US
tr denote the return on H share and ADR traded at day t, assume 
that the return distributions are elliptical and define tY = 
HK
tr - 
US
tr , tX = 
HK
tr +
US
tr , 
and tDEVX = tX - X . Then, perform the following regression. The null hypothesis that 
0β =0 and 1β =0 is against the alternative hypothesis that at least one of the coefficients 
is different from zero, namely the mean returns and the returns variances are 
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simultaneously equal. We report F value of the null hypothesis in Table 4.6. 
tY = 0β + 1β tDEVX  + te                        (4) 
 
Table 4.6: F-test for joint means and variance tests 
(t stat in parenthesis) 
 
Equality test Symbol  
Constant (ß0) DEVX(ß1) F-test 
Portfolio I 
ACH -4.13e-5(-0.03) -0.034 (-1.21) 1.46 
CBA 1.41e-4(0.11) -0.007 (-0.30) 0.09 
LFC -1.03e-4(-0.09) 0.077**(2.25) 5.07** 
CHL -4.91e-5 (-0.06) 0.063***(3.05) 9.30*** 
CHA -3.82e-5 (-0.04) -0.008 (-0.25) 0.06 
CEO -1.76e-5 (-0.02) -0.042 (-1.10) 1.20 
GSH 2.22e-4(0.27) -0.065***(-3.31) 10.99*** 
PTR -5.56e-5 (-0.08) 0.010 (0.43) 0.18 
CHU -1.11e-4(-0.12) 0.063***(2.75) 7.56*** 
Portfolio I 
CEA 3.42e-5 (0.03) -0.166***(-8.35) 69.73*** 
SNP -2.32e-4(-0.26) 0.044*(1.68) 2.84* 
ZNH -2.95e-5 (-0.03) -0.044**(-2.05) 4.21** 
HNP -5.75e-4(-0.76) 0.034***(2.50) 6.26*** 
SHI 9.65e-5 (0.10) -0.130***(-7.06) 49.84*** 
YZC -2.91e-4(-0.27) -0.018 (-1.00) 1.00 
Note:*** indicates a less than 1% significant level, ** indicates a less than 5% significant level, * 
indicates a less than 10% significant level 
 
On the basis of the reported F-tests we reject equality of both means and variances 
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for four out of nine securities in Portfolio I but five out of six securities in Portfolio II at 
less than 10% significant level.  The results again confirm a structural difference 
between Portfolio I and Portfolio II and that when returns variances are considered the 
returns distributions for ADRs and H shares are not identical. 
 
Table4.7: Summary of test results of Tables 4.5 and 4.6.  
(‘Yes’ indicates rejection of the hypothesis while ‘No’ indicates null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected.) 
 
Symbol Ksa Wilcoxon signed-rank test Two sample t-test Joint means and variance tests
Portfolio I 
ACH No No  No  No  
CBA Yes  No No No 
LFC Yes No  No  Yes 
CHL  No  No No Yes 
CHA Yes  No  No  No  
CEO Yes No No No 
GSH Yes  No  No  Yes 
PTR Yes No No No 
CHU Yes No  No  Yes 
Portfolio II 
CEA Yes  No  No  Yes 
SNP Yes No No Yes 
ZNH Yes  No  No  Yes 
HNP Yes No No Yes 
SHI Yes  No  No  Yes  
YZC Yes No  No  No 
 
 122
We summarize the test results in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 in Table 4.7, which indicates the 
following. a) Standard locations tests are inadequate in capturing the differences between 
ADRs and the underlying securities returns.  b) The distributions appear to be different 
primarily due to differences in variances and their tail masses (we provide Q-Q plots of 
normalized returns in Graph 4.2 to show how the tail areas are different from those of 
identical distributions).  c) There are structural differences between Portfolio I and 
Portfolio II, which lead to differences in their returns distributions.  This finding is 
appealing, because the most obvious difference between these two portfolios is whether 
these ADRs have A shares listed in China’s domestic stock market, though there are also 
some differences in the industries that these ADRs belong to. The additional A shares 
listing gives rise to an increasing in the shareholder base, because the number of 
outstanding shares increase. At the same time, the A shares are only issued and traded in 
domestic market which is known as segmented with the Hong Kong and US market as we 
have introduced in chapter 2. The structural difference between two portfolios clearly 
tells us the investors would give the valuation of this additional A shares listing, in 
particular, the investors in the US tend to give negative assessment for it. Because the 
return spread in portfolio II are all negatively skewed, which indicates the ADRs return in 
portfolio II have higher possibility to be lower than their underlying H shares return.   
As mentioned earlier, in Graph 4.2 we provide Q-Q (quantile-quantile) plots of 
the normalized returns for ADR and the underlying H security. Q-Q plot visually checks 
for whether the data deviate from certain distribution, or whether two data sets come from 
populations with common distribution. A 45-degree reference line is also plotted. If the 
two sets come from a population with the same distribution, the points should fall 
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approximately along this reference line.  
 
Graph 4.2: Q-Q (Quartile-Quartile) plots of ADRs and H shares returns 
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15. YZC 
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In the Q-Q plots, the horizontal axis measures the return of the ADRs, usr stands 
for ADRtr , and the vertical axis shows the return of the H shares, hkr stands for
HK
tr . There 
are four fractions in each axis, which means the first, the second, the third, and the forth 
quantiles of the distribution. The Q-Q plot describes the quantiles of the ADRs return 
against the quantiles of the H shares’ return. By a quantile, we mean the fraction (or 
percent) of points below the given value. That is, the 25% quantile is the point at which 
25% percent of the data fall below and 75% fall above that value.  
A 45-degree reference line is plotted automatically by the software package (we 
use STATA). As we have already pointed out, if the two securities have the same 
distribution, the points should fall approximately along this reference line. The greater the 
departure from this 45-degree reference line, the greater of the evidence that the return of 
the ADRs and the H shares have different distributions. In our 15 plots, all ADRs have 
the points concentrated along the reference line between the first quantile and the third 
quantile, but all the ADRs have greater departure from the reference line at the quantiles 
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which is greater than the third quantile or smaller than the first quantile, which means the 
return distribution of two securities are quite different at the tails. We also notice that the 
reference line in some plots are not 45 degree and the intercepts is not zero, for example, 
ACH, CHU, CEA, and YZC, a non-45 degree line usually stands for the difference in 
kurtosis of two returns.     
  In conclusion, we find two securities have quite different distributions in their 
returns, and the difference mainly comes from the tail and higher moments. The 
descriptive statistics of two securities return also indicates the return data are not 
normally distributed since all return series have the kurtosis which is higher than 3. The 
equality tests on return distribution and the descriptive statistics of return spread clearly 
show a structural difference between the two portfolios; we expect this difference may be 
due to the US investors’ pessimistic attitude to the additional A shares listing.  
 
4.5.2 Tests on the comovement effect on the mispricing 
 
Next, we examine the pair-wise correlation between two securities’ return and then the 
comovement effect with the local market indices. We use Spearman correlation test and 
Pearson Correlation test to measure the correlation between each pair of the ADRs by 
matching the returns during the same trading date, the number of observations can be 
accessed in table4.4. The null hypothesis is that 0),( =HKADR rrρ  i.e., the Chinese ADRs 
and underlying H shares returns are uncorrelated.  Since ADRs are claims on cash flows 
generated by their respective underlying shares, and the conversion mechanism between 
the ADRs and the underlying shares would force the prices of two securities to be close to 
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each other. Therefore, intuitively, one would expect that the contemporaneous 
correlations between the two returns to be high (probably close to one). On the other hand, 
due to the difference in trading hours that Hong Kong market starts 12 hours earlier than 
the US market; we also expect the lead-lag correlation between the two securities to be 
high.  
 
Table 4.8: Pearson and Spearman correlation test 
(p value in parenthesis) 
Symbol  Spearman  
correlation 
( ADRtr , 
HK
tr ) 
Pearson 
correlation 
( ADRtr , 
HK
tr ) 
Spearman  
correlation 
( ADRtr 1− , 
HK
tr ) 
Pearson  
correlation 
( ADRtr 1− , 
HK
tr ) 
ACH 0.722*** 
(0.000) 
0.766*** 
(0.000) 
0.242*** 
(0.000) 
0.274*** 
(0.000) 
CBA 0.772*** 
(0.000) 
0.805*** 
(0.000) 
0.151*** 
(0.000) 
0.151***  
(0.000) 
LFC 0.687*** 
(0.000) 
0.742*** 
(0.000) 
0.194*** 
(0.000) 
0.232*** 
(0.000) 
CHL 0.679*** 
(0.000) 
0.668*** 
(0.000) 
0.263*** 
(0.000) 
0.333*** 
(0.000) 
CHA 0.659***  
(0.000) 
0.711*** 
(0.000) 
0.202***  
(0.000) 
0.237***  
(0.000) 
CEO 0.621*** 
(0.000) 
0.661*** 
(0.000) 
0.283*** 
(0.000) 
0.288*** 
(0.000) 
GSH 0.495*** 
(0.000) 
0.494*** 
(0.000) 
0.202*** 
(0.000) 
0.200*** 
(0.000) 
PTR 0.625*** 
(0.000) 
0.696*** 
(0.000) 
0.239*** 
(0.000) 
0.253*** 
(0.000) 
CHU 0.629*** 
(0.000) 
0.653*** 
(0.000) 
0.260*** 
(0.000) 
0.300*** 
(0.000) 
CEA 0.539*** 
(0.000) 
0.522*** 
(0.000) 
0.239*** 
(0.000) 
0.348*** 
(0.000) 
SNP 0.676*** 
(0.000) 
0.701*** 
(0.000) 
0.183*** 
(0.000) 
0.231*** 
(0.000) 
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ZNH 0.655*** 
(0.000) 
0.664*** 
(0.000) 
0.156*** 
(0.000) 
0.229*** 
(0.000) 
HNP 0.701*** 
(0.000) 
0.702*** 
(0.000) 
0.222*** 
(0.000) 
0.289*** 
(0.000) 
SHI 0.520*** 
(0.000) 
0.528*** 
(0.000) 
0.330*** 
(0.000) 
0.402*** 
(0.000) 
YZC 0.613*** 
(0.000) 
0.606*** 
(0.000) 
0.185*** 
(0.000) 
0.206*** 
(0.000) 
Note:*** indicates a less than 1% significant level, ** indicates a less than 5% significant level, * indicates a less than 
10% significant level 
 
In Table 4.8 we report Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients between 
( ADRtr ,
HK
tr ) and between (
ADR
tr 1− , 
HK
tr ), and the corresponding significance levels between 
ADR and the underlying security returns. All the ADRs have significant positive 
correlation with their underlying H shares with regard to the contemporaneous and 
lead-lag relation.  And the value of Spearman test is a bit lower than that from the 
Pearson test, but both tests are consistent in their level of significance and sign. One 
observation from this table is the contemporaneous correlations are not as high or close to 
one as intuition may have predicted. The contemporaneous correlations of Spearman test 
range from 0.495 for GSH to 0.772 for CBA, the lead-lag correlation of Spearman test 
range from 0.151 for CBA to 0.330 for SHI. These results are consistent with the findings 
of Kato et al. (1991). Although Kato et al. (1991) declaimed that their findings support 
the law of one price; they also demonstrated that the returns of the ADRs and the 
underlying stocks are neither perfectly, nor even near perfectly correlated, since the 
correlations are not close to one, and they suggested the non-overlapping trading hour is 
at least a partial explanations for this.    
Therefore, we extend the research by Kato et al. (1991), and follow the approach 
of Gagnon and Karolyi (2004). We present our results of the time series model described 
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in equation (1) in table 4.9.  
Specifically, we use S&P 500, ^HIS, and ^SHA as three market indices 
respectively. S&P 500 is a market capitalization-weighted index that tracks the daily total 
return performance of 500 common stocks of large capitalization companies that are 
listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. The S&P 500 accounts for about 64% of the 
market value of shares listed at the three exchanges. ^HSI is Hang Seng Index, which is a 
free float-adjusted market capitalization-weighted stock market index in Hong Kong. It is 
used to record and monitor daily changes of the largest companies of the Hong Kong 
stock market and is the main indicator of the overall market performance in Hong Kong. 
These 45 companies represent about 67% of market capitalization of the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange. ^HSI is the most representative index of Stock Exchange of Hong Kong 
(SEHK), and is active from 1969. ^SHA is the index of all A-shares on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SHSE), and is active from 1991. The reason not to use ^SSEC, the 
composite index of SHSE, is because ^SSEC also includes all B-shares on the SHSE; 
however A-shares and B-shares are two segmented markets. 
The table 4.9 bellow reports summary statistics for time-series regressions of the 
Chinese ADRs and the underlying H shares return differences on the cotemporaneous and 
up to two lagged returns on the US market index, the underlying Hong Kong market 
index, and the home market index for the ADRs in portfolio II. The sample period ends 
on October 20, 2006, begins on various dates according to individual securities listing 
history, the number of the observations can be found in table 4.4. We perform the 
following model for the 15 pairs of the ADRs: 
ADR
tr -
HK
tr  = 
USα + ∑
−=
+
0
2i
US
it
US
i Rβ  + ∑
−=
+
0
2i
HK
it
HK
i Rβ + tε  (1) 
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Table 4.9: Results of time series regression analysis  
 
Portfolio I 
 
 ACH CBA LFC CHL CHA CEO GSH PTR CHU α  0.000 
(0.14) 
0.000 
(0.07) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.07) 
0.000 
(0.07) 
0.000 
(0.11) 
0.000 
(0.50) 
0.000 
(-0.02) 
0.000 
(-0.01) 
US
tβ  0.278*** (11.55) 0.207*** (9.45) 0.868*** (11.51) 1.002***(33.17) 0.812***(16.87) -0.314***(-4.50) 0.388*** (7.61) 0.428*** (10.32) 1.001***(20.61) 
US
t 1−β  -0.153*** (-5.88) -0.076*** (-3.23) -0.761***(-8.78) -0.780***(-23.55) -0.554***(-10.27) -0.117* (-1.69) -0.311*** (-5.70) -0.345*** (-8.79) -0.749***(-17.83) 
US
t 2−β  0.014 (0.56) -0.008 (-0.35) 0.135* (1.65) -0.010 (-0.31) -0.115** (-2.23) 0.197***(3.05) 0.254*** (4.42) 0.035 (0.32) -0.014 (-0.33) 
HK
tβ  -0.136*** (-5.09) -0.069*** (-2.98) -0.228***(-3.78) -0.320***(-13.47) -0.195***(-4.73) 0.788***(8.60) 0.003 (0.10) -0.108*** (-3.03) -0.357***(-8.95) 
HK
t 1−β  -0.007 (-0.28) -0.022 (-1.14) -0.106* (-1.74) 0.020 (0.83) -0.071* (-1.68) -0.445***(-4.85) -0.322*** (-6.76) -0.054 (-1.15) -0.037 (-0.98) 
HK
t 2−β  0.100 (0.41) 0.020 (0.97) 0.078 (1.40) 0.063 (0.97) 0.086** (2.15) -0.084 (-0.90) 0.071** (1.98) 0.063 (1.25) 0.064* (1.80) 
Adj. 
R2 
16.87% 8.84% 29.6% 52.8% 34.84% 20.92% 6.58% 15.94% 45.57% 
Portfolio II 
 
 CEA SNP ZNH HNP SHI YZC    α  0.000 
(0.02) 
0.000 
(0.08) 
0.000 
(-0.14) 
0.000 
(0.10) 
0.000 
(0.41) 
0.000 
(0.48) 
   
US
tβ  0.148** (2.44) 0.208*** (10.57) 0.459*** (8.26) 0.521***(12.43) 0.205***(7.35) 0.258***(3.41)    
US
t 1−β  -0.198*** (-7.01) -0.149*** (-7.73) -0.462***(-8.05) -0.330***(-7.32) -0.196***(-7.16) -0.221***(-3.46)    
US
t 2−β  0.132 (1.08) -0.001 (-0.63) 0.146** (2.19) 0.010 (0.74) 0.077***(2.76) 0.062 (0.95)    
HK
tβ  0.026 (1.28) -0.058*** (-3.22) 0.023 (0.42) -0.128***(-3.85) 0.008 (0.48) -0.008 (-0.16)    
HK
t 1−β  -0.167*** (-8.69) -0.023 (-1.34) -0.235***(-4.91) -0.103***(-3.19) -0.177***(-10.60) -0.043 (-0.92)    
HK
t 2−β  0.023 (1.25) 0.016 (0.40) 0.017*** (0.42) 0.034 (1.02) 0.026 (1.58) 0.072 (1.40)    
SH
tβ  0.012 (0.59) -0.014 (-1.01) 0.112*** (2.48) -0.021 (-0.59) 0.004 (0.39) 0.066 (1.28)    
SH
t 1−β  0.002 (0.09) 0.007 (0.52) -0.013 (-0.28) -0.019 (-0.54) 0.026* (1.78) -0.048 (-0.94)    
SH
t 2−β  -0.031 (-1.47) -0.017 (-1.09) -0.044 (-0.95) 0.088***(2.48) -0.015 (-1.26) -0.042 (-0.81)    
Adj. 
R2 
7.06% 14.48% 8.68% 11.37% 7.46% 1.32%    
Note:*** indicates a less than 1% significant level, ** indicates a less than 5% significant level, * indicates a less than 
10% significant level 
 
In table 4.9, we present summary statistics of time series estimates from the 
regression model described in Equation (1) for the 15 pairs of the ADRs grouped into two 
portfolios in our sample. We find that for all 15 pairs of ADRs, return differentials exhibit 
intercept coefficients nearly to be zero. With regard to the contemporaneous comovement 
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effect, we find the positive and significant exposure to the US market index ( UStβ ) for all 
ADRs but CEO, while for the estimation of the coincident underlying market index 
( HKtβ ), we find significant negative relation in ten ADRs. With respect to the lagged 
comovement effect; we find negative and significant exposure to the US market index 
with one lag ( USt 1−β ) for all ADRs, and negative and significant exposure to the underlying 
Hong Kong market index with one lag ( HKt 1−β ) for eight ADRs. The exposure to each 
market index with two period lags ( USt 2−β , HKt 2−β ) is less than the exposure to the 
contemporaneous and one period lagged market index, we find positive significant 
estimation for five ADRs in terms of USt 2−β , and positive significant estimation for four 
ADRs in terms of HKt 2−β .  We believe the relatively smaller in magnitude and the less in 
significant estimations of USt 2−β , HKt 2−β  suggest that the comovement effect is a short-run 
effect, and this is also consistent with the conclusion in De Jong et al. (2003). 
Second, while the effects of the US and Hong Kong market index returns on 
security returns are consistently significant for most of the ADRs return differentials, the 
exception is for CEO which shows an opposite market beta estimation with negative 
correlation with the US market index but positive correlation with the Hong Kong market 
index. We also note that the evidence of isolated home country effect is insignificant. We 
only find significant Shanghai market beta in three ADRs, namely ZNH, HNP and SHI. 
Our sample is too small and the number of firms displaying such anomalies is even 
smaller and thus we refrain from generalizing the exceptions; however, we note that 
similar evidence of scattered security specific effects are documented in Alberton et al 
(2001) and Chakrovarty (2005). 
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  Third, our results of the contemporaneous coefficient of the US and Hong Kong 
market indices are consistent with De Jong et al. (2003) and Gagnon and Karolyi (2004), 
they reported significant positive relations between return differentials and the US market 
index and significant negative relations between return differentials and the home market 
index at a contemporaneous level. This finding is also in line with our prediction in 
section 4.3.2. However, unlike De Jong et al. (2003) and Gagnon and Karolyi (2004) that 
they did not find any significant estimation with regard to the lagged market indices, 
while we find for most of the Chinese ADRs, the return differentials are significantly 
negative with the one period lagged US and Hong Kong market indices. It is not difficult 
to understand a negative relation with the lagged Hong Kong market index, for instance, 
a positive shock in the Hong Kong market at day 0 will lead to a rise in the H shares 
return at day 1 and therefore a drop in the return differentials at day 1. The consistently 
significant negative relations with the lagged US market ( USt 1−β ) for all the ADRs seems 
odd. However, we find similar evidence from Kim et al. (2000), who studied the dynamic 
relation between ADRs’ return and the S&P 500 in a long horizon. They found the ADRs 
response to the innovation of the S&P 500 is large, positive and highly significant at day 
0, and followed by a large, significant negative price response on day 1. They argued that 
it is because ADRs are clearly overreacting to innovations in the S&P 500 Index. 
Therefore, our findings offer new evidence for the existence of mispricing of the ADRs 
and new attributions to the limits of the arbitrage, that mispricing of the ADRs is not only 
caused by the contemporaneous comovement effect but also the lagged comovement 
effect with the local market index. We believe this finding will be very useful for hedge 
funds managers to design arbitrage strategy, since short-selling is not restricted in both 
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the US and Hong Kong market.      
  Finally, we also notice an interesting pattern of the estimated betas that are quite 
different between two portfolios. We then turn our attention to the value of the betas on 
the portfolio level. We summarize the mean of each coefficients of the estimation in 
equation (1), and perform F test; our null hypothesis is that the estimated betas for the US 
and Hong Kong market risk are jointly equal in both mean and variance between two 
portfolios, we report our results in table 4.10. 
 
Table 4.10. F test on joint equality of mean and variance between two portfolios 
 Mean Variance F statistics 
(p value) 
No. of significant 
estimations 
 Portfolio I Portfolio 
II 
Portfolio 
I 
Portfolio 
II 
 Portfolio 
I 
Portfolio 
II 
US
tβ  0.519 0.299 0.193 0.002 8.306** (0.016) (+) 8 (-) 1 (+) 6 
US
t 1−β  -0.427 -0.262 0.083 0.015 5.478** (0.038) (-) 9 (-) 6 
US
t 2−β  0.054 0.071 0.013 0.003 3.746* (0.08) (-) 1 (+) 3 (+) 2 
HK
tβ  -0.069 -0.022 0.116 0.003 32.472*** (0.00) (-) 7 (+) 1 (-) 2 
HK
t 1−β  -0.116 -0.124 0.025 0.006 3.695* (0.08) (-) 4 (-) 4 
HK
t 2−β  0.051 0.031 0.003 0.0004 6.95** (0.02) (+) 3 (+) 1 
Note:*** indicates a less than 1% significant level, ** indicates a less than 5% significant level, * indicates a less than 
10% significant level 
 
We report mean and variance for each correlation coefficients for two portfolios 
respectively, the F statistics with the p value are reported, we also report the number of 
significant coefficients with specifying positive or negative correlation coefficients, for 
example, ‘(+) 6’ means we get 6 significantly positive coefficients. 
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Interestingly, table 4.10 is clearly showing structural difference between two 
portfolios. The F statistics reject the equality of mean and variance between two 
portfolios for all estimated betas. Bearing in mind that in table 4.4 which summarizes the 
description of the return spread, we find that all ADRs in portfolio II, but only four out of 
nine ADRs in portfolio I have negatively skewed tail. Once again, in section 4.5.1, the 
test on the law of one price, we also find two portfolios have different patterns in the 
return distribution. Therefore, we may attribute one of the reasons for the difference in 
two portfolios to the various magnitude comovement effects of the two markets.  
Furthermore, as we can see from table 4.10, with regard to the betas on the US 
market index; the means are 0.519/0.299, -0.427/-0.262, and 0.054/0.071 for two 
portfolios respectively, while with regard to the betas on the Hong Kong market index, 
the means are -0.069/-0.002, -0.116/-0.124, and 0.051/0.031 for two portfolios 
respectively. This indicates the ADRs expose to higher systematic risk of the US market 
than that of the Hong Kong market, and this is same as the findings in Gagnon and 
Karolyi (2004).  
In conclusion, the two steps investigations on the existence of the ADRs 
mispricing show that the significant positive correlations between pair-wised two 
securities returns have limitation in the argument that the law of one price is applicable to 
the ADRs and their underlying shares. Although we find significant positive correlated 
ADRs return and H shares return, and similar magnitude in the correlation coefficients 
like Kato et al. (1991), we still find evidence of the existence of the mispricing between 
two securities. We attribute to the contemporaneous comovement effect with the local 
market index (Gagnon and Karolyi, 2004), as well as the US based investors’ prolonged 
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over reaction to the innovations in the US market (Kim et al. 2000).  
 
4.5.3 Test on the liquidity effect 
 
We will now calculate two liquidity proxies, )log( tt volliq = , tILLIQ  = tt volr /  for 
ADRs and H shares respectively. Both ADRs and H shares are frequently traded in two 
markets; the none-trading days account for less than 1% of the total sample period for 
most of the ADRs and H shares. We exclude the data with zero trading value to avoid the 
unnecessary exaggerated variance, and since only a handful of data has been deleted, we 
believe it will not change the results of our time series regression estimation. We report 
the descriptive statistics of two liquidity proxies and the correlation coefficient between 
two liquidity measures for both the ADRs and H shares in table 4.11. 
 
Table 4.11: Descriptive statistics of liquidity proxies 
 
tliq  
Log(volume) 
 
tILLIQ  Symbol Obs.  
mean 
 
Std. 
Dev 
mean 
 
Std. Dev
Corr.  
of tliq and 
tILLIQ  
(ADR) 
Corr.  
of tliq and 
tILLIQ  
 (HK) 
ACH 
[2600.hk] 
1166 5.099 
5.431 
0.751 
0.299 
7.12e-07 
8.28e-07 
3.92e-06 
8.18e-06 
-0.596*** -0.130*** 
CBA 
[1114.hk] 
1190 4.213 
5.144 
0.512 
0.446 
2.029e-06
3.83e-07 
3.84e-06 
2.826e-06
-0.593*** -0.449*** 
LFC 
[2628.hk] 
701 5.10 
6.20 
0.525 
0.287 
1.29e-07 
8.66e-09 
1.465e-07
7.83e-09 
-0.498*** -0.138*** 
CHL 
[0941.hk] 
2154 5.460 
6.567 
0.426 
0.233 
1.02e-07 
5.22e-09 
1.68e-07 
5.46e-09 
-0.532*** -0.157*** 
CHA 
[0728.hk] 
951 4.948 
5.897 
0.337 
0.255 
1.52e-07 
1.79e-08 
1.27e-07 
1.67e-08 
-0.292*** -0.213*** 
CEO 
[0883.hk] 
627 5.157 
5.808 
0.256 
0.226 
1.04e-07 
2.39e-09 
8.90e-08 
2.26e-09 
-0.356*** -0.189*** 
GSH 
[0525.hk] 
2566 4.146 
5.011 
0.577 
0.392 
2.01e-06 
2.63e-07 
4.05e-06 
6.73e-07 
-0.518*** -0.333*** 
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PTR 
[0857.hk] 
1468 5.198 
5.939 
0.592 
0.272 
1.94e-07 
1.59e-08 
3.50e-07 
1.50e-08 
-0.700*** -0.143*** 
CHU 
[0762.hk] 
1550 5.459 
6.227 
0.399 
0.257 
8.68e-08 
1.06e-09 
1.31e-07 
9.15e-10 
-0.484*** -0.123*** 
CEA 
[0670.hk] 
2317 3.735 
5.081 
0.705 
0.468 
6.73e-06 
8.33e-09 
1.59e-05 
1.51e-09 
-0.603*** -0.429*** 
SNP 
[0386.hk] 
1485 4.953 
5.813 
0.575 
0.332 
4.09e-07 
3.08e-08 
7.88e-07 
3.93e-07 
-0.676*** -0.389*** 
ZNH 
[1055.hk] 
2089 3.948 
5.135 
0.605 
0.419 
5.69e-06 
6.53e-08 
1.58e-05 
2.71e-07 
-0.608*** -0.397*** 
HNP 
[0902.hk] 
2067 5.069 
6.668 
0.397 
0.608 
1.93e-07 
8.55e-08 
3.36e-07 
1.61e-08 
-0.348*** -0.618*** 
SHI 3178 4.249 
5.145 
0.528 
0.449 
1.87e-06 
1.32e-07 
7.30e-06 
3.89e-07 
-0.567*** -0.419*** 
YZC 1919 3.838 
5.223 
0.731 
0.375 
9.87e-06 
2.14e-07 
2.64e-05 
3.93e-07 
-0.628*** -0.458*** 
Note:*** indicates a less than 1% significant level, ** indicates a less than 5% significant level, * indicates a less than 
10% significant level 
 
We then report summary statistics for time-series regressions of the liquidity 
effect on return spreads in table 4.12. The sample period ends on October 20, 2006, 
begins on various dates according to individual securities listing history, the number of 
the observations can be accessed in table 4.11. This model is tested based on daily data. 
We perform the following model for the 15 pairs of the ADRs, ILLIQ is scaled up by 
multiplying 105, t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
εββα +++=− HKtHKADRtADRHKtADRt ILLIQILLIQrr 21    (2) 
εββα +++=− HKtHKADRtADRHKtADRt liqliqrr 43          (3) 
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Table 4.12: Liquidity effects. 
 
Symbol ADR
tliq  HKtliq  
ADR
tILLIQ  
HK
tILLIQ  
Adj R2 
ACH 0.008*** 
(2.64) 
-0.016*** 
(-3.07) 
  7.93% 
   0.002** 
(2.14) 
-0.14 
(-0.97) 
1.22% 
CBA 0.006* 
(1.82) 
-0.016*** 
(-3.50) 
  2.90% 
   0.004 
(1.44) 
-0.084 
(-1.54) 
1.02% 
LFC 0.003*** 
(2.31) 
-0.007 
(-1.41) 
  6.70% 
   0.005 
(0.58) 
-0.026*** 
(-2.32) 
2.69% 
CHL 0.003** 
(1.93) 
-0.002 
(-0.61) 
  4.55% 
   0.195*** 
(3.29) 
-0.007 
(-1.15) 
2.29% 
CHA 0.007*** 
(2.25) 
-0.010*** 
(-2.14) 
  3.83% 
   0.021* 
(1.79) 
-0.723** 
(-2.16) 
3.31% 
CEO 0.004** 
(2.10) 
-0.008*** 
(-4.17) 
  5.02% 
   0.065* 
(4.07) 
-0.322* 
(-3.17) 
3.45% 
GSH 0.007*** 
(2.78) 
-0.011*** 
(-2.85) 
  5.13% 
   0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.014* 
(-1.84) 
1.25% 
PTR 0.004** 
(1.90) 
-0.006** 
(-1.91) 
  5.05% 
   0.005 
(0.26) 
-0.069 
(-1.49) 
1.02% 
CHU 0.005*** 
(1.97) 
-0.009* 
(-2.55) 
  3.45% 
   0.074 
(1.26) 
-0.003 
(-0.66) 
0.98% 
CEA 0.007*** 
(2.80) 
-0.004 
(-1.03) 
  4.03% 
   -0.004 
(-0.45) 
-0.009 
(1.72) 
0.89% 
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SNP 0.002 
(0.93) 
-0.004 
(-1.10) 
  2.87% 
   0.016 
(1.46) 
0.017 
(0.21) 
0.96% 
ZNH 0.005 
(1.34) 
-0.001 
(-0.27) 
  5.03% 
   0.002 
(1.07) 
-0.036 
(-1.32) 
0.90% 
HNP 0.007* 
(1.88) 
-0.006* 
(-1.92) 
  2.21% 
   -0.001 
(-0.28) 
-0.002* 
(-1.87) 
0.87% 
SHI 0.009*** 
(3.39) 
-0.017*** 
(-2.83) 
  6.33% 
   0.001 
(1.28) 
-0.002* 
(-1.83) 
1.20% 
YZC 0.004*** 
(2.66) 
-0.008*** 
(-2.49) 
  5.12% 
   -0.0003 
(-0.59) 
0.0002 
(1.07) 
0.78% 
Note:*** indicates a less than 1% significant level, ** indicates a less than 5% significant level, * indicates a less 
than 10% significant level 
 
     The results in table 4.12 are consistent with our expectations regarding the 
relation between the return differentials and the trading volume as well as illiquidity. 
By employing trading volume as a measure of liquidity risk, we predict a positive 
relation between liquidity risk and return. An increase in the liquidity risk of the 
ADRs will lead to a rise in the ADRs’ return, and therefore a rise in return spread. 
Likewise, an increase in the liquidity risk of the H shares will lead to a rise in the H 
shares’ return, and therefore a drop in return spread. We find the signs of the estimated 
betas on the ADRs trading volume are consistently positive with return spread, and H 
shares trading volume are consistently negative. The coefficients of trading volume 
are significant for 10 pairs of ADRs and H shares. With the rest of 5 pairs of the 
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ADRs and H shares, we only find significant coefficients in ADRs trading volume for 
three ADRs, namely LFC, CHL, and CEA. Further, we notice the magnitude of the 
estimated correlation coefficients ranges from 0.009 for SHI as the ADRs to -0.017 
for SHI as the underlying H shares. The adjusted R2 ranges from 2.21% for HNP to 
7.93% for ACH.  
With regard to the illiquidity measure, as we predict in the previous section 
that there should be a positive relation between illiquidity and return. An increase in 
the illiquidity of the ADRs will lead to a rise in the ADRs’ return, and therefore a rise 
in return spread. Likewise, an increase in the illiquidity of the H shares will lead to a 
rise in the H shares’ return, and therefore a drop in return spread. We find for 12 pairs 
of the ADRs and H shares, the signs of the estimated correlation coefficients of the 
ADRs illiquidity are consistently positive, and that of the H shares’ illiquidity are 
consistently negative. But in these 12 pairs of the ADRs, the coefficients are 
significant only in 2 pairs, namely CHA and CEO, 8 pairs of ADRs have significant 
coefficient in either ADRs illiquidity or H shares illiquidity. And the adjusted R2 
ranges from 0.78% for YZC to 3.45% for CEO.  The illiquidity measure seems to 
have less explanatory power than trading volume. We expect illiquidity to be a more 
noisy measure of liquidity than the trading volume since it is measured as daily 
absolute returns per unit of volume, as we know daily time series data usually has 
higher variance than weekly or monthly time series data, and high variance may lower 
the significant level of the estimation. 
      Therefore, we have demonstrated that apart from the comovement effect from 
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local market index, liquidity effect can also explain the mispricing of the ADRs. 
However, from the relatively small R2 of the liquidity effect regression, we believe the 
comovement effect would dominate over the liquidity effect.  
 
4.5.4 Structural change  
 
As far as the empirical investigations have gone through, we now have a clear image 
about the arbitrage possibility of the Chinese ADRs. We have shown that the 
difference in the return distribution between the ADRs and the H shares lead to the 
possible return differentials and this mispricing is persistent for an extended period 
because the market-based, information-based, and trading-based barriers hamper 
arbitrage activity. We have found strong evidence of contemporaneous and lagged 
comovement effect from the local market index; we also found obvious evidence for 
liquidity risk effect.  
Specifically, we have found that two portfolios have apparently different 
patterns in the comovement effect. The most distinguishing characteristics of these 
two portfolios is while one portfolio is with additional A shares listed in Shanghai 
Stock Exchange, the other is without. We have also found some isolated comovement 
effect from Shanghai stock market in the comovement effect examination. This 
finding addresses the question that how does the innovation in Shanghai stock market 
influence the Chinese ADRs listed in the NYSE? As we have discussed in chapter 2, a 
set of important reformation took place around 2003 in China. On November 5, 2002 
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the CSRC and the People's Bank of China (PBOC) introduced the QFII (Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investor) program as a provision for foreign capital to access 
China's financial markets, and the important non-tradable shares reform starting from 
the end of 2002. For this, we believe that the year 2003 to be a breaking point to test if 
there is any structural change in the comovement effect from the domestic market.  
On the other hand, observing the listing dates of the Chinese ADRs as 
indicated in Graph 4.1, more than 50% (8/15) ADRs were listed between 2000 and 
2003. We believe a reasonable hypothesis for this structural shift in 2000 may be the 
market collapse in the US, particularly the IPO market, which led some Hong Kong 
firms to offer their securities to the US investors as alternative investment options. 
Therefore, we decide to study further about the impact from the market innovations in 
terms of the comovement effect. We select two breaking points, the year of 2000 and 
2003, the former date stands for the innovations in the US market, and the later date 
represents the reformations in the China’s stock market. Econometrically, we test this 
structural break/shift via a Chow test that requires the break periods to be known a 
priori.  
Chow test is to test the equality of regression coefficients over two sample 
periods conditional on the equality of error variances. It is commonly used to test for a 
structural break. The model in effect uses an F-test to determine whether a single 
regression is more efficient than two separate regressions involving splitting the data 
into two sub-samples. 
We will report summary statistics for structural change test in table 4.13. The 
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sample period ends on October 20, 2006, begins on various dates according to 
individual securities listing history, the number of the observations can be found in 
table 4.4. We divide the sample period into three sub-periods, before 2000, 2000-2003, 
and after 2003, for the ADRs listed before 2000, the sub-periods will be three, while 
for the ADRs listed after 2000, the sub-periods will be two. Three ADRs, namely 
LFC, CHA, and CEO are excluded from the structural change test, because their 
listing date is in 2003, which makes our observation number for the period of 
post-2003 too limited. We perform the following model for the 15 pairs of the ADRs, 
for the ADRs in portfolio II, we in addition include the market index of Shanghai:  
ADR
tr -
HK
tr  = 
USα + ∑
−=
+
0
2i
US
it
US
i Rβ  + ∑
−=
+
0
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HK
it
HK
i Rβ + tε  
Table 4.13: Structural change 
Portfolio I 
symbol ACH CBA CHL 
Sub-period 01-03 03- 01-03 03- -00 00-03 03- 
US
tβ  0.163***(4.78) 
0.387*** 
(11.53) 
0.092***
(2.83) 
0.343***
(11.02) 
1.04*** 
(14.98) 
1.03*** 
(19.34) 
1.03*** 
(25.07) 
US
t 1−β  -0.082** (-2.17) 
-0.253*** 
(-6.97) 
-0.003 
(-0.10) 
-0.162***
(-4.82) 
-0.752***
(-9.91) 
-0.809*** 
(-13.53) 
-0.697***
(-15.65) 
US
t 2−β  0.771 (1.04) 
-0.054 
(-1.52) 
0.039 
(1.09) 
-0.075***
(-2.24) 
-0.068 
(-0.91) 
0.071 
(1.19) 
-0.087** 
(-1.97) 
HK
tβ  -0.016 (-1.31) 
-0.168*** 
(-5.56) 
-0.062 
(-1.51) 
-0.063** 
(-2.25) 
-0.326***
(-8,58) 
-0.362*** 
(-6.85) 
-0.226***
(-6.13) 
HK
t 1−β  -0.048 (-1.44) 
0.014 
(0.47) 
-0.020 
(-0.51) 
-0.023 
(-2.82) 
0.059 
(1.26) 
-0.029 
(-0.55) 
-0.023 
(-0.64) 
HK
t 2−β  -0.061 (-1.32) 
0.036 
(1.30) 
-0.024 
(-0.66) 
-0.005 
(0.44) 
0.081 
(1.40) 
-0.023 
(-0.49) 
0.089 
(1.26) 
Adj. R2 12.16% 21.85% 3.5% 16.66% 50.52% 50.82% 56.22% 
Chow 8.57*** 9.76*** 5.34*** 
 
symbol GSH PTR CHU 
Sub-period 96-00 00-03 03- 00-03 03- 00-03 03- 
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US
tβ  0.528***(4.07) 
0.237*** 
(4.34) 
0.501***
(7.27) 
0.271***
(6.03) 
0.735***
(12.41) 
1.03*** 
(18.21) 
0.95*** 
(15.82) 
US
t 1−β  -0.600***(-4.21) 
-0.077 
(-1.26) 
-0.294***
(-3.96) 
-0.311 
(-6.16) 
-0.435***
(-6.77) 
-0.768*** 
(-12.06) 
-0.701***
(-10.70) 
US
t 2−β  -0.595***(-4.16) 
0.039 
(0.64) 
0.076 
(1.02) 
0.060 
(1.14) 
-0.061 
(-0.97) 
0.167 
(0.26) 
-0.067 
(-1.04) 
HK
tβ  -0.162** (-2.20) 
-0.193*** 
(-3.51) 
-0.163***
(-2.68) 
-0.026 
(-0.55) 
-0.220***
(-4.18) 
-0.394*** 
(-6.55) 
-0.298***
(-5.44) 
HK
t 1−β  -0.511***(-6.98) 
-0.021 
(-0.39) 
-0.107** 
(-1.97) 
0.009 
(0.20) 
-0.145***
(-2.75) 
-0.036 
(-0.61) 
-0.043 
(-0.79) 
HK
t 2−β  0.038 (0.57) 
0.080 
(1.54) 
0.060 
(1.09) 
0.026 
(0.61) 
-0.124 
(-1.34) 
0.072 
(0.89) 
0.036 
(0.73) 
Adj. R2 9.98% 5.55% 9.72% 13.59% 24.01% 50.63% 34.65% 
Chow 24.54*** 8.97*** 7.89*** 
Portfolio II 
symbol CEA SNP   
Sub-period 97-00 00-03 03- 00-03 03-   
US
tβ  0.244***(3.28) 
0.087*** 
(3.31) 
0.145***
(4.75) 
0.163***
(6.15) 
0.289***
(11.41) 
  
US
t 1−β  -0.480***(-5.91) 
-0.007 
(-0.26) 
-0.119***
(-3.64) 
-0.140***
(-4.72) 
-0.189***
(-6.91) 
  
US
t 2−β  0.325 (1.08) 
0.019 
(0.64) 
0.031 
(0.96) 
-0.002 
(-0.10) 
-0.010 
(-0.39) 
  
HK
tβ  -0.157***(-3.82) 
-0.159*** 
(-5.96) 
-0.097***
(-3.56) 
-0.001* 
(-1.69) 
-0.124***
(-5.42) 
  
HK
t 1−β  -0.302***(-7.29) 
0.019 
(0.73) 
0.038 
(1.23) 
-0.008 
(-0.29) 
-0.050** 
(-2.20) 
  
HK
t 2−β  0.004 (0.11) 
0.025 
(1.03) 
-0.029 
(-1.17) 
-0.018 
(-0.72) 
0.067 
(1.16) 
  
SH
tβ  -0.070* (-1.71) 
-0.031 
(-1.53) 
-0.009 
(-0.54) 
-0.003 
(-0.08) 
-0.022* 
(-1.86) 
  
SH
t 1−β  -0.015 (-0.31) 
0.025 
(0.90) 
-0.003 
(-0.17) 
0.021 
(0.72) 
0.003 
(0.25) 
  
SH
t 2−β  -0.072 (-1.46) 
-0.030 
(-1.10) 
0.014 
(0.77) 
-0.040 
(-1.40) 
-0.002 
(-0.02) 
  
Adj. R2 15.75% 8.44% 7.24% 12.07% 23.33%   
Chow 15.87*** 16.02***   
  
Symbol ZNH HNP  
Sub-period 98-00 00-03 03- 98-00 00-03 03-  
US
tβ  0.399***(2.05) 
0.479*** 
(8.15) 
0.526***
(7.55) 
1.101***
(8.32) 
0.269***
(5.15) 
0.487*** 
(8.45) 
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US
t 1−β  -0.896***(-4.30) 
-0.294*** 
(-4.49) 
-0.262***
(-3.53) 
-0.758***
(-5.32) 
-0.157***
(-2.80) 
-0.342*** 
(-5.72) 
 
US
t 2−β  0.605***(2.90) 
0.021 
(0.33) 
-0.120* 
(-1.82) 
-0.079 
(-0.57) 
-0.001 
(-0.03) 
0.054 
(0.91) 
 
HK
tβ  -0.425***(-3.35) 
-0.201*** 
(-3.43) 
-0.288***
(-4.57) 
-0.109 
(-1.29) 
-0.099** 
(-1.96) 
-0.192*** 
(-3.88) 
 
HK
t 1−β  -0.655***(-5.13) 
-0.051 
(-0.87) 
0.210 
(1.33) 
-0.122 
(-1.51) 
-0.099** 
(-1.94) 
-0.003 
(-0.07) 
 
HK
t 2−β  -0.121 (-1.02) 
-0.012 
(-1.56) 
0.055 
(0.95) 
-0.026 
(-0.36) 
0.090 
(1.48) 
-0.123*** 
(-2.58) 
 
SH
tβ  -0.370 (-0.26) 
0.010 
(0.15) 
0.029 
(0.70) 
-0.019 
(-0.18) 
-0.027 
(-0.49) 
-0.051* 
(-1.84) 
 
SH
t 1−β  -0.099 (-0.61) 
0.034 
(0.55) 
-0.007 
(-0.19) 
-0.165* 
(-1.84) 
0.051 
(0.92) 
0.011 
(0.34) 
 
SH
t 2−β  -0.052 (-0.32) 
-0.089 
(-1.42) 
 
0.004 
(0.01) 
-0.258 
(-2.48) 
0.009 
(0.17) 
0.012 
(0.38) 
 
Adj. R2 13.23% 14.22% 10.85% 22.33% 7.54% 14.22%  
Chow 6.98*** 7.05***  
 
Symbol SHI YZC  
Sub-period 93-00 00-03 03- 98-00 00-03 03-  
US
tβ  0.177***(3.36) 
0.173*** 
(6.45) 
0.301** 
(10.19) 
0.205 
(1.02) 
0.146** 
(2.02) 
0.651*** 
(7.25) 
 
US
t 1−β  -0.397***(-6.88) 
-0.029 
(-0.97) 
-0.149***
(-4.69) 
-0.380* 
(-1.78) 
-0.019 
(-0.24) 
-0.411*** 
(-4.30) 
 
US
t 2−β  0.232***(4.02) 
-0.014 
(-1.34) 
-0.065** 
(-2.09) 
0.123 
(0.58) 
0.099 
(1.24) 
-0.096 
(-1.01) 
 
HK
tβ  -0.089***(-3.26) 
-0.108*** 
(-3.89) 
-0.111***
(-4.22) 
-0.316 
(-2.47) 
-0.266***
(-3.69) 
-0.204*** 
(-2.54) 
 
HK
t 1−β  -0.268***(-9.77) 
0.028 
(1.01) 
-0.020 
(-0.78) 
-0.202 
(-1.57) 
0.089 
(0.22) 
-0.097 
(-1.20) 
 
HK
t 2−β  0.033 (1.34) 
-0.018 
(-0.76) 
0.022 
(0.94) 
-0.185 
(-1.54) 
-0.014 
(-1.02) 
0.035 
(0.47) 
 
SH
tβ  0.019 (1.15) 
-0.071*** 
(-2.44) 
-0.036** 
(-2.05) 
0.160 
(0.92) 
-0.124* 
(-1.71) 
-0.023* 
(-1.72) 
 
SH
t 1−β  0.016 (0.95) 
0.040 
(1.29) 
0.002 
(0.41) 
-0.204 
(-1.19) 
-0.063 
(-0.81) 
0.024 
(0.44) 
 
SH
t 2−β  -0.016 (-0.99) 
-0.006 
(-0.21) 
0.008 
(0.17) 
-0.065 
(-0.38) 
0.068 
(0.88) 
0.006 
(0.13) 
 
Adj. R2 10.78% 10.10% 16.72% 3.87% 3.29% 9.20%  
Chow 10.62*** 10.06***  
Note:*** indicates a less than 1% significant level, ** indicates a less than 5% significant level, * indicates a less 
than 10% significant level 
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Table 4.13 contains the parameter estimates from the regression model in 
equation (1) and the corresponding Chow test statistic for the following two sub 
periods: prior to 2003 and post 2003, or three sub-periods: prior to 2000, 2000-2003, 
post 2003, for the ADRs where applicable. The Chow tests are statistically significant 
at less than 1% level for all ADRs. It clearly indicates multiple structural shifts around 
the year of 2000 and 2003 during the whole sample period, which causes the 
regression parameters to significantly differ in magnitudes from one period to another. 
This points to the obvious unreliability of pooled estimates since the regression 
coefficients seem to be non-stationary. The parameter estimates for each sub period 
provide a narrative for a dynamic relation between returns spread and the market 
indices. 
The over arching theme from table 4.13 is that the regression coefficients vary 
more with time than with respect to models. First, due to different listing history of 
these ADRs, some ADRs listed before 2000, some listed after 2000, so the 
observation of the structural change around 2000 is limited. However, for the seven 
ADRs which were listed before 2000, two in the portfolio I (namely CHL, GSH) and 
five in the portfolio II (namely, CEA, ZNH, HNP, SHI, YZC), we find except for CHL, 
all the other six ADRs have a drop in their correlation coefficients with 
contemporaneous US market return during the sub-period of 2000-2003. This finding 
demonstrates our expectation as selecting 2000 to account for the US market collapse 
around 2000. It shows when the US market had negative shock, the ADRs’ 
comovement effect with the US market decrease.  
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Second, we find the comovement effect with the underlying Hong Kong 
market varies to a fairly large extent. We show that in portfolio I, three ADRs, namely, 
ACH, CBA, and PTR, do not have significant comovement effect with the Hong 
Kong market before 2003. And the other three ADRs in portfolio I (GSH, CHU, and 
CHL) slightly decrease in the correlation coefficients with Hong Kong market return 
after 2003. For portfolio II, three ADRs (CEA, ZNH, and YZC) have a decreasing 
trend in the comovement effect with Hong Kong market return, while the other three 
ADRs (SNP, HNP, and SHI) have an increasing trend in the comovement effect with 
Hong Kong market return. We do not observe a clear changing movement in the 
comovement effect with Hong Kong market return around 2003, in spite of our 
expectation of an indirect impact transferring from China’s stock market to the Hong 
Kong stock market.  
Third, for the portfolio II, we include Shanghai market return in their 
regression functions. And we find the comovement effect with Shanghai market index 
exists only contemporaneously, which may suggest the impact from Shanghai market 
diminish quickly. For the six ADRs in portfolio II, we find except for ZNH, the other 
five of them have significant negative coefficient with the contemporaneous 
comovement effect with Shanghai index. Further, two of these ADRs (HNP and SNP) 
have significant correlation with Shanghai market only after 2003, and two of them 
(SHI and YZC) have significant correlation with Shanghai market after 2000, and the 
coefficients for the sub-period 2000-2003 are bigger than that for the sub-period 
post-2003, finally, one ADR (CEA) has significant correlation coefficient with 
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Shanghai market only for the sub-period 1997- 2000. These findings are isolated, so 
that it is difficult to claim whether the innovations of the China’s stock market have a 
clear pattern of impact on the Chinese ADRs.  
From this structural change test, we find the comovement effects with the US 
market dominate in each sub-period, and most of these ADRs have a shrink in the 
comovement effect with the US market for the period of 2000-2003, this justifies our 
expectation about the US market collapse in 2000. However, the impacts from the 
innovations of China’s domestic market do not show a clear pattern for the period of 
post-2003. This may suggest insignificant market impact either directly from 
Shanghai or indirectly from Hong Kong.  
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
We study returns and returns spreads on Chinese ADRs listed with primary listing in 
Hong Kong stock exchange.  We compare returns and return distributions on the 
Chinese ADRs and their underlying H shares, by applying both the location-sensitive 
statistical tests and distribution-sensitive statistical tests, we find although we cannot 
reject the equality in the locations (means, medians) of two securities return series, we 
reject the equality in the distributions for most of the ADRs in our sample. This 
finding is consistent with both Kato et al. (1991) and Rabinovitch et al (2003), though 
these two important papers make contradictory conclusions with regard to the issue of 
the Law in the ADRs. Recently developed theory about the financial market, such as 
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Copula weighted portfolios, indicate some international financial institutions, such as 
hedge funds, can gain profit in the higher moments deviation of the cross-listed 
securities, so our finding is of importance for the internationally investment strategies. 
   Further we find the return spread (price differential) of the Chinese ADRs is 
affected by the comovement effect. Our findings are not only consistent with that of 
Gagnon and Karolyi (2004) who reported the significant contemporaneous 
comovement effect, but also contribute to the literature that we in addition find lagged 
comovement effect. Our finding also supports Kim et al. (2000) who found the ADRs 
response to the innovation of the S&P 500 is large, positive and highly significant at 
the day 0, and followed by a large, significant negative price response on day 1.  
One of the interesting findings is that two portfolios are clearly different in 
terms of the comovement effects, as well as return distributions. The ADRs in 
portfolio II which list A shares in Shanghai have lower returns than the ADRs in 
portfolio I. We believe it is due to A shares listing increased shareholder base that 
decreased the ADRs return, as explained by the ‘Investors’ Recognition Hypothesis’ 
by Merton (1987), who argued that expected return of the firm’s stock decrease with 
the size of the investor’s shareholder base this justifies the implicit impact of the 
domestic market. On the other hand, unlike the ADRs in portfolio I, return spreads of 
the ADRs in portfolio II are all negatively skewed, this indicates two portfolios have 
structural break in terms of return distribution. Further, the ADRs in portfolio I have 
larger magnitude of the comovement effect than the ADRs in portfolio II. 
Finally, we have also investigated illiquidity effect and liquidity risk on the 
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return spread. We measure liquidity risk by trading volume and illiquidity by 
Amihud’s ILLIQ. The illiquidity effect is less significant than the liquidity risk, and 
though we find liquidity is one of the factors in determining return spread, it is a 
secondary effect compared to the comovement effect.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Volume-Volatility in Dual Markets: Lessons from the Chinese ADRs 
 
5. 1. Introduction 
The findings of previous chapters lead to a further investigation on the price 
difference between the Chinese ADRs and their identical underlying H shares in this 
chapter. We have shown the different prices of two securities can be explained by the 
systematic comovement effect of the local market, and our findings are consistent 
with the findings of Gagnon and Karolyi (2004). The comovement effect is caused by 
information-based factors such as the degree of synchronization of the common 
movement between the ADRs market and the underlying market, the existence of 
asymmetry of information between insiders and other shareholders.  
From the viewpoint of market microstructure theory, price is a function of the 
intensity of information arrivals. As posited in O’Hara (1995:153) that ‘prices are 
conditional expected values, the price at each point reflects all publicly available 
information’. Anderson (1996) stated that ‘price movements are caused primarily by 
the arrival of new information and the process that incorporates this information into 
market prices’.  
For the Chinese ADRs and their underlying H shares, due to the 
non-synchronistic trading hours, the new information, which is expected to be equally 
affecting the price of two securities, however arrives at two markets at different times, 
thus the price adjustment process to the new arrival of information may differ 
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between the two markets. And the reason of the different price adjustment process 
may stem from the non-synchronistic trading hours to the issues of the dynamic 
information flow across markets, and how market participants learn from market 
information.  
There are a number of factors which would take part in this price adjustment 
process, for example ‘the trader’s risk preferences and endowments, the nature and 
extent of uncertainty, and the market structure itself’ (O’Hara, 1995: 155). We believe 
any differences of these factors between the two markets could lead to various price 
adjustment processes. As analysed and reported in chapter 2, the market 
microstructures of the NYSE and SEHK are different. NYSE is a hybrid market with 
combining dealer and auction trading mechanisms where market makers play a very 
important role in providing liquidity. On the contrary, SEHK has adopted a continuous 
auction trading mechanism where individual traders put trading orders through an 
electronic trading board, namely Automatic Order Matching and Execution System 
(AMS), and very limited numbers of market makers exist in the market. Different 
trading mechanisms of two markets give rise to different kinds and proportions of 
market participants, for example, in the NYSE, market participants are composed of 
informed traders, market makers, and uninformed traders, both informed traders and 
uninformed traders would trade with market makers; in the SEHK, however, market 
participants are mainly either informed traders or uninformed traders who trade 
among themselves through electronic trading board. The informed traders have 
private information about the stock’s future dividends, while the uninformed traders 
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extract information from realized dividends, prices and public signals. The 
uninformed investor trade for non-informational reason and this non-informational 
trading are also known as noise trading. The different risk preference and endowments 
of the investors in the US and Hong Kong market leads to differences in noise trader 
risk in two markets which hampers professional arbitrageurs to earn arbitrage profit 
between two securities, and it gives rise to a persistent price discrepancy between the 
Chinese ADRs and H shares, which is known as the comovement effect.  
       From the market microstructure perspective, the price adjustment process is 
revealed by trading volume, as Epps and Epps (1976) argued that increase in trading 
volume is associated with the extent to which traders disagree on a stock’s price 
which leads to price change, therefore the price variability-volume relation arises. In 
chapter 4, we have reported a positive relation between contemporaneous relation 
between trading volume and return, and we have explained that it occurs as trading 
volume may contain the information of liquidity risk as suggested by Karpoff (1987) 
and Johnson (2007).  
As we have analysed above that long term mispricing persists between the 
Chinese ADRs and the underlying H shares may be due to the different market 
microstructure of the two markets which employ two kinds of trading mechanisms 
and involve heterogeneous investors, these factors lead to price adjusting in different 
process. Since the literature suggests that trading volume is one important factor in 
conveying the price adjustment process, we believe different return volatility-volume 
relation between the two markets would give deeper insights for the ADRs’ 
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mispricing. Therefore, a market microstructure perspective to investigate the 
volume-volatility relation would make an important contribution to the literature of 
the ADRs’ arbitrage. 
The relationship between trading volume and return volatility has received 
considerable attention in the finance literature. In terms of new information arriving 
into the market and its impact on the volume volatility relation, the two existing 
hypotheses- the Mixture of Distributions Hypothesis (MDH) and Sequential 
Information Arrival Hypothesis (SIAH) – make contrdictory predictions. On the one 
hand, the Mixture of Distributions Hypothesis (MDH) originally proposed by Clark 
(1973) predicts a positive relation between contemporaneous stock return variance 
and trading volume. On the other hand, the Sequential Information Arrival Hypothesis 
(SIAH) proposed by Copeland (1976) and Jennings et al (1981) suggests a positive 
bidirectional causal relation between changes in stock prices and trading volume. 
Prior empirical studies on the volatility-volume relation found evidence on a 
contemporaneous as well as a lead-lag causality relation between volume and 
conditional return volatility. Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990), Anderson (1996), and 
Girard and Biswas (2007) found evidence in support of a contemporaneous volume 
volatility relation as predicted by the MDH for the US stock market. Omran and 
McKenzie (2000) found similar evidence for the UK stock market; Pyun et al (2000) 
for the Korean stock market; and Bohl and Henke (2003) for the Polish stock market.  
With regard to SIAH, although empirical evidence generally supports 
causality between trading volume and returns volatility, such evidence on the 
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direction of causality is mixed. Gallant et al (1992), Gervais and Mingelgrin (2001), 
and Darrat et al (2003, 2007) provide strong evidence for a positive lead lag relation 
between volume and absolute price changes in the NYSE but find the causality 
relation only exists from volume to return volatility. On the contrary, Hiemstra and 
Jones (1994) and Brooks (1998) found the presence of bidirectional Granger causality 
between daily stock returns and changes trading volume in the US stock market. 
Silvapulle and Choi (1999) find similar evidence from the Korean stock market. 
As we can see from the literature, the majority of empirical researches on the 
volume-volatility relations cited above focus on single country market indexes and we 
know of no published empirical study on the volume-volatility relations of individual 
securities traded in multiple markets. We examine the relation between daily 
information flow as measured by trading volume and the conditional volatility of 
returns of 15 individual Chinese ADRs listed on the NYSE and of their corresponding 
primary listings on Hong Kong stock markets (SEHK), the total number of stocks in 
our sample is 30. 
The primary objective of our study is to compare and contrast the 
volume-volatility relations of the Chinese ADRs and those of their underlying shares. 
We test if a contemporaneous correlation exists between return volatility and volume 
as predicted by MD hypothesis. We then examine the lead–lag relations between 
volume and volatility using appropriate Granger-causality tests to test the predictions 
of the alternative SIA hypotheses. We also test the competing theories put forth in the 
literature as explanations for the presence of GARCH effects in stock return volatility. 
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In terms of modeling, we use a bivariate GARCH model in a VAR framework where 
return volatilities for ADRs and their underlying securities are jointly determined by 
volume and volatility in each market. 
This chapter proceeds as follows: section 5.2 gives the literature review on the 
two hypotheses about volume-volatility relationship; section 5.3 introduces the 
research methodology and hypothesis development; section 5.4 contains data 
description and the empirical results; section 5.5 is the conclusion. 
  
5.2. Literature Review 
 
5.2.1 The Mixture Distribution Hypothesis 
 
The Mixture Distribution Hypothesis indicates securities’ return is not drawn from a 
single probability distribution but from the joint distribution of volatility and volume 
upon the rate of information arrival instead. The important papers include Clark 
(1973), Epps and Epps (1976), Tauchen and Pitts (1983), Lamoureux and Lastrapes 
(1990), and Andersen (1996).  
Clark (1973) intended to model the stochastic process of the cotton futures 
price series and tried to explain why the probability distribution of the daily price 
change is leptokurtic. The secondary finding of his paper is ‘the variance of price 
change is a combination of price changes on individual trades,  and a deficiency of 
volume at high price changes, caused by traders moving their expectations in unison’.  
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Clark (1973) used this model βννσ tt B=2  to investigate the curvilinear relationship 
between conditional price variance ( tνσ 2 ) and trading volume ( tν ) and found quite 
high correlation between these two variables by applying the model in the cotton 
futures market. He explained that in the cotton futures market, if the information is 
asymmetric between informed and uninformed traders, then large price changes 
would be coincident with high volumes.  
      Epps and Epps (1976) considered a within-day trading model to explain the 
price-formation price where the changes in log price and transaction volume are 
stochastic dependent. Their model is similar to Clark’s (1973) and implied that the 
conditional variance of the price change is a function of trading volume. Epps and 
Epps (1976) also reported empirical evidence by applying their model to examine 20 
NYSE-listed common stocks based on the transaction during the month of January, 
1971, they found positive correlation between )log( 2 tνσ  and )log( 2tν . 
Tauchen and Pitts (1983) derived a joint probability distribution of the price 
change and the trading volume in their empirical study of T-bill futures market. The 
model of Tauchen and Pitts (1983) was different with the models of Clark (1973) and 
Epps and Epps (1976) in several ways, first, both Clark’s model and Epps and Epps’ 
model required to specify in advance by nonlinear regression the functional form of 
the conditional expectation )( 2 VE σ ; second, neither of these two models considered 
growth in the size of speculative markets as experienced by many of the new financial 
future markets. Therefore, Tauchen and Pitts considered a setting with J active traders 
who take long or short position in a single futures contract, and the price adjust from 
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the (i-1)st to the ith within day Walrasian equilibrium. In their model, trading volume is 
a function about the absolute difference between the change of Walrasian equilibrium 
price and the current market price, and the variance of the change of the current 
market price and the variance of trading volume include common variable which is 
related to J, the number of the market traders. And finally, they reported the 
covariance of the change of the market price square and trading volume is greater than 
0, namely, 0),( 2 >∆ VpCov , where 2p∆  is the change of the market price square, 
V is trading volume. Like Clark (1973) and Epps and Epps (1976), Tauchen and Pitts 
(1983) examined the relation between )log( 2tp∆  and )log( tV  by using OLS 
estimation, they found positive relation between these two variables, at the same time, 
they reported that the error term of this regression function is heteroscedasticy. These 
findings suggested the model of Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) to be used in investigating the volatility-volume relation in the following 
studies. 
Unlike Clark (1973), Epps and Epps (1976), and Tauchen and Pitts (1983) 
who used the variance of the change of log price to capture the volatility of return, 
Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) employed the Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) to model the return volatility. This paper 
studied the relation between daily return volatility and volume based on a sample of 
20 actively traded common stocks in the US stock market with the sample period of 
one year. Their empirical model was tttt Vhh 312110 ααεαα +++= −− , where th is the 
GARCH term from the fitting AR (n) model, and tV  is trading volume. Lamoureux 
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and Lastrapes (1990) found a significant relation between th and tV , and a substantial 
reduction in volatility persistence when volume is included, which they explained as 
the contemporaneous trading volume containing the information about the variance of 
the stock return.  
Andersen (1996) modified the MDH model into a full dynamic representation 
by incorporating a specific stochastic volatility process for the information arrivals, 
unlike previous MDH approaches which applied an identical joint probability 
distribution of price changes and trading volume over each interval, Andersen (1996) 
constituted a dynamic joint distribution of price changes and volume during each 
equilibrium phase. He described a dynamic market specification in a microstructure 
framework where three distinct groups of traders, namely, specialists, informed 
traders, and uninformed traders, kept revising their price estimations upon receiving 
either public or private information over time. Specifically, the daily return is 
conditionally normal with variance which reflects the intensity of information arrivals, 
namely, ),0(~ 2 ttt KNKR σ  where tR  is daily return, tK  stands for the intensity 
of information arrivals. )(~ 0 µttt IKmPoKV +  is the specification of the dynamic 
trading volume, which is based on a Poisson approximation incorporating both noise 
component ( 0m ) and informed component ( µtIK ). Therefore, the covariance of the 
return variance and trading volume is greater than zero, namely, 0),( 2 >tt VRCov . 
Andersen (1996) also reported empirical evidence of contemporaneous 
characterization of the return-volume relation as suggested by MDH based on a 
sample of 5 major common stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange in a time 
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period of 18 years.  
Omaran and McKenzie (2000) followed the same methodology as Lamoureux 
and Lastrapes (1990) and examined the common stocks in the UK market. Their 
sample included the daily returns and volume on 50 British companies during the 
period from January 1988 to February 1994. The model they tested was exactly the 
same as the model of Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) that 
tttt Vhh 312110 ααεαα +++= −− , and their findings were consistent with that of 
Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) that the coefficient of volume was highly significant 
for all companies and volatility persistence became negligible for most stocks when 
trading volume was involved. However, contradicting Lamoureux and Lastrapes 
(1990); they argued that GARCH effects cannot be explained by the serial 
dependence in volume of trade, because the structure of the model itself that 1−th  is 
itself a function of 1−tV . Moreover, tV is highly correlated with its past, 1−tV ; 2−tV ;…; 
which can lead to a multicollinearity problem between the explanatory variables 
used, 1−th  and 1−tV . 
Similar empirical evidence also include Pyun, Lee, and Nam (2000) and Bohl 
and Henke (2003). Both of these two papers followed the approach of Lamoureux and 
Lastrapes (1990) and reported consistent results with Lamoureux and Lastrapes 
(1990). Pyun, Lee, and Nam (2000) studied weekly returns of stocks listed on the 
Korean Stock Exchange during the 5 year period between 1990 and 1994. Bohl and 
Henke (2003) consider daily returns and the trading volume for 20 stocks listed at the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) over the period from January, 1999 to October, 2000. 
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5.2.2 The Sequential Information Arrival Hypothesis 
 
The contradictory theory to MDH is the Sequential Information Arrival Hypothesis 
(SIAH) of Copeland (1976), Jennings, Starks and Fellingham (1981), Gallant, Rossi 
and Tauchen (1992), Hiemstra and Jones (1994), Gervais and Mingelgrin (2001), and 
Darrat, Rahman and Zhong (2003). The main difference between the SIAH and the 
MDH is that the MDH assumes all traders have homogeneous response to new 
information, while the SIAH assumes new information is disseminated sequentially to 
traders and in a random order, and traders responds to the new information 
heterogeneously. The traders adjust their positions and expected market price based 
on the observed market price and their own private information. As such, before a 
final equilibrium is attained, a series of sequential equilibriums as intermediates 
contain information on past volatility data that can be used to forecast trading volume, 
or vice versa. Due to the lagged sequential information flow absolute stock returns 
could have predictive power for current trading volume and vice versa, which imply 
bidirectional causality between volume and volatility. 
Copeland (1976) developed a theoretical model to describe a setting where N 
traders possessed an identical set of information, but each of them would shift their 
demand curve in different magnitude and direction. Further, he considered three cases 
with short sale binding, namely, all traders were pessimistic, all traders were 
optimistic, and traders were mixture of pessimistic and optimistic. His model had 
 164
some strict assumptions such as the percentage of optimistic traders was 
symmetrically distributed with the mean of 0.5, and the short sale constraint was 
binding that the uninformed traders would not sell more than they have. Since all 
traders would shift their demand curve differently, Copeland developed sequential 
equations of equilibrium price and the corresponding volume at different stages 
between the original and the final equilibria. Upon these assumptions, the model 
predicted a positive correlation between absolute price change and trading volume at 
sequential equilibrium. 
Jennings, Starks and Fellingham (1981) specified a particular dynamic price 
adjustment process that it assumed that only one trader observed the information 
initially. This trader interpreted the news, revised his beliefs, and traded to arrive at a 
new optimal position. The next investor became informed based on this new 
equilibrium, and after a similar sequence of events, a second temporary equilibrium 
was achieved. This process continued until all traders were informed and results in a 
series of momentary equilibria. When the last trader receives the information, the 
market reaches a final equilibrium. The outcome of this series of events was the 
generation of a sequence of transaction volume. Jennings et al (1981) modified the 
model of Copeland (1976) by considering informed and uninformed traders and a 
margin requirement as a realistic restriction on short sales. Their model also 
theoretically predicted a positive correlation between the absolute price change and 
trading volume. 
Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen (1992) undertook an empirical investigation of the 
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dynamic interrelationships among price and volume movements of the US stock 
market index. Their sample was composed of the daily closing value of the S&P 
composite stock index and the daily volume of shares traded on the NYSE with the 
time period from 1928 to 1987. Their results suggested that large price changes lead 
to increases in both the mean and variability of the volume.  
Gervais and Mingelgrin (2001) investigated the high-volume return premium. 
The high-volume return premium is such kind of volume-return relationship that 
periods of high trading volume tend to be followed by periods of positive excess 
returns, whereas periods of low volume tend to be followed by negative excess returns. 
Their findings also confirmed that a positive relation exists between the average 
cumulative returns and trading volume, and that the shocks in the volume contain 
information about future returns. 
Hiemstra and Jones (1994) empirically studied both linear and non-linear 
causality relation between volume and return. Their sample included daily return and 
trading volume data of Dow Jones stock index for the time period from 1915 to 1990. 
They employed both traditional linear Granger causality test and the modified Baek 
and Brock test which is a non-parametric Granger causality test. The traditional linear 
Granger causality test detected unidirectional Granger causality from stock returns to 
trading volume. In contrast, the modified Baek and Brock test provides evidence of 
significant nonlinear bidirectional Granger causality between stock returns and 
trading volume.  
Silvapulle and Choi (1999) used daily Korean Composite Stock Index data to 
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study the linear and non-linear Granger causality between stock price and trading 
volume. They followed the modified Baek and Brock test by Hiemstra and Jones 
(1994) and reported significant bidirectional causality between trading volume and the 
return volatility predicted by the GARCH (1, 1) model. 
Darrat, Rahman and Zhong (2003) examined the contemporaneous correlation 
as well as the lead–lag relation between trading volume and return volatility. Their 
sample consisted of all stocks comprising the Dow Jones industrial average (DJIA) 
from April 1, 1998 to June 30, 1998. They used 5-minute intraday data and measure 
return volatility by the exponential generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity method (EGARCH). They applied Granger causality test to study 
both contemporaneous and lead-lag relation on a bivariate vector autoregression 
model (VAR). Their findings strongly supported the SIAH but found little evidence of 
MDH. 
 
5.3. Research methodology and hypothesis development 
 
5.3.1 Model selection for return volatility 
 
The variance of the price change was the proxy to stand for return volatility in the 
earlier literature of volume-volatility relation, such as Clark (1973), Epps and Epps 
(1976), and Tauchen and Pitts (1983). However, these papers all reported that the 
error term of the OLS estimated regression function of )log( 2tp∆  on )log( tV  is 
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heteroscedasticy. Since Engle published his remarkable paper about Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model in 1982, Lamoureux and Lastrapes 
(1990) turned to use the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
(GARCH) to model the return volatility. Thereafter, GARCH model became widely 
used in the study of return volatility-volume relation. Further, Kim and Kon (1994) 
compared three models: GARCH, Exponential GARCH (EGARCH), and Threshold 
GARCH (TGARCH), they found that both EGARCH and TGARCH models could 
capture the conditional heteroscedasticity and the asymmetric leverage effect of the 
return series fairly well, in addition, the individual stock’s return is in favor of 
TGARCH model, while the EGARCH model is more likely a proper description for 
the stock index return.  
In this chapter, we will examine the heteroscedasticity of return series by 
applying Ljung-Box test. And then follow the approach of Kim and Kon (1994) and 
Giraid and Biswas (2007), who used two asymmetric GARCH methods, namely, the 
Threshold GARCH and Exponential GARCH, to model stock return volatility. These 
two models capture asymmetric characteristics of the positive/negative shock (namely 
good/bad news). Particularly, Threshold GARCH model is able to involve positive 
shock where the error is above the threshold value of zero, and negative shock where 
the error is below the threshold value of zero. Generally, negative shocks have a 
greater effect on conditional volatility than positive shocks of the same magnitude, 
which is known as ‘leverage effect’ that volatility clustering in asymmetric pattern. 
The reason we apply these two asymmetric GARCH models is because ‘leverage 
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effect’ is commonly observed in equity markets that volatility is higher in a falling 
market than it is in a rising market. The volatility response to a large negative return is 
often far greater than it is to a large positive return of the same magnitude. 
Apart from ‘leverage effect’, the Threshold GARCH and Exponential GARCH 
models also account for two other characteristics. The first is volatility clustering 
which implies large (small) price changes tend to follow large (small) price changes. 
The second characteristic is fat tail which is characterized as leptokurtosis and 
skewness, and both of which indicate departure from normality of the data, and both 
of which are regarded as the particular feature of daily stock returns.  
Further, these two models allow for a general probability density function (i.e., 
generalized error distribution, GED), which nests the normal distribution along with 
several other possible densities. Bollerslev et al. (1992) noted that imposing the 
normality assumption on the GARCH model could bias the estimates.  
Finally, many GARCH models have to place non-negative constraints on the 
parameters to avoid generating negative variances, even though this may unduly 
restrain the model dynamics. The EGARCH model eliminates the need for such 
constraints by formulating the conditional variance in logarithmic terms.  
Although Kim and Kon (1994) argued individual stock’s return is fond of 
TGARCH rather than EGARCH, Girard and Biswas (2007) showed there was no 
preferred one between the TGARCH and EGARCH models. Following Girard and 
Biswas (2007), we will use both TGARCH and EGARCH model to estimate return 
volatility process. We give our mean return equation and return volatility equation 
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according to TGARCH model as: 
tR = α +∑
=
p
r 0
rβ 1−tR + tε                          (1) 
2
tσ =α + ψ 2 1−tε + 2 1−tγε 1−td  + 2 1−tλσ                   (2) 
Where Rt is the realized return of the stock, expressed as an AR (p) process with 
an error term of mean zero and conditional variance 2tσ . Lags p in AR process is 
selected based on AIC and SBC criteria. The conditional variance 2tσ  is specified as 
a function of the mean volatilityα , 2 1−tε  which is the lag of the squared residual from 
the mean equation (the ARCH term) and which provides news about volatility 
clustering; 2 1−tσ which is the last period’s forecast variance (the GARCH term) and 
finally, the term for capturing the asymmetry 2 1−tε 1−td  . The parameter td is a 
dummy which equals 1 if tε  <0, and 0 otherwise, so that good news ( tε >0) and bad 
news ( tε  <0) are allowed to have different effects on the conditional variance. Good 
news has an effect ofψ , while bad news has an effect of ψ +γ . Accordingly, if γ  
>0, a leverage effect, exists, then bad news has greater effect than good news. 
 The EGARCH model has the same mean equation as the one of TGARCH 
model, but is different in the conditional variance equation which is defined in terms 
of a standard normal variate zt : 
 ln 2tσ  = ω  + g(zt-1) +β ln 2 1−tσ                            (3) 
Where g(.) is an asymmetric response function defined by g(zt) = tzλ  + 
)/2( πϕ −tz , where )/2( π−tz  is the mean deviation of zt since π/2  = 
)( tzE
15.  
                                                        
15 EGARCH is difficult to use for volatility forecasting because there is no analytic form for the 
 170
 
5.3.2 De-trend Trading volume  
 
Previous papers have reported that trading volume is not stationary and with trend, 
since we will use vector autoregression (VAR) framework to test Granger causality of 
volume-volatility relation as suggested by SIAH, it requires the variables in the VAR 
framework are stationary. Following Lee and Rui (2002) and Girard and Biswas (2007), 
we de-trend the trading volume series by assuming volume as a deterministic function 
of time. As reported by Gallant et al (1992), trading volume series is composed of 
both linear and nonlinear time trend, we include both time and quadratic time trend 
terms: 
Volt  = α+βt + χ t2 +εt               (4) 
Where Volt represents raw daily trading volume and t is time. For the 15 Chinese 
ADRs and their underlying shares, the coefficients for both linear and non-linear trend 
term are significantly different from zero. In the following analysis we will employ 
trading volume without trend for the 15 Chinese ADRs and their underlying HK 
shares. The de-trended trading volumes as unobservable information arrival are the 
residuals from equation (4).   
 
5.3.3 Test MDH 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
volatility term structure. 
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Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990) developed a method to empirically examine the 
MDH by incorporating trading volume into equation (2), and they argue that if trading 
volume and return volatility are jointly distributed, then persistence of volatility 
should become negligible when trading volume is incorporated, and there is a positive 
relation between return volatility and trading volume. However, Lamoureux and 
Lastrapes (1990) suggested volume may be endogenous to the system and would 
cause that “simultaneity bias”, so Girard and Biswas (2007) alternatively employed 
volume with one lag in the variance equation, we follow Girard and Biswas (2007) to 
test the MDH model as below: 
2
tσ =α + ψ 2 1−tε + 2 1−tγε 1−td  + 2 1−tλσ + δ 1−tV                     (5) 
Where the other terms are same as that in equation (2), 1−tV  stands for the 
contemporaneous trading volume after de-trended. According to the MDH, 
persistence of volatility is measured by ( λγψ ++ ), if ( λγψ ++ ) equals one, then 
current shocks persist indefinitely in conditioning the future variance. It also 
represents the change in the response function of shocks to volatility per period. And 
if ( λγψ ++ ) is greater than one, which implies that the response function of 
volatility is explosive. Likewise, if ( λγψ ++ ) is less than one, which implies that the 
response to volatility shocks declines over time. As demonstrated in Lamoureux and 
Lastrapes (1990) and Girard and Biswas (2007) that when contemporaneous trading 
volume is involved, persistence of volatility would disappear, so our null hypothesis is 
1−tV is not positively correlated with
2
tσ , and ( λγψ ++ ) will be significantly different 
from zero. 
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5.3.4 Test SIAH 
 
The SIAH has been tested by applying Granger causality test, for example, Hiemstra 
and Jones (1994), Silvapulle and Choi (1999), and Darrat, Rahman, and Zhong (2003).  
We follow these papers to examine the lead-lag relations between volume and 
volatility by using Granger causality test. Granger causality means that a lead-lag 
relationship is evident between variables in a multivariate time series, or one variable 
happens before and helps to predict another one. According to the SIAH, due to the 
sequential information flow, lagged trading volume could have predictive power for 
current absolute stock returns and lagged absolute stock returns could have predictive 
power for current trading volume. We give the testing model as below: 
2
tσ = 1α  + 2
1
kt
p
k
k −
=
∑ σβ + ktq
k
kV −
=
∑
1
θ + t1ε              (5) 
tV = 2α  + 2
1
kt
m
k
k −
=
∑ σδ + ktn
k
kV −
=
∑
1
φ  + t2ε              (6) 
Where 2σ  is the return volatility and tV  is the de-trended trading volume.  In 
equation (5), if the kθ  coefficients are statistically significant, then inclusion of the 
past trading volume, in addition to the past volatility, yields a better forecast for the 
future volatility, and we say volume cause return. Likewise, in equation (6), if return 
volatility cause volume, the coefficient of kδ  will be significantly different from 
zero. We use a Granger causality Wald test to test that 1δ = 2δ = …= mδ = 0 and 
1θ = 2θ =… = qθ = 0. Because when we have a large sample, the Wald test can have a 
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better approximate, we do not use Granger causality F test is because F test 
emphasizes that the errors are normally distributed and the explanatory variables are 
treated as non-stochastic (Griffiths, Hill, and Judge, 1993: 456).  
5.4. Data and empirical results  
 
5.4.1 Data 
 
We use the same data sample as for the sample in chapter 4, which consists of daily 
prices (see the descriptive statistics in Table 4.3) and trading volumes (see the 
descriptive statistics in Table 4.11) on the Chinese ADRs listed on the US stock 
exchanges and their corresponding underlying securities listed on the Stock Exchange 
of Hong Kong (SEHK). We compute continuously compounded returns on the 
underlying stocks listed at SEHK (Hong Kong Stock Exchange) and their corresponding 
ADR listings in NYSE as )/ln( 1
i
t
i
t
i
t PPr −= where itP denotes closing price of security i 
on day t.  
 
5.3.2 Results of model selection for return volatility 
 
So in the following, we analyze the heteroscedasticity of return series. In statistics, a 
sequence or a vector of random variables is heteroscedastic if the random variables 
have time-varying variances. Heteroskedasticity does not cause OLS coefficient 
estimates to be biased. However, the variance (the standard errors) of the coefficients 
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tends to be underestimated, increasing the t-ratio and is probably to make insignificant 
variables appear to be statistically significant. Many financial return series display 
volatility clustering, that is autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity, and which 
implies a strong autocorrelation in squared returns, so we utilize Ljung-Box test to 
examine if return and squared return series are serial correlated, an autocorrelated 
time series means the covariance is not independent of time. The Ljung-Box Q 
statistic is calculated based on the sample autocorrelation, under the null hypothesis of 
zero autocorrelation, Q will have an asymptotic 2χ distribution with certain degree of 
freedom, the Ljung-Box Q(6) and Q(12) statistics for return and squared return 
autocorrelations are reported in Table 5.1.  
 
Table5.1. The Ljung-Box Q statistics 
(Q(6) and Q (12) are Ljung-Box statistics for returns distributed as 2χ  with 6 and 12 
degrees of freedom respectively, Q2(6) and Q2(12) Ljung-Box statistics for squared 
returns distributed as 2χ  with 6 and 12 degrees of freedom respectively.) 
 
Symbol Market Q(6) Q(12) Q2(6) Q2(12) 
ACH NYSE 12.99** 15.81 26.54*** 49.60*** 
 SEHK 11.54** 20.19* 24.46*** 78.80*** 
CBA NYSE 7.32 14.39 23.19*** 29.22*** 
 SEHK 3.33 7.40 82.26*** 150.91*** 
LFC NYSE 10.48 13.21 87.04*** 163.05*** 
 SEHK 6.53 8.02 81.74*** 95.75*** 
CHL NYSE 6.88 10.76 94.35*** 179.26*** 
 SEHK 21.94*** 31.60*** 210.31*** 341.12*** 
CHA NYSE 3.29 7.18 83.58*** 117.22*** 
 SEHK 9.81 12.57 34.44*** 83.56*** 
CEO NYSE 1.97 3.32 20.03*** 43.90*** 
 SEHK 7.77 9.28 17.90*** 66.12*** 
GSH NYSE 23.98*** 36.22*** 198.43*** 259.87*** 
 SEHK 7.76 15.17 102.96*** 174.17*** 
PTR NYSE 5.97 14.73 99.02*** 222.16*** 
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 SEHK 13.41** 16.08 56.84*** 103.35*** 
CHU NYSE 7.31 11.37 17.39*** 38.57*** 
 SEHK 4.54 6.65 28.73*** 67.07*** 
CEA NYSE 8.86 11.49 73.39*** 144.02*** 
 SEHK 9.63 25.62*** 98.77*** 155.92*** 
SNP NYSE 10.59 20.94** 109.52*** 126.16*** 
 SEHK 15.87*** 18.69* 58.43*** 103.74*** 
ZNH NYSE 3.52 13.63 71.63*** 119.69*** 
 SEHK 5.88 16.36 71.65*** 174.19*** 
HNP NYSE 8.81*** 11.84 150.50*** 313.92*** 
 SEHK 18.51*** 21.30** 67.00*** 223.88*** 
SHI NYSE 6.85 11.24 123.89*** 294.58*** 
 SEHK 1.57 9.67 204.25*** 489.49*** 
YZC NYSE 8.11 13.53 24.26*** 41.68*** 
 SEHK 9.43 12.10 125.96*** 179.82*** 
Note:*** indicates a less than 1% significant level, ** indicates a less than 5% significant level, * indicates a less 
than 10% significant level 
 
Data presented in Table 5.1 indicates that only 1 out of 15 ADRs have 
significant autocorrelation in both 6 and 12 orders; 4 out of 15 HK shares have 
significant autocorrelation in both 6 and 12 orders. While the significant Ljung-Box 
test statistics Q2 (6) and Q2 (12) indicate the presence of conditional heteroscedasticity 
for all ADRs and their underlying shares. These findings justify the use of GARCH 
modeling (Bollerslev, 1986), which allows for conditional variance in the returns.  
Next, following Kim and Kon (1994) and Giraid and Biswas (2007), we use 
TGARCH to model return volatility and examine the ‘leverage effect’; we report the 
coefficients of the ‘good news’ and ‘bad news’ respectively. We also apply EGARCH 
as comparison with the TGARCH model, and provide likelihood ratios of both 
models in Table 5.2.  
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Table 5.2. Volatility persistence without volume  
 
Symbol Market  2
1−tε  2 1−tε 1−td  2 1−tσ  LL1 LL2
ACH NYSE 0.058(12.13)*** 0.003(0.39) 0.581(27.20)*** 2508 2498
 SEHK 0.071(18.74)*** -0.002(-0.50) 0.558(29.36)*** 2381 2375
CBA NYSE 0.147(51.33)*** 0.002(0.51) 0.421(39.75)*** 3178 3171
 SEHK 0.103(57.01)*** -0.021(-7.68)*** 0.383(32.97)*** 3017 3012
LFC NYSE 0.133(13.97)*** 0.057(4.38)*** 0.494(21.05)*** 1733 1730
 SEHK 0.046(9.90)*** 0.019(2.82)*** 0.530(19.70)*** 1728 1722
CHL NYSE 0.091(25.11)*** -0.0046(-0.87) 0.537(37.66)*** 4836 4827
 SEHK 0.254(67.60)*** 0.0005(0.10) 0.423(48.88)*** 4897 4891
CHA NYSE 0.121(22.70)*** 0.036(5.11)*** 0.536(31.39)*** 2476 2474
 SEHK 0.083(13.67)*** 0.014(1.75)* 0.506(22.20)*** 2398 2392
CEO NYSE 0.076(36.45)*** -0.0002(-0.06) 0.472(28.47)*** 1631 1633
 SEHK 0.069(18.77)*** 0.043(8.22)*** 0.329(14.00)*** 1562 1564
GSH NYSE 0.288(78.80)*** 0.073(11.45)*** 0.352(45.00)*** 5659 5645
 SEHK 0.203(45.92)*** -0.009(-1.52) 0.463(45.20)*** 5356 5346
PTR NYSE 0.139(38.04)*** 0.019(3.81)*** 0.424(32.13)*** 3844 3844
 SEHK 0.113(22.39)*** 0.048(6.78)*** 0.400(23.81)*** 3857 3855
CHU NYSE 0.024(6.49)*** 0.0089(1.66) 0.470(21.61)*** 3345 3348
 SEHK 0.106(51.75)*** -0.027(-8.41)*** 0.307(23.96)*** 3435 3437
CEA NYSE 0.220(82.14)*** -0.011(-2.27)** 0.456(56.69)*** 4674 4662
 SEHK 0.314(53.66)*** 0.001(0.22) 0.453(49.39)*** 4343 4297
SNP NYSE 0.050(26.64)*** -0.029(-10.93)*** 0.491(26.73)*** 3466 3465
 SEHK 0.009(40.76)*** -0.018(-50.82)*** 0.355(25.18)*** 3437 3435
ZNH NYSE 0.10(20.29)*** 0.111(16.91)*** 0.627(56.12)*** 4046 4012
 SEHK 0.156(56.22)*** -0.010(-2.62)*** 0.446(46.06)*** 3867 3846
HNP NYSE 0.200(45.53)*** 0.041(6.56)*** 0.415(38.26)*** 4703 4688
 SEHK 0.196(45.96)*** 0.020(2.95)*** 0.406(32.77)*** 4251 4231
SHI NYSE 0.176(53.94)*** 0.001(0.19) 0.545(58.46)*** 5947 5945
 SEHK 0.029(40.93)*** -0.053(-44.73)*** 0.523(46.56)*** 5432 5426
YZC NYSE 0.271(47.91)*** 0.026(4.14)*** 0.607(88.71)*** 3671 3667
 SEHK 0.063(18.92)*** -0.049(-13.56)*** 0.412(22.47)*** 3567 3562
Mean NYSE 0.140 0.022 0.495   
 SEHK 0.121 -0.0029 0.433   
Maximum NYSE 0.288 0.073 0.627   
 SEHK 0.314 0.048 0.558   
Minimum NYSE 0.024 -0.029 0.421   
 SEHK 0.009 -0.053 0.329   
Significant NYSE 15 9 15   
 SEHK 15 11 15   
Sig. and NYSE 15 7 15   
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Positive 
 SEHK 15 5 15   
Note:*** indicates a less than 1% significant level, ** indicates a less than 5% significant level, * indicates a less 
than 10% significant level 
 
In table 5.2, we report LL1 which is the maximum log likelihood attained with 
the above TGARCH model, and LL2 which is the maximum log likelihood that would 
have been obtained if EGARCH was utilized. 2 1−tε  and 2 1−tε 1−td  stand for good news 
and bad news respectively. 2 1−tσ  measures the GARCH effect with one-period lag. 
The coefficients are estimated based on equation (1) and (2), the lags of tR is chosen 
based on SBC and AIC. 
tR = α +∑
=
p
r 0
rβ 1−tR + tε                          (1) 
2
tσ =α + ψ 2 1−tε + 2 1−tγε 1−td  + 2 1−tλσ                   (2) 
 
These results indicate the following: a) All Chinese ADRs and their underlying 
HK shares have significant coefficient of ‘good news’ ( 2 1−tε ). The coefficients of 2 1−tε  
range from 0.024 (CHU) to 0.288 (GSH) for ADRs, while range from 0.009 (SNP) to 
0.314 (CEA) for HK shares.  
b) With regard to reflection on ‘bad news’, the ADRs on the NYSE have 
different pattern with the underlying shares on the SEHK, the average coefficient is 
positive for ADRs whereas negative for HK shares, and the number of significant and 
positive coefficient of ADRs is more than that of the HK shares. Which suggests the 
investors in the two stock markets differ in the sentiment to ‘bad news’. On the NYSE 
the leverage effect of ‘bad news’ is much bigger than the investors on the SEHK, 
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which imply the US investors are more sentimental to ‘bad news’.  
This finding is interesting, and we find supportive evidence from recent 
published paper. Arquette et al (2008) compared the price of the Chinese stocks listed 
in Shanghai with the price of the same firms but listed in Hong Kong and the US. 
They found the price differential is significantly determined by the investors’ 
sentiment which is captured as the company P/E ratio in each market. On the other 
hand, in chapter 4, we test the comovement effect on the Chinese ADRs mispricing, 
we find the US investors over react to the US stock market index that is also 
demonstrated by Kim et al (2000). These findings may be the evident of ‘investors’ 
sentiment’ hypothesis that stock price is a function of ‘investors’ sentiment’ and the 
US investors are more pessimistic than the other. 
Further, the different reflections with ‘bad news’ in the US and HK market 
justifies the earlier conclusion in chapter 4 that the inequality distribution of the 
returns of the Chinese ADRs and their underlying HK shares. 
c) The persistence of conditional volatility of the ADRs on the NYSE is higher 
than that of the HK shares on the SEHK; and we also find similar evidence from the 
published paper. Xu and Fung (2002) studied price discovery and volatility spillover 
effect of the Chinese ADRs. Using the bivariate GARCH model, they found the 
coefficients of the ADRs’ return volatility are higher than that of the H shares’ return 
volatility. So they concluded that the Chinese ADRs listed on the NYSE play a bigger 
role in volatility spillover.  
However, we also find none of the past volatility coefficient ( λγψ ++ ) is 
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close to one for the ADRs and H shares, which implies that the response to volatility 
shocks declines quickly over time.  
d) As consistent with the findings of Girard and Biswas (2007), we also find 
slight higher value of likelihood ratio of TGARCH (1, 1) than that of EGARCH (1, 1) 
for most of the Chinese ADRs. However the likelihood ratios for TGARCH and 
EGARCH are very close, so we do not carry out the likelihood ratio test. 
 
5.3.3 Results of the test on the MDH 
 
Next, we proceed to test the MDH, we report results in table 5.3.  
 
Table 5.3. Contemporaneous volume-volatility relation test with trading volume. 
 
Symbol Market 2
1−tε  2 1−tε 1−td  2 1−tσ  1−tV  
(times 104) 
LL1 LL2
ACH NYSE 0.058(11.98)*** 0.0027(0.35) 0.578(26.83)*** 0.1(1.28) 2508 2498
 SEHK 0.07(17.72)*** -0.002(-0.46) 0.552(28.73)*** 0.1(0.99) 2381 2375
CBA NYSE 0.148(50.47)*** 0.001(0.33) 0.425(39.70)*** -0.3(-2.61)*** 3178 3171
 SEHK 0.103(56.16)*** -0.021(-7.70)*** 0.383(32.94)*** -0.069(-0.62) 3017 3012
LFC NYSE 0.128(12.36)*** 0.057(4.36)*** 0.481(19.00)*** 0.3(1.37) 1733 1730
 SEHK 0.040(8.16)*** 0.019(2.87)*** 0.509(18.63)*** 0.4(3.51)*** 1728 1722
CHL NYSE 0.091(24.96)*** -0.0046(-0.85) 0.537(37.66)*** -0.077 (-0.54) 4836 4827
 SEHK 0.254(66.58)*** 0.0005(0.10) 0.423(48.62)*** -0.2(-1.10) 4897 4891
CHA NYSE 0.122(21.65)*** 0.036(5.07)*** 0.538(31.06)*** -0.074 (-0.77) 2476 2474
 SEHK 0.082(13.03)*** 0.014(1.78)* 0.505(22.08)*** 0.077 (0.59) 2398 2392
CEO NYSE 0.076(35.95)*** 0.00004(0.01) 0.475(28.59)*** -0.091(-1.97)** 1631 1633
 SEHK 0.067(17.65)*** 0.043(8.31)*** 0.325(13.90)*** 0.2(2.84)*** 1562 1564
GSH NYSE 0.289(78.43)*** 0.073(11.58)*** 0.355(45.09)*** -0.4(-2.90)*** 5659 5645
 SEHK 0.204(45.30)*** -0.009(-1.58) 0.464(44.92)*** -0.1(-0.78) 5356 5346
PTR NYSE 0.139(37.61)*** 0.019(3.81)*** 0.423(31.93)*** 0.053 (1.18) 3844 3844
 SEHK 0.110(20.86)*** 0.048(6.81)*** 0.394(23.10)*** 0.3(2.36)*** 3857 3855
CHU NYSE 0.021(5.81)*** 0.0087(1.63) 0.463(21.20)*** 0.2(1.44) 3345 3348
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 SEHK 0.106(48.93)*** -0.023(-8.41)*** 0.307(23.35)*** -0.03(-0.30) 3435 3437
CEA NYSE 0.223(80.09)*** -0.011(-2.32)** 0.463(56.34)*** -0.4(-3.78)*** 4674 4662
 SEHK 0.317(52.60)*** -0.001(-0.14) 0.454(49.39)*** -0.8(-2.09)*** 4343 4297
SNP NYSE 0.050(26.46)*** -0.029(-10.91)*** 0.489(26.60)*** 0.039(0.96) 3466 3465
 SEHK 0.009(39.70)*** -0.018(-49.28)*** 0.355(24.80)*** 0.034 (0.39) 3437 3435
ZNH NYSE 0.10(20.29)*** 0.111(16.91)*** 0.627(56.12)*** 0.3(1.23) 4046 4012
 SEHK 0.156(56.22)*** -0.010(-2.62)*** 0.446(46.06)*** -0.3(-1.75)* 3867 3846
HNP NYSE 0.199(43.42)*** 0.041(6.58)*** 0.413(37.30)*** 0.2(1.06) 4703 4688
 SEHK 0.196(45.94)*** 0.019(2.88)*** 0.404(32.23)*** -0.1(-0.95) 4251 4231
SHI NYSE 0.176(52.62)*** 0.001(0.19) 0.545(57.65)*** -0.039(-0.22) 5947 5945
 SEHK 0.029(40.41)*** -0.055(-44.34)*** 0.528(46.91)*** -0.1(-4.35)*** 5432 5426
YZC NYSE 0.271(47.73)*** 0.025(4.05)*** 0.607(88.72)*** -0.2(-1.06) 3671 3667
 SEHK 0.062(18.34)*** -0.047(-13.15)*** 0.410(22.37)*** 0.5(1.48) 3567 3562
NYSE 0.145 0.023 0.488 -0.0279   Mean 
SEHK 0.124 -0.002 0.421 -0.0777   
NYSE 0.289 0.057 0.627 0.3   Maximum 
SEHK 0.317 0.048 0.552 0.5   
NYSE 0.021 -0.029 0.355 -0.4   Minimum 
SEHK 0.009 -0.047 0.307 -0.8   
NYSE 15 9 15 4   Significant 
SEHK 15 11 15 6   
NYSE 15 7 15 0   Sig. and 
Positive SEHK 15 5 15 3   
Note:*** indicates a less than 1% significant level, ** indicates a less than 5% significant level, * indicates a less 
than 10% significant level 
 
In table 5.3, we report LL1 as the maximum log likelihood attained with the 
above TGARCH model, and LL2 as the maximum log likelihood that would have 
been obtained if EGARCH was utilized. 2 1−tε  and 2 1−tε 1−td  stand for good news and 
bad news respectively. 2 1−tσ  measures the GARCH effect with one-period lag. 1−tV  
measures the contemporaneous volume. The testing model is: 
2
tσ =α + ψ 2 1−tε + 2 1−tγε 1−td  + 2 1−tλσ + 1−tV  
In Table 5.3, we include de-trended trading volume with one lag to test the 
contemporaneous volume-volatility relation as suggested by MDH. The coefficients 
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of past surprises and innovations only change slightly as compared with the results 
without contemporaneous trading volume, and we do not find positive and significant 
correlation between volatility and volume for all ADRs on the NYSE, though we find 
3 positive and significant correlations between volatility and volume out of 15 
underlying shares on the SEHK. Further, the persistence of volatility do not become 
negligible after involving trading volume, this is also contradict to the prediction of 
the MDH. So our finding does not support MDH.  
On the other hand, we do not find significant reduction of volatility 
persistence when the contemporaneous volume series is incorporated, though this 
evidence is inconsistent with the findings of Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990), we 
also find compatible evidence of the findings of Lee and Rui (2002) and 
Bessembinder and Seguin (1993). 
 
5.3.4 Results of the test on the SIAH 
 
Finally, we report the results of the test on the SIAH in table 5.4. We construct VAR 
model, as presented in equations (5) and (6) to examine the lead-lag relations between 
volume and volatility by using Granger causality test, and allow lags up to 5, which is 
one week length. 
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Table 5.4. Granger causality between volume and volatility.  
 
Symbol Market  
H0: Vt →/ 2tσ   H0: 2tσ  →/  Vt  
ACH NYSE 2.5e+08(0.000)*** 3.2647(0.353) 
 SEHK 22.923(0.000)*** 1.5686(0.667) 
CBA NYSE 39.806(0.000)*** 2.2117(0.530) 
 SEHK 32.881(0.000)*** 11.442(0.010)*** 
LFC NYSE 53.296(0.000)*** 2.8106(0.422) 
 SEHK 30.73(0.000)*** 1.5729(0.666) 
CHL NYSE 53.217(0.000)*** 2.4393(0.486) 
 SEHK 46.871(0.000)*** 3.843(0.279) 
CHA NYSE 39.045(0.000)*** 1.3083(0.727) 
 SEHK 29.615(0.000)*** 0.51276(0.916) 
CEO NYSE 51.299(0.000)*** 7.2652(0.064)* 
 SEHK 24.56(0.000)*** 3.8014(0.284) 
GSH NYSE 32.43(0.000)*** 4.8024(0.187) 
 SEHK 46.73(0.000)*** 4.47(0.215) 
PTR NYSE 36.156(0.000)*** 7.2834(0.063)* 
 SEHK 65.029(0.000)*** 2.3009(0.512) 
CHU NYSE 51.387(0.000)*** 7.5388(0.057)* 
 SEHK 49.445(0.000)*** 2.6485(0.449) 
CEA NYSE 45.671(0.000)*** 0.68548(0.877) 
 SEHK 44.212(0.000)*** 1.244(0.742) 
SNP NYSE 8.2505(0.083)* 2.4604(0.482) 
 SEHK 43.708(0.000)*** 2.429(0.488) 
ZNH NYSE 4.6738(0.022)** 0.46437(0.927) 
 SEHK 11.573(0.021)** 7.3979(0.060)* 
HNP NYSE 15.769(0.003)*** 2.3752(0.498) 
 SEHK 16.727(0.002)*** 2.6326(0.452) 
SHI NYSE 75.659(0.000)*** 4.4835(0.214) 
 SEHK 56.216(0.000)*** 2.1963(0.533) 
YZC NYSE 17.137(0.002)*** 2.5422(0.468) 
 SEHK 21.072(0.000)*** 1.0273(0.795) 
NYSE 15 4 Significant 
SEHK 15 2 
Note:*** indicates a less than 1% significant level, ** indicates a less than 5% significant level, * indicates a less 
than 10% significant level 
 
The testing models are:  
 183
2
tσ = 1α  + 2
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kt
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k
k −
=
∑ σβ + ktq
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θ + t1ε     (5)   
tV = 2α  + 2
1
kt
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k −
=
∑ σδ + ktn
k
kV −
=
∑
1
φ  + t2ε     (6)  
The null hypothesis is (1) volume does not cause return volatility, so 
kθ jointly equals to zero; (2) return volatility does not cause volume, so kδ jointly 
equals to zero. Granger causality Wald tests are used, and 2χ statistics with p-value in 
parenthesis are reported in table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 contains results of the set of equations 5 and 6, Granger causality is 
estimated using the Wald. We find significant causality relation from trading volume 
to volatility in 15 ADRs and underlying shares in both markets, and find significant 
causality relation from volatility to trading volume in 4 ADRs and 2 underlying shares. 
This finding is in support of the SIAH and corroborates Darrat, Rahman, and Zhong 
(2003). 
 
5.5 Conclusions  
 
In this paper, we use daily return volatility and de-trended trading volume in 
TGARCH and EGARCH process to incorporate persistence in return volatility. We 
examine the contemporaneous versus lead–lag relations between volume and 
volatility in 15 Chinese ADRs on the NYSE and their underlying shares on the SEHK. 
Our main findings are: first, there are different patterns in leverage effect on ‘bad 
news’ between two markets, as well as various magnitude of volatility persistence 
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over time between the two markets. This may give supportive evidence to our 
findings in chapter 4 that the Chinese ADRs and the H shares have different return 
distributions. 
Second, we find little evidence in support of MDH. The contemporaneous 
correlations are positive and statistically significant in only 3 of the 15 underlying 
shares on the SEHK. And all ADRs and remaining 12 underlying shares do not 
exhibit significant and positive correlation between volume and return volatility. Such 
weak evidence of contemporaneous correlations contradicts the prediction of the 
MDH.  
Third, we find supportive evidence for the SIAH. The trading volume and 
return volatility are found to follow a clear lead–lag pattern in all ADRs and their 
underlying shares. But most of evidence suggests a Granger causality relation from 
trading volume to return volatility, though this is consistent with Darrat, Rahman, and 
Zhong (2003), we suspect the modified Baek and Brock test as developed by 
Hiemstra and Jones (1994) could make a deeper examination on the bidirectional 
relation between volume and volatility. However, due to the limit of time and difficult 
mathematical requirements, we have to leave it as future study.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
This thesis is to explore the issue of the arbitrage of the cross-listed securities by 
looking into a particular setting, the Chinese ADRs. This study is especially interested 
in investigating the securities trading behavior from the market microstructure 
perspective. The new things have been discovered as result of our research and added 
to the knowledge: 1. Differences in return distribution between the ADRs and their 
underlying shares can create arbitrage possibility; 2. Price differentials of the ADRs 
could be caused not only by contemporaneous but also lagged comovement effect; 3. 
Firms’ ownership structure could be one of the factors to affect price differentials 
between the ADRs and their underlying shares; 4. Different liquidity risk and 
illiquidity cost are the factors determining the ADRs price differentials; 5. Differences 
in the investors’ sentiment with bad news cause different volatility between the ADRs 
and their underlying shares. 
First, we have demonstrated that for the cross-listed securities, differences in 
return distribution between the ADRs and their underlying shares may create arbitrage 
possibility. Earlier studies such as Kato et al. (1991), Miller and Morey (1996), and 
Karolyi and Stulz (1996) concluded that ADRs do not present investors with any 
arbitrage opportunities. These papers employed the approaches which only examine 
the locations, such as mean and median of the securities return data. However, we are 
particularly interested in return distributions because recently developed approach, for 
example, the Copula weighted portfolio which is based on the higher moment 
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dependence between markets, has been widely used in international financial 
institutions to exploit arbitrage profit across multiple markets. Therefore, we adopted 
a set of methods to compare both location and shape of two securities return.  
By employing the approach of Kato et al (1991), we compared the mean and 
median of the Chinese ADRs and their underlying H shares return, we could not reject 
the equality of two securities return as Kato et al reported in their paper. On the other 
hand, by employing the approach of Rabinovitch et al (2003) to compare return 
distribution, we found two securities return distributions are different for most of the 
Chinese ADRs. This finding reinforces the study of the ADRs arbitrage that difference 
in higher moments of securities return may create arbitrage possibility. 
Second, we have demonstrated that price differentials between the Chinese 
ADRs and their underlying H shares are caused not only by contemporaneous but also 
lagged comovement effect, and the comovement effect with the US market dominates 
the effect with Hong Kong. We first used two correlation tests as Kato et al (1991) to 
examine pair-wise correlation between two securities’ returns. Our finding of the 
correlation tests are similar to Kato et al (1991) that showed that the returns of the 
ADRs and the underlying stocks are significantly correlated, but these correlation 
coefficients are not close to one, and they suggested the non-overlapping trading hour 
is one of the possible reasons. We then followed the approach of Gagnon and Karolyi 
(2004) to specify the impacts of the US and Hong Kong market returns on each 
individual securities. Our findings are consistent with Gagnon and Karolyi (2004) 
who reported the significant contemporaneous comovement effect. At the same time, 
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we contribute to the literature that we also revealed significant lagged comovement 
effect between market index and the ADRs’ price differentials. Especially, with 
respect to the lagged comovement effect; we find negative and significant exposure to 
the US market index with one lag for all ADRs. This is because ADRs are clearly 
overreacting to innovations in the S&P 500 Index. This finding reinforces the study of 
Kim et al (2000), who reported that the ADRs response to the innovation of the S&P 
500 is large, positive and highly significant at day 0, and followed by a large, 
significant negative price response on day 1.  
Third, we have provided the evidence that apart from country specific factors 
such as local market impact, firm specific attributes such as firms’ ownership 
structure would also affect the ADRs price differentials. Since part of the Chinese 
ADRs listed A shares in Shanghai after they listed H shares and ADRs, we are able to 
examine the impact of the difference in the ownership structure.  
With respect with the return distributions and return spread, we showed an 
obvious structural break between the Chinese ADRs with A shares and those without 
A shares. We rejected the equality of return distribution for most of the ADRs with A 
shares, while rejected the equality of return distribution for only part of the ADRs 
without A shares. In terms of the descriptive statistics of return spread, we found for 
all the Chinese ADRs with A shares but only part of the ADRs without A shares, have 
negative skewness in their return spread. This means the ADRs with A shares tend to 
have lower return than their underlying H shares. This finding reinforces the 
‘Investors’ Recognition Hypothesis’ by Merton (1987), who argued that expected 
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return of the firm’s stock decrease with the size of the investor’s shareholder base.  
Further, with regard to the comovement effect, the ADRs with A shares and 
those without A shares are different in terms of the magnitude of the comovement 
effect. The Chinese ADRs without A shares are usually have larger correlation with 
the US and Hong Kong market indices, than those with A shares. This indicates that 
the ADRs without A shares tend to be more closely correlated with both market 
returns. Further, for the Chinese ADRs with A shares listed in Shanghai, we also 
considered the Shanghai market return, and found isolated market impacts from the 
domestic stock market on three ADRs.  
Fourth, we have showed different liquidity risk and illiquidity cost are the 
factors determining the ADRs price differentials. Our investigation of the liquidity 
effect started from the comparison of the market microstructure and trading costs of 
the China’s domestic stock exchanges and Hong Kong stock exchange. We also 
compared the implicit trading costs of the three China-related stock exchanges with 
those of the US stock exchanges. The results clearly showed the NYSE and NASDAQ 
have the lowest implicit trading costs. Illiquidity reflects the impact of order flow on 
price, namely the discount that a seller concedes or the premium that a buyer pays 
when executing a market order, which results from adverse selection costs and 
inventory costs. Therefore, we employed a measure of the ratio of the daily absolute 
return to the dollar value of trading volume on that day as Amihud (2002) to measure 
daily illiquidity costs. On the other hand, Johnson (2007) demonstrated that the scale 
of liquidity innovations (liquidity risk) is positively related to volume, because 
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intuitively, large changes in liquidity cannot occur without high trading volume, and a 
small amount of trading volume must imply a small change in liquidity. Therefore, we 
use trading volume as alternative measure of liquidity risk. Our findings demonstrated 
trading volume is a better proxy than illiquidity in explaining the ADRs price 
differentials. This finding also provided evidence to the theory of liquidity that the 
difference in the liquidity risk between the ADRs and their underlying shares can 
cause two securities have different prices. 
Finally, we have given the proof that differences in the investors’ sentiment 
with bad news cause different volatility between the ADRs and their underlying 
shares. We have examined the heteroscedasticity of return series and applied two 
General Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models to measure 
return volatility. The two GARCH models we used in this thesis are known as 
asymmetric GARCH models to capture asymmetric characteristics of the 
positive/negative shock (namely good/bad news). We found that the Chinese ADRs 
and their H shares are clearly different in terms of the leverage effect on bad news. 
We showed that the leverage effect of ‘bad news’ for the ADRs is much bigger than 
that for the underlying H shares. This finding supports the ‘Investor’s Sentiment 
Hypothesis’ proposed by De Long et al. (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
which argued stock’s price are likely to be affected by investor’s sentiment. 
However, there also exist some limitations of this study. For example, we 
could make some improvements in liquidity proxy by using the moving variance of 
trading volume, which exactly measures the change of liquidity to measure liquidity 
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risk. On the other hand, in spite of ILLIQ as reported being more likely a noisy 
measure, we also suspected that the statistically insignificant results of ILLIQ may be 
due to our use of daily data, which may increase the variance of ILLIQ data sets, and 
lower the significance level. Further, although we have provided evidence for SIAH 
when examining volume-volatility relation, we have only found significant Granger 
causality from volume to volatility. While the academic literature generally argues 
that volume causes price change and thus volatility, the street perception is volatility 
attracts volume. Some papers reported non-linear Granger causality existed either 
from volume to volatility or the converse by employing advanced methods; we are 
interested in a further study by applying alternative methods in future. 
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